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t\13 TRACT 
Safety training can significantly reduce injury and death among workers. A urvey of fish 
harvesters in Newfoundland in the early 1990s (post-moratorium) found that aU 
participants had incurred some form of injury. There is, however, no published literature 
evaluating the impact of safety training programs in the Newfoundland fishery. This 
thesis examined the impact of a basic and augmented safety-training program on fish 
harvesters and other seafarers. The Marine and Emergency Duties A 1 programme is a 
basic 3-day safety-training course created by Transport Canada that all marine workers 
must complete. A sample of 40 fish harvesters and marine workers were allocated to 
either the basic or an augmented course (referred to as standard group and enhanced 
group respectively). All participants were surveyed before and after the training to assess 
their attitudes, perceptions and knowledge of safety issues. Results indicated an overall 
increase in knowledge in both groups with the enhanced group scoring significantly 
higher than the standard group. Discussion with the participants also revealed changes in 
attitudes toward the Marine Emergency Duties A 1 programme mandate: from a general 
aversion (pre-training) to support for the continuation of the program (post-training). 
\Vhilst there was no significant overall difference in attitudes between the two groups, 
the enhanced group indicated a significant difference in more of the individual attitude 
items and the subscales as compared to the standard group. Further evaluation of the 
programme is necessary to understand its specific strengths and weaknesses as these 
relate to fishing and the industry. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Problem 
Fishing is a traditional occupation that pre dates recorded history. For centuries 
fish harvesters have battled with the dangers of the sea to maximize benefits for all 
(Harrington, 2000; Herbert, 2000). Even today, commercial fishing contributes 
significantly to the economy of countries with large fishing grounds (FAO 2000; 2006). 
Commercial fish harvesters work in harsh weather conditions, limited space, unstable 
boats and often far away from any kind of help - medical or technical (Conway, 2002; 
Norrish & Cryer, 1990). Inherent dangers of fishing include: unpredictable weather, 
unstable working conditions and risk of boats capsizing. Their work is further 
complicated by fatigue, anxiety and physical stress created by the working conditions and 
the requirements of long hours of work during peak season (Neitzel, Berna & Seixas, 
2006). Sophisticated equipment, advancement in technology and learning from lived 
experiences has resulted in improved safety measures for this extremely hazardous 
occupation. Commercial fishing, however, remains a notoriously dangerous occupation 
(Abraham 2000; F AO 2000; ILO 1 999; Meng 1991). 
A comparison of fishing-related fatality rates from countries including Canada, 
Denmark, the Faroe Islands, Greenland, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Russia, the 
U.K. and U.S.A. show that they exceed their national average occupational fatality rates 
(Abraham 2000). More recently, fishing decks have evolved into 'complex industrial 
environments' introducing a range of new risks in this industry (Conway, 2002; Thomas, 
Lincoln, Husberg & Conway, 2001; Neitzel et al., 2996) . For instance, 36% of the deaths 
in Alaskan fishing industry resulted from crammed and slippery decks suggesting that 
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there is a need to examine the relationship between fishing equipment, machinery, the 
vessel and the crew (Thomas et al., 2001). 
[n 2005, 20211 fishing vessels were registered in Canada representing 74% of all 
registered vessels in the country (fransport Safety Board [TSBl, 2005). Statistics from 
TSB (2005) show that fishing vessel accidents accounted for nearly 50% of the shipping 
accidents in Canada over the past 11 years. The TSB also estimated that 83% of the crew 
involved in reported fishing vessel accidents during that period had unknown or no 
formal safety-training certificate. 
Safety training is defined as any activity that aims to increase a person's capacity 
to respond more quickly, efficiently and innovatively to the situation facing them (Hale 
1984; Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001). It is axiomatically entwined with injury reduction 
(Hale, 1984). While education provides a knowledge base from which ali other forms o f 
activities of individuals are determined at subsequent stages, training is less general and 
tends to focus on specific skills or knowledge development. A review of 80 reports on 
workplace health and safety published between 1980 and 1996 shows evidence to 
support the direct and indirect benefits of training to ensure a safe and healthy work 
environment (Cohen & Colligan 1998). Furthermore, research has shown that 
inadequate training or lack of training is a significant contributory factor to workplace 
injury and death of workers (Cohen & Colligan 1998; Lincoln & Conway 1999). Various 
training techniques ranging from abstract education to practical hands-on training have 
been shown to enhance the ability to better deal with risky situations (Salas & Cannon-
Bowers, 2001). Appropriate measurement of the effect of safety training, however, is a 
contentious issue (Cooper & Cotton, 2000; Hale 1984). 
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1.1. Background/ Rationale of thls Study 
The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch keeping 
for seafarers (STCW-F 1995) requires that all seafarers must meet the minimum 
mandatory requirements of basic safety-training. As a signatory to the International 
Maritime Organization's STCW-F 1995 onvention, Canada is required to implement a 
training and certification program for all seafarers which provides seafarers with 
familiarization as well as some basic training on fire fighting, personal safety, social 
responsibility and personal survival techniques. 
In keeping with the STCW-F, Transport Canada (TC, 2009) developed stx 
training courses, effective 1999, to be conducted by schools, shore establishments and 
employers under the Marine Emergency Duties (MED) Program. The Basic Safety 
Course (A 1) is the first of the six courses, which aim to create awareness and 
understanding of hazards, associated with the marine environment and vessels, and to 
provide training for skills that are necessary for survival and appropriate functions in an 
emergency onboard. The A 1 course outlines seven specific topics with a total duration of 
19.5 hours involving both practical demonstrations and classroom participation. 
The Offshore Safety Survival Centre (OSSC) of the Marine Institute (MI), St. 
John's, ewfoundland is approved by TC to conduct MED training programs in 
Newfoundland and Labrador (NL). In addition to the current IED 1 cour e outline, 
the OSSC has developed instructional vide clips to be included in their regular lecture 
materials. The e short clips augment the course by showing participants various 
examples such as how to wear a flotation device, what to do in an emergency, how to 
deploy a life raft and so on. These clips are generally short, lasting about 3-5mins. Only 
when in tructors are talking about certain safety equipment such as a per onal tlotation 
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device (PFD ), do they run the clips showing participants how to wear these. Classroom 
instruction and video clips precede practical sessions where each participant completes 
physical tasks such as wearing PFDs, deploying life rafts, jumping from heights and 
other emergency procedures. 
In 1997, TC (fC, 2009) amended the Crewing Regulations of the Canada 
Shipping Act to mandate marine emergency duties for all fish harvesters. This goal, 
however, co uld not be reached by 2002 for various reasons including insufficient 
resources allocated for the delivery of the course to accommodate the large number of 
fish harvesters who were required to take it at that time. The deadline was thus 
postponed to April 1, 2007 giving all fish harvesters a 10-year time frame to complete 
the course. According to TC, any non-compliance with the MED training requirements 
could result in a fine of up to $10,000 under the Regulations of the Canada Shipping Act. 
Although thls training program has been in place for a very long time and it 
became mandatory for all fish harvesters a decade ago, the MEDA 1 has never been 
evaluated to see how participants perceive the course or indeed if this training enhances 
their skills, challenges their attitudes to safety or increases their knowledge. As the course 
is both a time and cost investment for the fish harvesters and the government, it is 
crucial to investigate the effect it has on fish harvesters. Currently, there is no published 
literature evaluating the impact o f safety-training on seafarers in Newfoundland. 
1.2. Research Question and Objectives 
The purpose of this study is to answer the following question: What is the impact of the 
MEDA 1 training on fi sh harvesters ' and other seafarers ' knowledge and attitudes? 
I have attempted to address this question through the following re earch objectives: 
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Objectives: 
a) To describe fish harvesters' and general seafarers' knowledge of safety 
b) To describe fish harvesters' and general seafarers' attitudes toward safety 
c) To describe fish harvesters' and general seafarers' attitudes toward safety-
training 
d) To evaluate the impact of the regular MEDA 1 training program, and an 
enhanced MEDA 1 training program that incorporated video clips, on fish 
harvesters and general seafarers' knowledge and attitudes. 
1.3. Methodology 
Health is a complex phenomenon that is genetically, politically, culturally and 
socially constructed (Larson, 1999). In this thesis, I explore the concept of health 
through one of its social determinants namely, education. I am especially interested in 
how safety-training, a particular form of education, impacts participants' knowledge and 
attitudes. I have used both quantitative and qualitative research methods to gather 
informacion and analyse data on attitudes/perceptions and knowledge. 
Participants' experiences, emotions, reactions and their thoughts are crucial 
elements to the research process and for the creation of knowledge to the benefit of all 
(Banister, Burman, Parker, Taylor & Tindall, 2002). I do not subscribe to a na'ive realist 
view of qualitative research where I, as a researcher, am simply giving 'voice' to the 
participants, instead, my qualitative analysis involved active participation where I 
selected, edited, listened, spoke and together constructed the meaning of the questions, 
its implications and the answers to these questions (\Vilkinson, 1998). 
16 
My biases are inherent in the question and the selections of themes that I chose 
to represent in my analysis. I approached the research through a social constructivist 
epistemology to analyse data and to explore some of the social determinants of health. 
Under the social constructivist methodology, I used focus group discussions as a method 
to generate and create knowledge that relates to participants' experiences and 
perspectives on safety and safety training. 
Focus groups allow for a dynamic negotiation of meaning in specific context. It 
is arguably one of the strong methodological tools for the construction of meaning and 
knowledge and has been used to explore issues relevant to the person-in-context 
(Wilkinson, 1998). Limitations of the method are discussed in chapter 6. 
1.4. Social Determinants of Health 
number of factors affect the health of workers. The World Health 
Organization (WHO, 2009) defines health as "a state of complete physical, mental and 
social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity." Disease, illness and 
inequalities in health arise as a result of the conditions in which people live, work, grow 
and age (WHO, 2008; Wilkinson & Marmot, 2003). Social and economic policies have a 
determining impact on life and health (Raphael, 2004) . Social and economic conditions 
interact through education, income tability, meaningful work and working conditions 
and collectively they all impact the health of individual workers and in rurn the 
population (Health Canada, 1999). The Commission on Social Determinants of Health 
argues that there is enough evidence to act now on the social determinants of health. It 
urges governments and international organizations to work together to improve 
research, monitoring and training infrastrucrures :v-HO, 2008). 
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One of the most important determinants of health is education and training 
(Raphael 2004). It influences persons' incomes, employment opportunltles and their 
working conditions; it builds their confidence and level of participation and quality of life 
(Health Canada, 1999). Another determinant of health is stable employment: it has a 
significant impact on people's physical, social and emotional health not only because it 
provides them with financial security, but also because it provides them with a sense of 
meaning, identity, social contacts and opportunity for personal growth. Working 
conditions, the work environment, the degree of support in the workplace and stress-
related demands associated with the workplace also affect the health of workers. All of 
these health determinants have consequences and affect the lives of fish harvesters of 
Newfoundland. 
Fishing is a very dangerous occupation and therefore physical and emotional 
safety is a very important determinant of fish harvesters' health. This not only affects the 
fish harvesters, but also their families, as well as their communities since their very 
livelihood depends upon the fishery. Safe, stable source of income and job security are 
important determinants of health. People with higher incomes are often healthier and 
live longer than people with lower incomes (Health Canada, 1999). All the social 
determinants of health are inter-related. The positive impact of one reverberates through 
the other. In this thesis safety-training is viewed as a strategy to improve on some of the 
social determinants o f the health o f fish harves ters. 
1.5. Significance of this Study 
This study will contribute to our understanding of the impact of the MEDA 1 on 
trainees. Seafarers and especially fi sh harvesters have years of experience of dealing with 
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dangers associated with life at sea. They have learned from experiences and generations 
of wisdom on how to deal with hazards of the sea. We need to understand how they 
perceive this course and to what extent they feel that the training and lessons of MEDAl 
connect with their reality. Their reaction to the training is of paramount importance 
since applications of lessons rests in their hands. The result will also be of interest to 
policy makers, proponents of fishing safety, Transport Canada and to those 
organizations that are involved in maritime safety allowing them to refine and enhance 
current programs. 
1.6. Outline of Thesis 
In this chapter, I have briefly described the nature of the problem in fishing 
industry, provided a background to the study and the rationale for conducting this 
research. I presented my research question and objectives and also described the 
methodology used in this thesis. 
In Chapter 2, I reviewed some of the existing literature to describe the magnitude 
of the problem in the fishing industry; identified some of the common causes of 
accidents and presented a model that described accident causation. I then looked at 
safety training in other occupations and also introduced and assessed a training 
evaluation model that is useful in measuring the impact of training. I also looked at 
fisheries and training followed by risk mitigating factors for commercial fishing both 
internationally and nationally before giving an overview of the NL fishery. 
fn Chapter 3, f described the method, design and data collection procedures as 
well as the ethical considerations. l also described the qualitative and quantitative 
methods used in this study to analyse the data. 
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In Chapter 4, I described the pre-training discussions, post-training discussions 
and highlighted some relevant themes that were common to both pre- and post-training 
situations. 
In Chapter 5, I presented statistical analysis of the questionnaire findings and 
highlighted elements that changed as a result of training. 
In Chapter 6, I discussed the results in relation to the literature reviewed earlier. I 
offered some critical analysis of the results and the models used for evaluation; and 
identified some limitations of this research and recommended future directions and 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Magnitude of the Problem 
2.1.1. Extent of Fatality and Injuries in the Fishing Industry 
Work-related hazards contribute significantly to injuries and fatalities worldwide 
(Takala, 1999; Hamalainen, T akala & Saarela, 2006). Work-related hazards or 
occupational hazards are inherent dangers of the work environment that include risk of 
accidents, diseases and deaths (Webster's New World Law Dictionary, 2006). According 
to a recent estimate of global occupational accidents some 970 people die every day 
because of work-related hazards (Hamalainen et al., 2006). There were nearly 350,000 
estimated workplace fatalities and more than 260 million occupational accidents 
worldwide in 1998. It is estimated that one fatality occurs for every 760 occupational 
accidents. Occupational accident and fatality rate in the Established Market Economies 
(EME) are reported to be 3240 and 4.2 per 100,000 person years, respectively. Higher 
than average accident and fatality rates are reported for Italy, Portugal, Spain, USA and 
Canada. Among these EME countries, Canada has the third highest occupational injury 
(4852/100,000) and fatality rates (6.4/ 100,000). 
Commercial fishing is regarded as one of the most hazardous occupations in the 
world today (Abraham, 2002; F AO, 2000; JLO, 1999). Even though less than 1% of the 
global workforce is employed in the fishing industry, the ILO and FAO estimate that 7% 
o f all occupational fatalities occur in this industry alone (Antao, Almeida, J acinto & 
Guedes Soares, 2008; Lincoln, Hudson, Conway & Pescatore, 2002). Meng (1991) 
analysed job related fatalities in 482 occupations in Canada and identified commercial 
fishing to be one of the most hazardous occupations with a fatality rate of 114.65 per 
100,000 person years. More than half of all vessel-related accidents in Canada are fishing 
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vessel related accidents (fSB, 2005). While there has been a significant decrease in 2005 
from 2000-2004 in the yearly average of marine accidents (45, down from 58), fatalities 
(19, down from 28) and injuries (62 down from 84); fishing vessels accidents and 
fatalities still accounted for the most (42% and 83% respectively). 
This pattern of higher accident rates in the fishing industry is also visible in other 
countries, especially in those with large fishing fleets (F AO, 2000; Turner & Petursdottir, 
2002). In New Zealand, the average fatality rate was 260/ 100,000 fish harvesters per year 
between 1975 and 1984 (Norrish & Cryer, 1990). In Britain, fish harvesters are 52.4 
times more likely to have a fatal accident at work than the general workforce (Roberts, 
2002; 2004). Between the years 1976 and 1995, 74% of the deaths that occurred in the 
fishing industry were due to accidents at work with a fatality rate of 103.1 per 100,000 
fish harvester years. Accident and fatality rates amongst all seafarers in the UK were 
reported to be 27.8 times higher than those in the general workforce (Roberts & Marlow, 
2005). Similarly, in Australia, fishing-related fatalities are 18 times higher than those in 
the entire Australian workforce (Driscoll, Ansari, Harrison, Frommer & Ruck, 1994). 
Higher fatality rates in the fishing industry when compared to the general workforce are 
widespread and have been reported in many countries and jurisdictions such as Alaska, 
USA (6.7x), Republic of Korea (16x), Estonia (lOx), Italy (3x), Lithuania (12x), Spain (6x) 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 1993; ILO, 1999). 
Rates for non-fatal injuries are also very high in this industry. Hospitalisation of 
574 fish harvesters between 1991 and 1998 gave an injury rate of 146/ 100,000 fish 
harvesters per year in the Alaskan fishing industry (Thomas eta!., 2001). In Sweden, 431 
serious accidents were reported to a Swedish insurance company between 1983 and 1995 
corresponding to an injury rate of 1200/ 100,000 fish harvesters per year (fa rner & 
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ordling, 2000). [n l ew Zealand, 307 claims were compensated for fishing related 
injury between 1987 and 1988 corresponding to an injury rate of 10,400/ 100,000 fish 
harvesters per year orrish & Cryer, 1990). In Norway, the e timated injury rate 
between 1991 and 1996 was 760/100,000 workers per year (Bull, R.iise & Moen, 2001). 
High rates of injury in the fishing industry are also reported in other countries with large 
fishing fleets. Additionally, insufficient data on the actual number of injuries and deaths 
make it difficult to assess the full extent of the problem. 
2.1.2. Insufficient Data 
Despite such high numbers of fatalities and injuries reported in the literature, it is 
widely acknowledged that the rates may actually be much higher due to under reporting 
of incidents, especially by self-employed harvesters, differing datasets and no formal 
system of data collection (F AO, 2000; ILO 1999; Petursdottir 2002; Wang, Pillay, Kwon, 
Wall & Loughran, 2005). The ILO (1999) estimated that 24,000 fishing related deaths 
occur annually world wide in this industry alone but the F AO contends that the death 
rate is much higher since 90% of the 15 million fish harvesters employed globally are 
employed in small fishing vessels Qess than 24 meters) and a significant portion o f them 
are in countries that do not collate such data (F AO 2000). 
nother problem in clearly defining the magnitude of the problems has to do 
with comparing differing datasets. Countries that collate occupatio nal fatality and injury 
data vary in their classificatio n and system of recording making it difficult to compare 
data (Driscoll et al., 1994; Lo ughran, Pillay, Wang, Wall & Ruxton, 2002; Wagner, 2000; 
Windle, 0lei , Bornstein & 0lavarro, 2005). Additionally, most countries do not have a 
central recording system for fishery -related incidents and accidents and instead rely on 
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several agenc1es and/ or government bodies (be they national or regional). This 
sometimes results in data overlap despite best efforts (fC, 2002) and in some instances, 
indi\·idual cases may slip through the cracks if they do not fall within pre-designated 
categories including self employed individuals who are reputed to work through many 
injuries to avoid income delays (Norrish & Cryer, 1990; Wagner 2000). 
D espite insufficient and inconsistent data collation, the high rates of fishery-
related incidents and accidents point to two very important realities: the hazardous 
nature of the job and the shared global problem, especially for countries with large 
fishing grounds, to do something about it (Conway 2002; FAO 2000). 
2.1.3 Causes of Accidents and Hazards in the Fishing Industry 
Hoyos & Zimolong (1988, p. 9) describe hazard as "the possible effects that 
physical bodies have on other physical bodies as a result of energy transfer." As such 
physical bodies or "hazard carriers" (termed by Skiba 1973 cited in Hoyos & Zimolong, 
1988) could be anything (such as water, fish slime, human beings, ice, wind) and could be 
anywhere with the potential of causing harm and becoming dangerous. A hazard that is 
avoided becomes an incident and a hazard that is not avoided becomes an accident. 
There are many factors that contribute to hazardous conditions leading to 
accidents at ea (Abraham, 2002; An tao et al., 2008; Binkley, 1995; NRC, 1991; 
O'Connor & O'Connor, 2006; TC, 2002). A wide range of studies are dedicated to the 
study of factors that may mitigate, if not eliminate, some of these hazards. Although 
accidents are commonly attributed to single factors in the fishing literature (e.g. vessel-
related, rough weather, man overboard, drowning, deck injurie and o on), more often 
than not, multiple factors interacting with one another are ultimately respon ible 
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(Acheson, 2000; An tao et al., 2008; ILO, 1999; NRC, 1991; Windle et al., 2005). [n this 
complicated web of interacting factors, it is difficult to discern the primary cause from 
the underlying factors that contributed to accidents (NRC, 1991). 
Vessel-related 
Vessel-related factors are one of the most common causes of accidents at sea 
(Abraham, 2002; Driscoll et al., 1994; Harrington, 2000; Thomas et al., 2001). Capsizing, 
fire, sinking, grounding, foundering (excessive water intake) and collision are identified 
as some of the primary causes of vessel-related accidents worldwide claiming half or 
more than half of the fatalities in many countries (Abraham, 2002; Roberts, 2004; 
Thomas et al., 2001; Lincoln & Conway, 1999). Vessel-related accidents account for a 
greater total loss to life and vessel Oin, Kite-Powell & Talley, 2001). The primary causes 
of vessel-related accidents and fatalities are also similar worldwide and include: poor 
condition of vessel, damaged machinery, lack of training in emergency response, not 
wearing personal flotation devices (PFDs), lack of training in the use of survival 
equipment and lack of attention to stability issues Oin & Thunberg, 2005; Lincoln & 
Conway, 1999; Roberts, 2004; TC, 2002; Wang et al., 2005) . 
In Canada, 287 people on vessels died between the years 1990 and 2000; of these 
deaths, 23% were attributed to capsized vessels and 21% to foundered vessels (fC 
2002). \Vhile rough weather was cited as the main cause of accident for some of these 
cases, most of the accidents and fatalities were due to underlying factors such as 
overloaded boats; obstructed drains; open doors and hatches; lack of training in survival 
situations including using specific language to request help, launching a life raft, and not 
wearing PFDs or survival suits. 
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Similarly, a majority of accidents in British fishing vessels were primarily 
attributed to machinery damage (64.4%) followed by foundering and flooding (14.23%) 
and grounding (10.25%; Wang et al., 2005). The underlying causes for these vessel-
related accidents were attributed to multiple interacting factors that include: poor 
maintenance o f equipment, incorrect operation, inadequate training and lack of 
automation. In Australia, vessel-related deaths accounted for 62% o f the fatalities, which 
in turn were caused by non-seaworthiness of vessels, failure to use PFDs and inadequate 
safety-training (Driscoll et al., 1994). It is noteworthy that 11% of the deaths were 
directly linked to job inexperience Qess than 1 year of experience). 
Rough Weather 
Rough weather is a significant and inherent danger of commercial fishing Oin & 
Thurnberg, 2005). It explained 53% of all fishing related fatalities in Australia between 
1982 and 1984 (Driscoll et al., 1994) and 61% in New Zealand between 1975 and 1984 
(Norrish & Cryer 1990). Probability of an accident is significantly higher during rough 
weather, higher wind speed and the winter season Qin & Thurnberg, 2005). Some of the 
underlying factors that magnify weather-related accidents are inaccurate weather 
reporting, restrictive fishing season making it more likely that harvesters will go out for a 
catch despite inclement weather (Power, Neis, Brennan, and Binkley, 2007) and fish 
harvesters, compromising vessel stability by retrofitting and/ or overloading vessels 
(Conway 2002). 
Fall Overboard/Man Overboard 
Man overboard (MOB) is the top ranked non-vessel related cause of injury and 
fatality in the fishing industry in many countries (Abraham, 2002; Lucas & Lincoln, 2007; 
Abraham, 2002; TC, 2002; Bull, Riise & Moen, 200 1). lt accounted for the single largest 
26 
percentage of deaths in the Canadian fishing industry (24%) between the years 1990 and 
2000 (TC, 2002). Internationally, MOB represents almost a quarter of all fishing related 
fatalities: 25% in the US, 33% in Iceland, 20% in Ireland, 30% in Denmark, and 27% in 
Norway (Abraham, 2002). 
MOB typically results from gear entanglement and heavy weather and chances of 
falling overboard are higher when harvesters are working alone (Murray & Dolomount 
1995). \'VOile each fall results from a series of interconnected circumstantial factors, the 
threat to life is magnified when personnel onboard do not wear PFDs or take other 
protective measures (Lincoln & Conway, 1999; Conway & Lincoln, 1995; Lucas & 
Lincoln, 2007; Thomas et al., 2001; Lincoln, Husberg & Conway, 2000). 
Drowning 
Most deaths at sea are the result of drowning (Thomas et al., 2001; Lincoln & 
Conway 1999; TC, 2002). Vessel-related accidents such as capsizing, sinking and non-
vessel related accidents such as MOB, especially in rough weather conditions, put the 
harvester at risk of injury or death. While the primary cause of accidents (such as 
capsizing, MOB, etc.) may not be as detrimental to life, it is the underlying causes such as 
not wearing PFDs, inadequate knowledge of how to operate safety equipment (such as 
life rafts; emergency position-indicating radio beacons [EPIRBs], etc.) that prove to be 
fatal . Falling into the frigid waters off the northern shores of Alaska and Newfoundland 
for instance, causes rapid hypothermia that increases the likelihood of death. 
In Alaska 88% of all the fatalities between 1991 and 1998 were due to drowning 
or hypothermia (Lincoln & Conway, 1999). Between the years 1991 and 1992, drowning 
claimed 94.3% of ail the fatalities (CDC, 1993). The odds of survival for persons wearing 
a PFD are 7.5 times higher than the odds of survival for persons not wearing one 
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(Lincoln & Conway 1999). However, of those who clied in vessel-related accidents 
between the years 1991 and 1998, 72% of the fish harvesters were not wearing PFDs 
even though they were available to them. imilar high rates of non-PFD use in deaths 
due to drowning are seen elsewhere: 8 % in UK (Roberts, 2004); 68% in Australia 
(Driscoll et al., 1994); 94% in New Zealand orrish & Cryer, 1990). 
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Deck Injuries 
Unstable, wet and slippery work surfaces are a signature feature of this 
occupation. Additionally, commercial fishing vessel decks have evolved into an industrial 
environment (Conway, 2002; Thomas et al., 2001; Roberts, 2004; NRC, 1991; Lincoln et 
al., 2000). The extent of injuries and fatalities caused by deck layout, gear and other items 
on the deck have often been cited as a major cause of concern (Thomas et al., 2001; 
Husberg et al., 2001; Bloswick, Husberg & Blumhagen, 2003). Equipment and 
machinery onboard were cited as the cause of 44% of all injuries that required 
hospitalisation between 1980 and 1987 in New Zealand (Norrish & Cryer, 1990). 
More than half of all injuries that occurred in Canada between 1990 and 2000 
were due to fishing gear, machinery onboard or wet and slippery surface (TC, 2002). Fish 
harvesters are more prone to accidents during the 'hauling' and 'shooting' of trawl nets 
(Murray & Dolomount, 1994; Roberts, 2004; Tomer, Karlsson, Saethre & Kadefors, 
1995). Failure to secure openings on decks and below decks directly contributed to 28 
fatalities and at least 20 vessel losses in Canada between 1975 and 1999 (Ayeko, 2000). 
Investigations have consistently found that fish harvesters were not aware that breaches 
of watertight integrity provided by the hatches was detrimental to the vessel and 
subsequently to their safety. 
More than half (57%) of all non-vessel related individual accidents that resulted 
in fatalities in the UK between 1976 and 1995 were due to operations such as haul-in or 
shoot-out of trawl nets (Roberts, 2004). Over 40% of the non-vessel related individual 
accidents were due to gear entanglement in trawling or other equipment on deck. Fish 
harvesters are frequently knocked or dragged overboard and drowned or dragged into 
winches (NRC, 1991). Deck clutter such as nets, wires and ropes and other hazards such 
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as oils and ice make it easy for harvesters to slip and fall (Roberts, 2004; Lincoln et al., 
2000), but often these injuries are under reported as most harvesters consider injuries to 
be a part of their job (Power et al., 2007). 
Government Regulations 
Fisheries management and government regulations that have been put in place to 
reduce pressure on declining fish stocks have increased economic pressure on fish 
harvesters (NRC, 1991; Kaplan & Kite-Powell, 2000; Roberts, 2004). This in turn may 
influence high risk-taking behaviour and decreased attention to safety at sea (Kaplan & 
Kite-Powell, 2000). Some of the regulations that influence risk and contribute to hazards 
include: reduced crew size (creating overworked and tired crew), limited fishing season 
(forcing harvesters to stay out in bad weather or with faulty fishing vessels), limited 
fishing areas (causing congestion), limited vessel length (causing them to build on vessel 
height and create instability) and specific gear allocation (NRC, 1991; Power et al., 2007; 
Kaplan & Kite-Powell, 2000). 
Since the moratoria in the groundfisheries of Newfoundland and Labrador, the 
fish harvesters have also had to face another new challenge: their years of experience 
were turned into inexperience as they learned to adjust themselves to new fisheries 
(Power et aL, 2007). They are often fishing with inappropriate vessels and without 
relevant equipment. Most harvesters are reluctant to discuss safety problems and 
fisheries management because they believe that their voices wi ll not be heard (Kaplan & 
Kite-Powell, 2000). There is, however, an urgent need to incorporate fish harvesters' 
perceptions and comments into the regulation process (Kaplan & Kite-Powell, 2000; 
N RC, 1991; Poggie, Pollnac & Jones, 1995) 
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Crew Factor 
Crew factor are hazards faced by fish harvesters that are specific to their job. For 
instance, the crew aboard some of the large catcher/ processor vessels catch and process 
75 tons of fish into packaged products within 12 hours or less (Neitzel, et al., 2006). 
Noise level from the equipment on some of these large fishing vessels can cause 
permanent noise-induced hearing loss. Fish harvesters have to deal with the hazards of: 
living and working in confined spaces; working with dangerous equipment (to process 
catch); unstable work surfaces; decks and work surfaces covered in oil, fish-slime, ice and 
water (fhomas et al., 2001) . The nature of fishing dictates that workers are away from 
home for a significant period of time and, moreover, in an instance they are required to 
be a fire-fighter, a paramedic, a mechanic and the judge and jury of all matters relating to 
the group while out at sea. These are some of the potential hazards that fish harvesters 
are exposed to by the very nature of their occupation (Binkley, 1995). And, as noted 
previously, often these are the pre-existing conditions that help to exacerbate if not 
actually cause the first in a series of actions leading to accidents. 
Automation 
Marine safety developments in the last decade or so have made significant 
progress in terms of technology and vessel efficiencies through the introduction of 
sonar, radar, global positioning system (GPS), climensions/ quality of fishing holds, 
EPIRBs but less attention has been paid to improvements in human-machine 
interactions (r\ntao et al., 2008). Generally, attention to marine safety has focused on the 
seaworthiness of vessels from an engineering point of view but little attention has been 
addressed to improving vessel designs for safety in context of human factors (Loughran 
et al., 2002; NRC, 1991) 
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For example, automation is a widely hailed advancement of modern technology. 
The underlying assumption of automation is that it reduces human error and workload 
and thereby increases efficiency. While automation does enhance efficiency and mitigate 
risks, in some contexts it can contribute to risk (Power eta!., 2007; Hetherington, Flin & 
Mearns, 2006). Increased reliance on automation (particularly for navigation) has meant 
that seafarers must now learn to operate, identify possible faults and constantly be 
vigilant of the machines at work. Hetherington et al. (2006) argued that these in turn 
impose increased cognitive demand on the already reduced workforce thereby increasing 
the risk of error. 
It has also been argued that automation induces cognitive laxity (Lutzhoft & 
Dekker, 2002). Lutzhoft and Dekker (2002) used the example of the R!Jyal Majesty vessel 
which ran aground as a result o f incorrect GPS positioning despite contradictory 
information from all other radars. This illustrates the extent to which fish harvesters 
have come to rely on some newer and supposedly superior forms of technology (such as 
GPS) or other forms of technology (such as radar). Reliance on automation has 
consequences and it does not simply replace human work with machine work, but 
instead can create new human weaknesses and magnify existing ones (Lutzhoft & 
Dekker, 2002). 
Human Factors 
Evidently, the literature suggests a multifaceted causal factor of accidents. Due to 
a lack of systematic and uniform causal analysis, however, what is being overlooked is 
the overwhelmingly significant contribution of human factors toward accident causation 
(Abraham, 2000; Antao et a!., 2008; NRC, 1991; O'Connor & O'Connor, 2006). Human 
factors here are defined in broader terms than just human behaviour, error, ignorance 
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and incorrect decisions (which are commonly identified in most literature), to include 
decision making at a higher level such as the policy level, skipper level and the level of 
the individual crew member and any human attribute that has any bearing on safety 
(NRC [National Research Councill, 1999). Human factors have long been cited as a 
major source of concern, but their magnitude has not been sufficiently appreciated by 
marine accident investigations which tend to focus on primary causes (such as machine, 
weather or human behaviour [Harrington, 20001) without looking into the underlying 
causes (such as whether right decisions or qualification standards were met which may 
have triggered the series of events (NRC, 1991). 
Indication of the role of human factors as playing whether a latent or an active 
role, in the causation of accidents, is visible in most maritime safety literature. 
Hetherington et al. (2006) identified 20 studies in maritime safety that shows how human 
factors permeated through design Issues, personnel tssues and 
organizational/ management issues. They proposed that monitoring and modifying 
human factor issues would contribute to greater safety in the industry. This is explained 
further by applying Reasons model to the fishing industry. 
2.2. Reason's Model 
An accident occurs when hazards (whether active or latent) are ignored on 
multiple levels as exemplified by the studies above (e.g., Hetherington et al. 2006; NRC, 
1991). This was best described by James Reason (1990). Reason's model of accident 
causation, also known as the Swiss cheese model (Reason, 2000), was developed 
primarily to understand what underlying forces were at play that governed thoughts and 
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actions of the workers and caused some of the relatively non-random errors. He 
approached the problem using a systems approach. 
Reason (2000) argued that the widespread and traditional use of the person 
approach to error management relied heavily on identifying the individual or group of 
individuals responsible for errors, thereby isolating the system error. In the person 
approach, risk management relies heavily on a culture of trustworthy reporting (of 
incidents, near misses and accidents) and on a reactive strategy that tries to reduce 
unwanted variability in human behaviour. The fishing industry is an example where 
much emphasis has been placed on identifying person error and remedies have tended to 
focus on the idea that fish harvesters needed to be guided on how to fish safely (NRC, 
1991). 
The system approach on the other hand views errors as part of human nature 
and focuses on changing the conditions in which humans work by building a system of 
defences. Here, errors are seen as a consequence not the cause of system failure. 
The Swiss cheese model depicts a number of defensive layers - one standing 
behind another "on guard" (Fig. 1). The first layer consists of defences that should 
mitigate the risk. Second is the unsafe act itself, the third consists of preconditions, the 
fourth is line management and the fifth consists of high-level decision makers. In the real 
world, these layers are never as solidly intact as one would hope for, instead they are full 
of "active" and "latent" holes (hence the name Swiss cheese), that open and close to 
accommodate the changes of our dynamic world (Reason, 2000). 
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Accident Causation model 
( By James flea son ) 
Act!VIIt 
Lafont lolenl 
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Figure 1: Reason's Model (Petursdottir, 2002) 
The presence of holes in any particular layer in itself does not result in an adverse 
situation. It is the momentary alignment of the holes in each layer that brings a hazard in 
direct contact with the victim. The holes are the result of active failure within a layer 
(such as slips and mistakes, inexperience and other obvious hazards) or some latent 
conditions embedded in a layer (such as top level decisions made by policy makers, 
safety-training, regulators, vessel designers, government, etc.) which may have an adverse 
effect on safety but are more subtle and are usually dormant until they combine with 
active failures or other local triggers. 
T he accident causation model can be applied to the fishing industry to get a 
better and in-depth understanding of where errors most often occur and how to mitigate 
if no t eliminate them altogether. The FAO (Petursdottir, Hannibalsson & Turner, 2001), 
for instance, used Reason's model on a hypothetical situation to show how the ho les 
alit,rned in each layer of defences to result in a tragedy common to the fi shing industry: 
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Country X does not mandate safety training for newcomers (decision layer), nor does the 
owner of a fishing vessel require the skipper to conduct safety drills onboard (decision 
and line management). An inexperienced fish harvester is asked to substitute for an 
unwell, experienced crew member (line management). The weather IS rough 
(preconditions), everyone is fatigued (preconditions) and the inexperienced newcomer 
goes too close to deck gear (unsafe act). Vessel motion causes him to lose his balance 
and fall on a winch which does not have proper guard (defence) thereby severing his 
arm. Here, the accident occurred as a result of holes of each layer aligning at the "right" 
moment for the hazard to come into direct contact with the victim. 
Commercial fishing is laden with active failures and latent pathogenic factors that 
contribute to the high number of accidents at sea. The risks have long been recognized 
nationally and internationally as evidenced in the literature reviewed earlier. Attempts to 
alleviate some of the risks have mainly focused on eliminating active failures by, for 
example, identifying and addressing the diverse causes of accidents at sea. To use 
Reason's words: 
"(A)ctive failures are like mosquitoes. They can be swatted one by one, but they 
still keep coming. The best remedies are to create more effective defences and to 
drain the swamps in which they breed. The swamps, in this case, are the ever-
present latent conditions." (2000, pg.769) 
One of the ever-present latent conditions of accident causation In the fishing 
industry is the lack o f safety-training (Peturdottir, 2002). In the example cited above, a 
lack of training in first aid could result in the loss of an arm or even death of the 
newcomer o r it could save his life and arm if met with appropriate actions (not to 
mention that safety-training could have prevented the newcomer from venturing too 
close to the unprotected winch, and the winch would not have been left unprotected). 
Although concerted efforts must be directed at reducing the number of holes in each 
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layer of defence, this study is concerned with the role of safety-training in mitigating 
some of the risks of this industry. 
2.3. Safety-training In Other Occupations 
Training is an axiomatic part of injury reduction. Hale (1984) defines training as 
any activity that aims to increase a person's capacity to respond more quickly, efficiently 
and innovatively to the situation facing them. There has been a dramatic increase in 
training in organizations in recent years, so much so that there is now a tendency to 
incorporate training as a strategic part of organizational plans instead of a separate or 
stand-alone event (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001). 
A cursory review of literature on the impact of training suggests there are two 
opposing camps: those that say training works (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001) and those 
that question the adequacy of training (Darragh, Stallones, Bigelow & Keefe, 2004; Tan, 
Fishwick, Dickson & Sykes, 1991). For example, in one study industrial workers who 
had received safety-training prior to commencing work showed no significant reduction 
in the incidence of hand injuries compared to those without training (Tan et al., 1991). 
Measures such as guards on machines were believed to be more successful in preventing 
accidents in high-risk industries than stand-alone safety-training aimed at changing 
behavioural patterns. 
[n the logging industry, companies that participated in a safety-training program 
showed no significant decline in injury claim rate compared to companies that did not 
participate (Bell & Gruscheky, 2006). There were also no significant decline in the injury 
rates amongst the participant companies following the safety-training program. 
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Mechanizing logging tasks, employee retention and performance inspections were 
suggested as possible ways to address the high injury rates o f this industry. 
The construction industry, also notorious for high injury and fatality rates, did 
not show any decline in injury rates following a safety education and training program 
(Darragh et al., 2004). Methodological problems with the evaluation of safety-training 
program such as designing the intervention plans and integrating it with plans for 
evaluation from the start were cited as possible limitations. 
In other areas, training programs have been shown to tncrease knowledge 
(Dauer, Kelvin, Horan & St. Germain, 2006), reduce injuries, induce positive attirudes 
and willingness to change worksite conditions (Becker & Morawetz, 2004; Cohen & 
Colligan, 1998), to name a few benefits. In an evaluation of a safety orientation and 
training program in the plumbing and pipefitting industry only 3.4% of workers who had 
received safety orientation experienced injury compared to 11.1% of workers without 
safety orientation (Kinn, Khuder, Bisesi & Woolley, 2000). Similarly, 42% of emergency 
responders who had previous safety training claimed that they had experienced incidents 
which might have resulted in their injury or death without the training (Weidner, Gotsch, 
Delnevo, Newman & McDonald, 1998). Construction workers who received safety 
training were 12% less likely to claim for workers compensation than workers without 
the training (Do ng, Entzel, Men, Chowdhury & Schneider, 2004). 
Organizations are increasingly investing in learning technologies and other 
methods o f continuous performance improvement p rocesses in o rder to remain 
competitive and to cater to the needs of an increasingly diverse workplace population. In 
today's information age, for example, workers are no lo nger confined to office spaces 
but can instead work from the convenience of their homes (Harrington & Walker, 2004). 
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Ensuring health and safety of dispersed employees can prove to be a challenge for 
employers of this dynamic job market. Innovative training strategies such as using 
computer based training programs have helped to reach out to a wider work population 
(Harrington & Walker, 2004; Wallen & Mulloy, 2006). 
Training techniques such as using notification messages or mass presentations to 
inform workers of occupational health risks have also proven to be effective (Tan-
Wilhelm et al., 2000). A group of workers receiving bulletin, posters and stickers, 
containing information on beryllium risk, showed significant increase in the perceptions 
of threat, more positive attitudes toward safety practices and behaviour than those 
without. Face-to-face training such as teaching in a classroom to train hairdressing 
students on the hazardous nature of chemical handling practices also show positive 
associations between participants' knowledge and risk perceptions and their intention to 
practice safe behaviour (Wong et al., 2005). 
A few authoritative reviews suggest that perhaps it is not training that is at fault; 
rather, there maybe a mismatch between the requirements of training and the level of 
analysis. The Annual Review of P!Jchology has produced six reviews on training and 
development over the past 40 years (see Campbell, 1971; Goldstein, 1980; Latham, 1988; 
Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001; Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992; Wexley, 1984). Two reviews 
(Tannenbaum & Yukl 1992; Salas & Cannon-Bowers 2001) have focused on describing 
emerging trends to argue that training effectiveness can be enhanced by keeping the 
following factors in mind: needs assessment, pre-training conditions, training design and 
methods, post-training conditions, and training evaluation. These reviews help inform 
our understanding o f whether or not training works and if so, when, how and why it 
actually improves safety. 
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2.4. Kirkpatrick's Model of Training Evaluation 
Among the various models for evaluating the effectiveness of training, 
Kirkpatrick's (1979, 1996) four-level model of training evaluation is considered the most 
influential (Alliger & Janak, 1989; Alliger et al., 1997; Bates, 2004; Kraiger, Ford & 
Salas, 1993; Russell, Wexley & Hunter, 1984; Thackwray, 1997). This model, developed 
five decades ago, revolutionized the area of training evaluation and until today, remains 
one of the most commonly used approaches (Alliger et al., 1997; Bates, 2004; Beech & 
Leather, 2006; Thackwray, 1997). 
Within this framework, questions about the effectiveness of training are defined 
within specific categories: reaction, learning, behaviour and result. It is conceptually the 
most appropriate framework for the present study because the model outlines that the 
objectives of training should determine the appropriate assessment criteria. So effective 
evaluation of training revolves around the question: effective in terms of what: reactions, 
learning, behaviour and/ or results? 
Kirkpatrick argued that the first step of any training evaluation is to measure the 
reactions to training. He defined this as a measure of the degree to which trainees liked 
or disliked a particular training program. He cautioned that while this is the same as 
evaluating trainees feeling toward a program, this does not measure or indicate if any 
learning has taken place. It is, however, important to evaluate reaction in order to 
understand and scan the general feeling. To evaluate reaction, he suggested using forms 
that are pre-designed to elicit specific infurmatiun, such as: 
i) Identifying specifically what we want to find out; 
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ii) Using a written sheet to list the specified items above for participants' 
comments; 
iii) Designing the form such that their reactions can be quantified and tabulated; 
iv) Making the forms anonymous to help obtain honest reactions; 
v) Providing space for additional comments that were not covered by pre-
designed questions. 
Evaluation of learning is more difficult than the evaluation of reaction. 
Kirkpatrick acknowledged and limited the definition of learning as the extent to which 
participants understood and absorbed knowledge, principals/ learning objectives and 
skills delivered in the training course. He recommended using experimental research 
methods such as a before-and-after approach, measuring each participant's knowledge 
objectively, using multiple choice tests or behavioural tests when facts and principles are 
being taught, and using statistical analysis and control groups whenever possible. He 
contended that the marketability and status of a training program is proven by how 
effective it has been in terms of its learning and reaction evaluation. He suggested that to 
evaluate learning, we need to: 
i) Measure each participant's knowledge to obtain quantitative results; 
ii) Use a pre- and post-training approach to relate learning to the trammg 
program; 
iii) Measure learning on an objective basis; 
iv) Use a control and experimental group to measure the effects of training; 
v) Use statistical analysis to prove learning in terms of correlations o r 
confidence intervals. 
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The third assessment criterion IS behaviour. Behaviour evaluation measures the 
transfer of knowledge and skills learnt in training back to the job. This is more difficult 
to measure than learning. To evaluate training programs in terms of behavioural changes, 
he suggested: 
i) A systematic appraisal of before and after the specific trained behaviour has 
taken place; 
ii) An appraisal of behaviour by the participant, their supervisor(s), peers who 
are familiar with the individual's professional development and so on (the 
more the better); 
iii) Statistical analysis of performance before and after training that relates the 
change to the training; 
iv) Post-training appraisals should be conducted after 3 months or more to 
allow participants to put in practice what they learnt; 
v) Using a control group for comparison. 
Finally, results evaluation measures the impact of training on the organization m 
terms of the its stated desires and goals (such as performance and profitability). This is, 
by far, the most difficult to measure given that there are several extraneous variables 
affecting an organization. Kirkpatrick gave examples of and suggested a participative and 
collaborative approach to evaluating results. 
Critics o f the Kirkpatrick model have argued that while its popularity and power 
lie in its simplicity, this is also its weakness (Alliger & Janak, 1989; Alliger et al., 1997; 
Bates, 2004; Kraiger et al., 1993). As mentioned previously, there are factors on an 
individual and o rganizational level that can influence training effectiveness before, during 
and after the training process (Tannenbaum & Yukl 1992; Salas & Cannon-Bowers 
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2001). The model does not consider or account for the complex network of these factors 
that surround and interact. 
Unfortunately, implicit assumptions within the model have led to 
misunderstandings and overgeneralizations (Alliger & Janak, 1989; Alliger et al., 1997; 
Bates, 2004; Kraiger et al., 1993). The first implicit assumption of the model is that these 
levels provide information that is in some ascending order in terms of value (Alliger & 
Janak, 1989; Bates, 2004). For example, a measure of behaviour provides more 
information than does a measure of learning which in turn provides more information 
than a measure of reaction. In this regard, level four is assumed to be the best indicator 
of training effectiveness. Advocacy for bottom-line dollar criteria at level four thus 
became more frequent in research journals, practitioner journals and textbooks even 
when, in reality, this may be an inappropriate measure. Also, not all training is meant to 
effect change at all four levels. For instance, a measure of reaction is sufficient to detect 
company pride. 
A second critique of the model is the interpretation that each level is causally 
linked to the other. This assumption has led to a linear view of the model (Fig. 2) such 
that positive reactions are assumed to lead to greater learning which influences positive 
behaviour which translates to positive organizational results (Alliger & Janak, 1989; 
Alliger et al., 1997; Bates, 2004). Unfortunately, this has led to a widespread belief that a 
positive measure of reaction can serve as a proxy measure for training outcomes at other 
levels (Bates, 2004). One study, for instance, found that over 94% of training evaluations 
in business organizations used reaction measures as an indicator of training effectiveness 
(Bassi, Benson & Cheney, 1996; study cited from Bates, 2004). ,\lliger and Janak (1989) 
have presented an alternative \'iew of the causal linkages among the levels where level 
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one is unrelated to the other levels, lev I two is important to some degree to level three 
and four, and levels three and four are causally interdependent on each other (Fig 2). 
Result 
Reaction 
a. Traditional model b. Alternative Model 
Figure 2: Traditional Hierarchical Model vs. Alternative Model. Adapted from 
Alliger and Janak (1982) 
Despite its limitations, Kirkpatrick's model has made significant contributions to 
evaluating training over the years and has helped focus training evaluation practices on 
training outcomes (Newstrom, 1995). It has also helped to show that single outcome 
measures are not sufficient to evaluate training and promoted the importance of multiple 
measures of training effectiveness (Bates, 2004). The model distinguishes between 
learning 0evel two) and behaviour 0evel three) and has thereby promoted an awareness 
of the learning transfer process that is crucial in making training effective. Most 
important of all, it serves as a useful preliminary heuristic for training evaluation (Aluger, 
et al. 1997; Alliger & Janak, 1989; Bates, 2004). 
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2.5. Fisheries and Training 
Some countries have started to legislate safety-training for fish harvesters. 
Norway was the first country in the world to start a systematic training program for fish 
harvesters (Langaune, 2000). Safety Training for Fishermen (STF) started as a trial 
project in 1981 comprising a 2-day curriculum that emphasized rescue and fire 
protection. By 1989, regulations were drawn up to mandate STF for all personnel 
onboard with course duration of 40 hours and a refresher course of 20 hour after a 6-8 
year gap. The course was comprised of basic safety-training in the areas of fire fighting, 
working conditions, protective measures, first aid and hazard recognition. The program 
was evaluated in 1989 and 1996 concluding that training increased participants' 
knowledge about and attitudes toward the importance of workplace safety (Langaune, 
2000). The number of work related fatalities also declined when comparing data from 
before 1981 to that from recent years. By August 2000, nearly 27,000 people (the 
majority being fish harvesters) had participated in the course. The number of people 
participating in refresher courses was less than the number of people participating in the 
basic course due to out-migration of experienced fish harvesters to other occupations. 
Experienced fish harvesters were being replaced with inexperienced fish harvesters. 
Similarly, Icelandic authorities established a safety-training centre, The Maritime 
Safety and Survival Training Centre (MSSTC) in 1985 onboard the vessel Saebjorg, to 
train fish harvesters in basic safety and survival and accident prevention at sea 
(Snorrason, 2000). The primary objective of the MSSTC training was to increase fish 
harvesters' knowledge of safety issues. It presently offers a 40-hour course (extended 
from the initial 30 hours) and by the end of 1999, a total of 15,000 seafarers had 
participated in the course. In addition to a reduction in the number of accidents at sea, 
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Snorrason (2000) cites its popularity and acceptance by the seafarers as a strong 
indication of its success. The Jaeijory, has called at every seaport of Iceland making it 
easier for trainees to attend the course by minimizing travel and living expenses. By 1999 
all of the Nordic countries to some extent were offering safety-training for fish 
harvesters (with Finland being the last to join in). \Vhile safety program varies in the 
length, financial support, mandatory requirement for training and training style, the 
courses revolve around similar training elements: accident prevention, rescue, first aid, 
safety apparatus, safe work environment, fire prevention and fire fighting (Petursdottir, 
2002). 
2.6. Risk Mitigating Factors: Global (FAO/ILO/STCW) 
Internationally, safety in the fishing industry is extended through the help o f 
global organizations such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) of the United Nations (UN) . These international organizations, together with 
Nation States, have developed several conventions, regulations and guidelines focusing 
on safety at sea. Some of the prominent ones are discussed below. 
One of the first-ever international conventions that dealt with safety at sea was 
SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea; IMO, 1974; Petursdo ttir et al., 2001). This was held in 
London in 19 14. Prompted by the 1911 Titanic disaster, SOLAS stipulated the minimum 
standards for design, construction, equipment and operation of ships. While regarded as 
the most important o f all international treaties, SOL-\S did not cover fi shing vessels or 
o lder ships that were not propelled by machines. Subsequently, SOLAS 60 approved 
three resolutions that were directly applicable to fishing vessels by requiring vessel 
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stability; rescue equipment on board and calling upon governments to report to IMO on 
the extent to which SOLAS was being implemented on these vessels. 
Another important international convention that related to safety at sea was the 
UN Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 (Petursdottir et al., 2001). This convention gave 
nations rights and responsibilities to maintain their marine resources and stipulated that 
each state should exercise its jurisdiction, administrative control and social matters 
related to ships flying its flag. Furthermore, the flag nations were responsible for taking 
necessary steps to ensure that ships were compliant with safety at sea regarding: 
equipment, vessel construction, vessel seaworthiness, manning of vessels, crew training, 
communication maintenance, using signals and preventing collisions. The idea was that 
while each state is free to deal with safety issues of vessels flying their flag, the stipulated 
safety initiatives meet international standards and must be compliant with international 
regulations. 
The first ever international convention that dealt directly with the safety of 
fishing vessels was the Torremolinos International Convention for the Safety of Fishing 
Vessels 1977 (lMO, 1977; Petursdottir et al., 2001). Fo rmulated along the lines of 
SOLAS, this convention outlined stability requirements for fishing vessels for the first 
time ever in an international convention; requirements for equipment and watertight 
integrity; fire fighting and protection, lifesaving equipment, emergency procedures, 
protection of crew, mustering and drills, radiotelegraphy and radiotelephony and 
onboard navigational equipment. The problem with this convention was that many 
member states felt that the requirements were either too strict or too lenient for their 
fishing fleet. Subsequently, a protocol to the convention was prepared but it is yet to be 
ratified by the nation states. 
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International organizations (ILO / lMO / F AO) have also assisted in research and 
publication of documents that are aimed at improving the occupational health of fish 
harvesters such as the Code of Safety for Fishermen and Fishing Vessels, Part A and B; 
the Voluntary Guidelines for the Design, Construction and Equipment of Small Fishing 
Vessels; the Document for Guidance on the Training and Certification of Fishing Vessel 
Personnel (Wagner, 2000). These documents are intended as educational tools and 
guides to supplement but not supersede any of the existing national/ international 
regulations. 
Additionally, the ILO has also had several meetings at the international level to 
discuss and promote dialogue between the various sectors in the fishing industry (ILO, 
1999; Wagner, 2000). The Tripartite Meeting on Safety and Health in the Fishing 
Industry is one such example that brought together international governments, 
employers and employees of the fishing industry (Wagner, 2000; lLO, 1999). Drawing 
on literature from around the world, a report was prepared by the ILO secretariat for 
discussions at the meeting that identified how some countries had extensive training 
programs (often reflecting the guidelines provided by the various international 
organizations) whilst others had none or was very limited. The three representative 
parties negotiated extensively before prioritising health and safety-training as an area in 
need of urgent improvement and also agreeing that the Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW)-F convention be ratified and fully 
implemented. 
The STCW- 1978 (IMO 1978) was one of the first internationally agreed 
Conventions that addressed the minimum standards of training for seafarers but was 
never ratified. Revised in 1995 (STCW-F, 1995), the STCW-F contained special 
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recommendations for crews on fishing boats. It stipulated that fish harvesters must 
complete a basic safety-training course in survival techniques, fire fighting, emergency 
procedures and first aid. Although this has not yet been ratified, the application of this 
convention has exceeded the minimum requirements in some countries while it is 
virtually absent in others. Canada, along with some countries in Europe, South America 
and Australia, has implemented STCW-F's requirements into their training programs. 
Commercial fish harvesters are now mandated under the Crewing Regulations of Canada 
Shipping Act to participate in a Marine Emergency Training program. 
These conventions, documents, protocols and guidelines are few amongst others 
that evidently point toward the enormous efforts made at the international level to 
mitigate some of the risks and to improve safety at sea (Wagner, 2000; Petursdottir et al., 
2001). While there seems no shortage of regulations and guidelines at the international 
levels, it is apparent that in many cases there is a serious lack of implementation at the 
national level and that the benefits are not reaching a majority of the harvesters for 
various reasons, including the fact that most of these standards/ regulations are yet to be 
ratified (Wagner, 2000). 
2.7 Risk Mitigating Factors: National 
In Canada, legislative authority over vessel safety falls under three governmental 
departments: the Marine Safety Branch of Transport Canada is the federal representative 
body to regulate safety in the fishing industry. The Transportation Safety Board of 
Canada (TSB), under Transport Canada is responsible fur investigating accidents whilst 
the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) under the Department of Fisheries and Oceans 
(OFO) is responsible for search and rescue operations and for promoting safety in the 
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industry. In addition to these, Newfoundland also has a host of other agencies that are 
either pro-actively engaged in or play an important role in the safety of fishing vessels 
such as the Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary, Marine Institute (l\-fl) of Memorial 
niversity, and the Professional Fish Harvesters' Certification Board (PFHCB) to name 
a few. 
The oldest piece of legislation that governed marine safety in Canada was known 
as the Canada Shipping Act (CSA, 2009). This was based on the Bn'tish Shipping Merchant 
Act 1894 of more than 100 years ago. On July 1, 2007, the CSA was replaced by the 
Canada Shipping Act 2001 (CSA 2001). This is the principal legislation in Canada that 
governs marine safety for all vessels operating within Canadian waters and for all 
Canadian vessels operating in all waters. The objectives of the CSA 2001 are to protect 
the health and well being of individuals and crew of vessels participating in marine 
transportation; promote safety and an efficient marine transportation system; ensure that 
Canada meet its international obligations and agreements with respect to shipping and 
navigation; and to promote harmonization and protection of the marine environment 
from navigation and shipping related damages. This new Act has shifted from being an 
inspection-based regime (under the previous one) to a compliance-based regime. It is 
less prescriptive than the previous one and places more emphasis on owner and operator 
responsibilities. 
An important set of Regulations that came into effect as a result of the CSA 200 l 
is the 11/arine Personnel Regulations. These regulations are divided into three parts and are 
concerned with safety, health and well being of individuals and crew, and ensuring that 
Canada meets its international obligations. The first part of these regulations deal with 
certificates of competency for eafarer and, a a signatory to the international 
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convention on STCW, these regulations outline the specific knowledge, skills and 
abilities required to function appropriately on Canadian vessels. 
The Marine Emergency Duties (MED) training courses deal with basic safety at 
sea with regard to emergency response to fire, first aid and ship abandonment. MED 
training has been mandatory in Canada since the late 1970's on large commercial vessels, 
but under the Crewing Regulations of the CSA, this course became mandatory for all 
seafarers on July 31, 2000. This deadline was later extended to July 2002 and 
subsequently to April 30, 2007 due to a lack of resources required for the 
implementation of these courses. The MED courses have been modified in accordance 
with the STCW requirements and continue to be mandatory for all seafarers under the 
Man·ne Personnel Regulations of the new CSA 2001. 
There are three MED courses: A 1, A3 and A4. MEDA 1 is the standard course 
consisting of 19.5 hours of training. It provides information on how to recognize and 
react to hazards and emergencies; how to deploy, store and care for safety equipment; 
how to provide assistance for self and others during an evacuation; and the knowledge 
and skills necessary for survival and rescue at sea. The MEDA 1 is a combination of in-
class lessons and hands-on practical lessons especially on extinguishing fires and using 
survival skills and safety equipment in the water. Although the MEDA3 and MEDA4 
also provide knowledge of basic safety at sea, these rwo courses are much shorter and 
comprise of 8 hours of in-class instruction only. The MEDA3 is limited to vessels 
operating no more than 25 miles from the shore and the MEDA4 is limited to vessels 
operating no more than 2 miles from the shore. In Newfoundland and Labrador, TC-
approved MEDAl courses are offered only at the MI while the MEDA3 is offered 
through the Professional Fish Harvesters' Certification Board (PFHCB). In 1997, the 
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PFHCB in Newfoundland became operational under proclamation of the Professional 
Fish Harvesters Act of the Newfoundland government (PFHCB, 2009) . 
In the early 1990s, the concept of professionalization came about as a strategic 
way to restructure the fisheries: to give it stability and recognition in the wake o f the 
moratorium (PFHCB, 2009). The objectives were to promote fish harvesters as a 
professional group, to standardize levels o f training and experience, and to play a greater 
role in the management of the fishing industry. It was discussed at the community level 
by fish harvesters and the FFAW, DFO, D epartment of Fisheries and Agriculture and 
other government agencies and educational institutes. Three certification levels were 
created: apprentice, level I and level II. Existing fish harvesters were 'grandparented' into 
this new system. With the exception of level II, all other harvesters were required to 
complete a specified number of hours fishing with a level II and complete some 
education/ training to upgrade to the next level. Also, fish harvesters needed to be at 
level II for DFO to consider access to species license. New entrants were required to 
register under the sponsorship of a professional skipper and only after a defined number 
of years of fulltime fishing activity and the completion of a basic safety-training course 
(which includes some of the MED training) were they allowed an upgrading to the next 
level. 
2.8. Overview of the Newfoundland Fishery 
Fishing is an integral part of Newfoundland culture. The settlement of 
Europeans in the early 1800s was dri,·en by the abundance of fish and it was the fisheries 
that laid down the foundation, culture and norm of the settler society that subsequently 
built itself as ewfoundland (Schrank, 2005). Fishing was initially a seasonal activity that 
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gradually changed with favourable market conditions and when Great Britain realized the 
economic advantages to having a more permanent base in Newfoundland. By the 1800s, 
Newfoundland was reputed to be the world's largest exporter of salt codfish (Murray, 
Macdonald, Simms, Fowler, Felt, Edwards & Gates 2005; Newfoundland and Labrador 
Heritage, 2005). 
The lives of the earlier fish harvesters were such that they were tied to merchant 
companies that provided, on credit, supplies and the necessary equipment for fishing 
whilst taking fish in return for the goods. Fishing soon became a family tradition where 
all family members (male and female; young and old) had some part to play in the whole 
process starting from sailing or rowing out to catch the fish to splitting, salting, tending 
and drying. By the 1880s, fisrung was at its peak with a population of 200,000 people 
residing in the various coastal communities and 99% of the male work force engaged in 
the fishery business. Fishery related products became the colony's main (90%) export 
(Roy 1997; Murray et al., 2005; Newfoundland and Labrador Heritage, 2005). 
This extensive fishing enterprise brought its own set of challenges to 
occupational health and safety. Fish harvesters are the product of many generations of 
experiences and therefore rely heavily on career-wisdom (Gray, 1987). Surviving 
situations that involved risks increases their acceptance and accommodation of even 
greater risks. An earlier report on the occupational health and safety in the Atlantic 
fishery of Canada (Gray, 1987) portrayed how the seemingly non-existent government 
regulation of occupational health and safety, no established employer/ employee 
relationship Q1ence no accountability for occupational health anJ safety), lu\ le el uf 
formal education and a lack of clear understanding of the risks involved, compounded 
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by the physical demands of the job, had significant impact on the health and well-being 
of workers in the industry. 
Over time, extensive foreign fishing, industrialization and economic 
diversification in Newfoundland and Labrador had a detrimental impact on the fishing 
industry (Schrank, 2005). By the late 1960s, groundfish stocks in particular, had been 
severely damaged due to foreign over fishing. Canada declared a 200-mile economic 
exclusion zone in 1976 to reduce the amount of foreign fishing off the coast of 
Newfoundland, but domestic fishing filled the gap. Realizing the immense pressure on 
fish stocks, the federal government declared a moratorium in 1992 for a two-year period, 
but it soon became evident that the moratorium would need to be extended far beyond 
the stipulated period because of the continued depletion of the fish stock (Murray et al., 
2005). 
Fish harvesters consider their job as a way of life and an identity (Murray, 2007; 
Murray & Rodgers 2005). This strong bond and their sense of pride in the job is a result 
of generations being raised in fishing communities. Indeed commercial fishing has been 
described as an occupational subculture - it is a group of individuals operating within a 
larger society with their own unique set of values, beliefs, attitudes, customs and 
behaviour (Murray and Rodgers, 2005; Pollnac, 1988; Poggie, et al., 199 5). Poggie et al. 
(1995) report that the harsh nature of the sea, heavy reliance on technology for 
production and safety, unstable and seasonally dependent income; and, physical distance 
from immediate help are some factors that help shape and characterize this fishing 
subculture. The fish harvesters of Newfoundland are a typical example of this 
occupational subculture. 
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r\ survey of fish harvesters in • ewfoundland in the early 1990s found that all 
those who were surveyed had incurred some form of injury in the fishing industry 
(Murray & D olomount, 1995). The study was conducted right after the moratorium with 
the aims of describing the character of accidents, extent of safety knowledge, practices, 
attitudes and beliefs of the inshore fish harvesters of Newfoundland. This study 
confirmed the high rate of accidents in the Newfoundland fishery and concluded that 
despite being knowledgeable of safety regulations and placing importance on safety 
precautions, a large number of fish harvesters still engaged in risky fishing practices. The 
CCG conducted a review of fishing vessel safety from 1993 to 1999 to conclude that 
injury rates, workers compensation claims and search and rescue operations were on the 
rise in Newfoundland (DFO, 2000). In particular, they noted that the number of 
fatalities in fishing vessels less than 35 feet in length was substantially high. 
2.9. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The causal mechanisms for risky practices have been studied from vanous 
angles. Some studies suggest that the inherent dangers associated with fisheries help 
select a certain personality type (Binkley 1995; Poggie et al., 1995; PoUnac, Poggie & 
Cabral, 1998) that helps to psychologically adapt the individual to this occupation . 
• otably, the fatalistic attitude of fish harvesters has received much attention in previous 
research (Binkley, 1995) as a protection mechanism for psychological adaptation. Other 
studies furray & Dolomount, 1995; (Power et al., 2007; Kaplan & Kite-Powell 2000) 
ha\·e suggested that fisheries management leaves room for risky practices and that fish 
harvesters have no choice but to engage in risk taking behaviour in order to survive 
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economically. Whatever may be the case for risk taking practices, safety-training may 
help to mitigate some of the inherent dangers of this hazardous occupation. 
The Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board, 
commonly known as TSB, mandated by the federal government to improve 
transportation safety, cites lack of training and safety awareness as one of the main 
underlying cause of accidents in the Canadian fishing industry (Ayeko, 2000). Applying 
Reason's model to investigate accident causation, TSB identified many safety deficiencies 
and made several safety recommendations. Two of the most commonly identified 
deficiencies by the TSB are: 1) inadequate safety-training and awareness; and 2) 
inadequate survival equipment, skills and drills. Over the years, TSB has recorded several 
fishing vessel-related incidents where "(o)ne person's knowledge of life raft deployment, 
distress signal use or emergency response could (have) easily save(d) an entire vessel and 
crew" (pg. 205, Ayeko, 2000). Conversely, it has also recorded incidents where entire 
crew were recovered after drifting in severe winter conditions in the North Atlantic 
waters because they were able to deploy and use life saving equipment as intended. 
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CHAPTER3 
Method 
Thi tudy was one component of a multi-component and multidisciplinary study 
of fishing safety funded jointly by the Canadian Institutes for Health Research (CIHR) 
and by the ew Initiatives Fund of the Canadian Search and Rescue ecretariat. 
SafetyNet has maJOr funding from CIHR to study occupational health and safety of 
marine and coastal work. It has nine inter-related research projects under the three broad 
categories of: Fisheries-related, Oil & Gas, and Human Cold Working Conditions. Of 
the nine projects, this study is under the umbrella of SafeCatch (Fi heries-related), which 
conducts research on fish harvesters' occupational health and fishing vessel safety. 
3.1 Design: This study used a mixed method experimental design. Two groups of 
seafarers registered in the OSSC MED 1 program in St. John's NL in 2006, were 
randomly cho en to be in either a standard group or an enhanced group. The standard 
group underwent regular MED A 1 training, which consists of 12.5 hours o f in-class 
lessons and 7 hours of practical training, totalling 19.5 hours. Their training focused on 
seven areas: introduction and safety, hazards and emergencies, fire fighting, emergency 
response, life saving appliances and abandonment, survival, and rescue. In addition to 
the regular training program, the enhanced group watched a series of video clips on 
safety. A total of 12 short video clips (approximately 3-5 minutes in length) on afety at 
sea and safe emergency responses were integrated into the multimedia classroom 
presentations. They were developed by staff at the OSSC and partially funded by 
SafeCatch. They were informed by findings from prev10us research lurray & 
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Dolomount, 1994, 1995; Murray & Rogers, 2005). These were shown to the enhanced 
group as a supplement to their regular training and course materials. 
3.2 Sample: Fifteen classes of MEDAl were conducted on-site at the Offshore Safety 
and Survival Centre of the Marine Institute, Foxtrap, St. John's. One class conducted 
off-site in Eastport, Newfoundland, was also included in this research because of the 
suitability of the group (which consisted entirely of fish harvesters) and to help attain a 
good sample size. Thus a total of 16 classes with a total of 130 students who registered 
with OSSC between September and D ecember 2006 were informed of this study and 
solicited for their participation. The study only included participants whose professional 
work experience was related to the marine environment. Out of the 16 classes of 
students, 1 class was excluded after they had completed the first part of the study 
because they were later combined with another class of students (for logistical purposes 
of OSSC). Of the 130 total students of OSSC, 8 declined participation and 28 consenting 
participants' questionnaires had to be removed (due to incomplete information) which 
resulted in a total sample size of 94. The following equation was used to calculate sample 
size: N = z2 x p x q / d2. Alpha was set at 0.05; p = q = 0.50; d = 0.15. Using this 
equation, the minimum sample size was calculated to be 43. To determine change 
between pre-test and post-test scores within a group with power set at 0.80, alpha set at 
0.05 and a medium size effect of 0.50, the minimum sample size required was 27 
(Co ttrell & McKenzie, 2005). 
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3.3 Questionnaire: A Training Evaluation Form (TEF, Appendix A) was developed to 
elicit information on perceptions, attitudes and knowledge of safety. This TEF was 
adapted from Murray and D olomount (1995) and it consists of four sections. 
ection I D emographics: This included six questions on the demographics of the 
participants (gender, age, experience, principal occupation, role o n vessel and size of 
boat) 
Section II Perceived causes of accidents and safety attitudes: This section 
contained two parts. The first part was a list of 25 potential causes of accidents at sea. 
Participants were asked to rate a series of 25 factors as not important, slightly important, 
important or very important in causing accidents at sea. Of these 25 causes, 20 were 
derived from a measure developed by Murray & D olomount (1995) . These 25 causes 
were classified as internal/ behavioural (i.e., factors that are determined by the behaviour 
of individuals) and external/ situational (i.e., factors that are determined by the context or 
situation in which individuals are working). In this thesis it was hypothesised that after 
the intervention the participants would rate the internal/behavioural causes as more 
important and that this change would be greater in the enhanced group. An additional 
five potential causes to accidents at sea (water temperature, type of fish, time o f day, 
colour of boat and individual's height) were added to the questionnaire. 
The second part lists a series of 23 statements of safety derived from .Murray & 
Dolo mount (1995). As per the original questionnaire, these were categorized into 6 
subscales: skepticism, responsibility, boatmanship, vessel restrictions, regulations and risk 
acceptance and participants were asked to indicate if they strongly agreed, agreed, didn't 
know, disagreed or strongly disagreed with each of the statements. In this thesis it was 
hypothesized that after the intervention, participants would show a significant change in 
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their agreeableness or disagreeableness (as appropriate) with each of the ubscales and 
that this change would be greater in the enhanced group. 
Section HI Safety Knowledge: Questions in this section were taken from the 
formal OSSC examination of the MEDA1 course. It included a list of 20 multiple-choice 
questions that tests their knowledge of safety at sea. This list of questions was developed 
and provided by TC to be used by aU establishments conducting and issuing the 
MEDA1 certificate. The questions were not modified or amended in any way. 
Section IV Safety Training; This section included a list of open and close-ended 
questions regarding OSSC and other safety-training issues. 
A pilot version of the questionnaire was administered to a group of MEDA 1 
participants in July 2006. Their comments and responses led to revisions and removal of 
certain items from the questionnaire. The post-training questionnaire for the standard 
group only included Section II, III and a few items from section IV (See Appendix B). 
The post-training questionnaire for the enhanced group included some open ended 
questions on the video clips and was otherwise identical to the standard group's post-
training questionnaire (See Appendix C). 
3.4 Ethical Considerations: The Human Investigation Committee (HIC) of Memorial 
University of ewfoundland approved this study (see Appendix D). The 0 SC also 
granted permission to conduct research with instructors and participants of MEDA 1 
courses. The project was explained to all participants of :\fED A 1. Permission was given 
by HlC for instructors to be involved during focus group discussions to aid in facilitating 
as and when necessary. Only those who voluntarily consented to participate in this study 
\Vere asked to complete a consent form preceding any actual research ( ee Appendix E 
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and F for consent forms for the standard and enhanced groups, respectively). 
Participants were also assured of complete confidentiality of their responses. An arbitrary 
number known to participants only was used to match participants' responses on the 
questionnaires before and after the course. 
3.5 Procedure: All instructors of MEDA 1 were informed in advance of this study by 
the research coordinator of OSSC. I arrived half-hour early on each day of the class to 
brief and meet with instructors and hand them a copy of the focus group questions 
(Appendix G). Assignment of participants into a control or enhanced group was driven 
by both practical and statistical reasons: I arrived at OSSC with questionnaires and 
consent forms for both the standard and enhanced group, if there were technical or 
logistical difficulties with the video clips that day, we proceeded with the regular safety-
training program and classified them as the standard group. 
Participants were not aware of the research until they had registered for the 
course and were seated in class. Once all participants were ready to begin their lesson, 
the instructor introduced me. I explained the research, my intention and the nature and 
significance of this project and solicited their help. I informed them that their 
participation in the research entailed completing a questionnaire and discussing issues on 
safety and training before and after the completion of their 3-day course. Participants 
were advised that the group discussions would be audio taped and that only I, and any 
transcribing assistants (if any) would be li tening to the tapes. There are several dialects 
of English spoken in 0Jewfoundland, many of which are very strong and therefore 
difficult to understand. During the focus group discussions, some instructors joined in 
collaboratively to help out with language/ accent barriers. 
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Once all queries had been answered and consent fo rms completed and signed, I 
handed out questionnaires to individual participants. Instructors asked participants to 
call out a number between one and ten o r to twelve (depending on the number of 
participants in class) and explained that these numbers were to be used during their fire 
drill to count off evacuees. I asked them to remember their number and to write it on 
their questionnaires to be able to match their responses before and after the course. 
These numbers do not match up to any personal identification. Participants were assured 
o f confidentiality and that anything they said o r wrote as part of the study that could 
potentially identify them would be kept confidential. 
I and/ or the instructor assisted in reading the questions aloud or writing 
responses of participants on their behalf when requested to do so. After the pre- and 
post-training questionnaires were completed, classroom participants were invi ted to 
participate in a group discussion on safety and training. This group discussion was led by 
myself and in some instances instructors joined in to help me deal with the language 
barrier. The discussions were audio taped and lasted between 10 to 45 minutes. A repeat 
of survey completion followed by group discussions took place at the end of their 3-day 
training. 
3.6. Analysis: Quantitative and qualitative analytical tools were used for data analysis. 
Perceived causes of accidents (Section II) were analysed individually and clustered using 
Murray & Dolomount's (1995) classification scheme: 'internal / behavioural' and 
'external/ situational' categories. Rough sea, safety awareness of crew, lack of a safety 
culture, boat size, slippery deck, poor safety regulations, untidy deck, experience of crew, 
stress and bad luck were coded as 'external/ situational' causes, and alcohol, safety 
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awareness of self, overloading, carelessness, level of safety training, overworking, 
tiredness, overpowering/ speeding, rushing and sickness were coded as 
'internal/behavioural' causes. All remaining perceptions items were categorized as 'other' 
causes including: water temperature, type of fish, rime of day, boat colour and individual 
height. 
tcitude items (Section II) were also analysed individually and clustered ustng 
Murray & D olomount's (1995) clas ification scheme: skepticism, responsibility, 
boatmanship, vessel restrictions, regulations and risk acceptance. 
3.6.1. Quantitative Analysis: The quantitative data were entered onto a database and 
analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) for windows version 
11 (Brace, Kemp & Snelgar, 2003). D escriptive statistics (frequencies) were computed 
for the demographic data. To compare the change in scores over rime (i.e. before and 
after the intervention) the paired sample t-test (for total knowledge scores), the 
Me. emar test (for individual knowledge items), and the Wilcoxon signed ranks test (for 
individual perceived cause of accidents and attitude items) were used. To compare results 
of the standard and enhanced group , independent samples t-test (for total knowledge 
score) and the Mann-\Xt'hitney U test (for total cause and total attitude items) were used. 
3.6.1.1. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test: The Wilcoxon signed ranks test is widely used 
in different field of study to assess change in scores (Pett, 1997). The following critical 
assumptions were met: 
a) .\[arched observation from random sample: the data con i t of paired 
observations from participants w 10 were tested pre- and po t-training. 
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b) cale of measurement must be at least ordinal if not continuous: A Likert-type 
scale of measurement was used where 1 = ot Important, 2 = Slightly 
Important, 3 = Important and 4 = Very Important (for perceptions scores); and, 
1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Don't Know, 4 = Agree and 5 = 
trongly Agree (for attitudes scores) of pre- and post-training questionnaire . 
Attitude items 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 15, 17, 18, 19,20 were reverse coded for analysis. 
c) Symmetrical distribution: the pre- and post-training scores followed a 
symmetrical distribution. 
3.6.1.2. Mann-Whitney Test: The Mann-Whitney test is employed to test the difference 
between two independent groups. This is a commonly used nonparametric test in the 
field of health care research and the data satisfied the following three critical assumptions 
(Pett, 1997): 
a) cale of measurement: the independent variable (standard and enhanced groups) 
was dichotomous and the scale of measurement for the dependent variable was 
ordinal (attitude scores ranged from 1 being Strongly Disagree to 5 being 
Strongly Agree [reverse coded where appropriate] and perceptions scores ranged 
from 1 being Not Important to 4 being Very Important). 
b) Random sample of independent observations: there were no repeated 
ob ervations in the data for the same participant and the two groups were 
mutually exclusive. Although groups of participants were randomly assigned to 
watching video clips or not, the initial sample of students at the 0 SC were not 
randomly selected (it was a con\'enience sample). 
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c) Unspecified but similar population distribution shape: although the distribution 
of the dependent variable (attitude scores) for the two groups is not required to 
follow normal distribution (for non-parametric test), in this case it did. For cause 
scores, the combined score of differences took a symmetrical shape (almost a 
bell curve), but the individual standard group's pre and post cause scores were 
slightly skewed. 
These findings are presented in Chapter 4. 
3.6.2. Qualitative Analysis: Group discussions were recorded on tape. Two tape 
recorders were present during focus group discussions. Before recording, I would test 
the recorder by recording my voice and giving it an ID by saying: "Focus group. Sept 
13'h. Experimental. Before". On the tape, I would also mark the appropriate ID as such: 
FG.13.Sept.Expt.Bef. This ID was established with the intention of separating pre- and 
post-training discussions between the standard and enhanced groups. I wanted to 
analyze and present my data comparatively. 
Unfortunately, the quality of the recordings was poor. Classes were held in four 
different classrooms of the OSSC building. Extra noise that was not audible during 
taping was picked up during the taping and made it impossible to hear clearly what was 
being said. I tried to get the groups to sit closer in one group, alternatively, for a big 
group (of 8-12) I placed a recorder closer to a bunch of people huddled together, sitting 
in a semi-circle, near each cusp. The recordings were still unclear, due to noise from 
perhaps the overhead projector and/ or other unknown electrical appliances that were 
present in the room. I also tried using computer software and recorded the discussion 
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directly into my laptop on a disc with the hope that the extra noise could be washed 
down using software, but this was not much help either. 
Another barrier for me was the strong Newfoundland accent. Instructors were all 
informed of this in advance and helped by either restating my question or by repeating to 
me what was said. Permission was taken from HIC for instructors to be involved in the 
focus group discussions. This allowed for the discussions to proceed in context of their 
class with minimal 'disruption' due to research and also helped my research discussion 
flow despite language barrier. 
I initially transcribed the tapes. This allowed me to really look at what was being 
said and/ or not said by participants. Graham Small (co-researcher of the project) also 
helped by transcribing some of the tapes and we would also go over each other's 
transcripts to see if we could complete them any further. Unfortunately, due to the poor 
quality of tapes, time constraints and the accent barrier, I had to send the tapes to be 
transcribed by a professional. Once I received the transcripts, I read them actively 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Remembering the actual focus group discussions helped with the interpretation 
of the transcripts . However, large chunks of data were lost, particularly from those 
discussions that had left me enriched and more knowledgeable about how participants 
saw the training program and this had in turn made an impression on me personally. 
Often as I read the small chunk of each transcript that was audible, I could place these in 
the larger context of what had been said, and I knew the thread of the discussion that 
follO\ved, but I did not have it in data form. I decided to work with only the available 
transcribed data. This meant that I did not have sufficient material to separate the 
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enhanced and standard groups. [nstead, I decided to separate pre- and post-training 
categories for the qualitative analysis. 
Thematic analysis is a very widely used and useful tool for analyzing qualitative 
data (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Attride-Stirling, 2001.). Put simply, thematic analysis 
involves sifting through the dataset to identify patterns or themes. This is the base or 
foundation from which most qualitative analysis inclurung thematic analysis begins. 
Complexities of thematic analysis are reflected in the varied forms of analysis that 
'emerge' out of a thematic analysis such as grounded theory, content analysis and 
ruscourse analysis. I chose to follow the guidelines as outlined by Braun & Clarke (2006). 
They outline six steps for qualitative data analysis: 
1. Familiarizing yourself with the data: this involves transcribing, rearung, re-rearung, 
and jotting down notes to help organize. 
2. Generating initial codes: identifying interesting features of the data set and collating 
them accorrungly. 
3. Searching for themes: collated codes soon evolve into broad themes, so this phase 
involves searching for more similar themes 
4. Reviewing themes: this involves checkjng the themes against the codes and the data 
set, reorganizing, deleting and/ or generating more themes. 
5. Defining and naming themes: refining each theme according to the o verall aim of the 
analysis and generating appropriate names for themes and their definitions. 
6. Producing the report: selecting examples, relating them back to the research 
ljUestions and literature. 
Part of doing good qualitative analysis i to use guidelines as guidelines only. I read 
through my data corpus to familiarize myself and for clarity o f thought. i\fy data corpus 
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consisted of the entire set of transcripts, the tapes and my own understanding based on 
first hand discussions with participants before, during and after the training. My dataset 
evolved after I had seen a pattern of responses in my data corpus. I sometimes used one 
particular thematic thread (code) such as "safety equipment" to look for similar patterns 
across the data corpus. At other times, I looked through one particular data item (i.e., 
transcript) to identify a new thread of thought and identified it as a new theme. I read the 
transcripts on their own and also with tapes. Excerpts that were similar to each other 
were placed under some of the codes that I was already anticipating, for instance: 
attitudes, knowledge, safety-training and regulations. When going back and forth from 
transcripts and looking closely at what was being said in each sentence, themes emerged 
that were different from each other within these codes and could be further subdivided 
or made redundant. So I began to isolate threads that were associated differentially. This 
led to shifting themes and codes, rearranging, generating more codes and deleting 
previous ones. I had a Microsoft \'V'ord document that was 'live'. Analysis was done at a 
semantic level: given the limitations of my transcripts, I decided to pull together similarly 
patterned data and describe the patterns. The codes eventually evolved into broader 
themes or categories. Similar themes were placed in broader categories and summarized. 
There was a clear distinction between pre- and post-training categories so these were 
subdivided accordingly. However, a third broad category also appeared: general concerns 
common to participants both before and after their training where training appeared to 
have no impact. 
To lay out the results and present my analysis of the group discussions, I decided 
to summarize each of the three broad subdivisions of categories (pre, post and common 
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grounds), describe the categories that fell under each of these subdivisions, and provide a 
summary of the analysis. This is presented in Chapter 4 
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CHAPTER4 
Focus Group Findings 
4.1 General Pre-training Attitudes and Perceptions 
Four broad categories were identified that best described some of the pre-
training discussions. These included: attitudes toward safety, attitudes toward safety-
training, attitudes toward safety equipment and attitudes toward regulations. Within each 
category there were a number of themes each of which is detailed below. Pre-training 
participants expressed a nonchalant attitude toward safety. They knew the risks involved 
in their occupation were very high and had therefore learnt to be resilient. They 
perceived safety through a framework of risk. 
There was a feeling of general apprehension amongst participants, as they felt 
intimidated by some of the requirements of the training program. Most of them were 
unaware of what to expect during their 3-day training but were hoping to acquire a 
general overview of how to prepare for an emergency. While they were not denying the 
benefits of safety training per se, they believed that it really would not add much to their 
overall experiential knowledge. 
Participants reported that safety equipment that was required onboard vessels 
was not tested to see if and how it operated, or if it was maintained. Most participants 
reported being unaware of correct handling procedures for their safety equipment. 
Discussions of regulations elicited a strong negative reaction expressed with 
emotion in most participants to the point that discussions of other topics would 
generally revolve back around regulatory enforcements. The main frustration with 
regulations was the belief that the government's ulterior motive was to make money. 
Participants were frustrated with the government for not taking a proactive and holistic 
approach to regulating safety in the fishing industry. 
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4.1.1 Category 1: Attitudes Toward Safety 
I 've been in situatiom ... then I sqy I'm not doin,g that no more- never again. Three months later I 'm 
Sc!Jing I'm never doing that again. (laughter) 
Three themes were identified that described different aspects of the participants' 
attitudes toward safety. These are described as nature of the job, occupational freedom 
and safety as common sense. Participants described their occupation as dangerous and 
perceived the risks involved in their occupation as a part and parcel o f their livelihood. 
The concept of safety therefore revolved around the limitations imposed by the risks of 
their job. In an occupation laden with dangers, making judgement calls was considered 
the norm, which in turn was associated with a certain kind of exhilarating freedom. 
Cognisant of this fact, participants looked at safety as requiring that they be 
conscientious or use common sense. 
Theme 1: Nature of the Job. Fishing involves dealing with uncertainty. Participants 
realized that fishing was a very risky operation. Therefore, to survive they learned to be 
resilient and persistent. Making judgement calls and 'pushing one's luck' were identified 
as common characteristics of this occupation. 
Participant: You knmv, a lot of times lllith liS- /lle're often at Otlr zone- cmd llle get Otlt there ... you get 
out there;JIOU get the bad forecast called for Jvith the . . . y ou get out there and it'll be a bad dqy and you 
sqy I'm steamin._f!,jor three hours nmv; I'm not going to be back in. I 'm going to have to try to put up with 
a bit more than 1vhat she'd regular!J put up 1vith,you know, but still .. . 
Pmticzpant: Y eah. 
Participant: .. you're pushing it like that. 
Facilitator: ll?'e all do that, nght- pmh. 
Participant: Oh yea b. 
Pmtiapcmt: I've been in situations . . . then I sqy I'm not doing tbat no more- never again. 
Pcuticipant: Yea/;, untilmxt time. 
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Participant: Three months later I i11 scrying I'm never doing that a,.gain. (laughter) 
Participant: Y eah, well ... 
Participant: The conditions change so fast. Yo11 k n01v, 1vhen Jve'11e done .... dozens of times you'll 
Ollerload your boat. Conditions are ,good at the time ... 
Participant: That's tight. 
Participant: ... but on the blink of an rye thry don't be long changing. 
Theme 2: Occupational Freedom. Participants perceived the risks associated with 
their occupation as an expression of their own freedom. They were proud of being free 
individuals bound only by Nature's laws. Some of the safety rules and regulations in the 
fishing industry were perceived to be inhibitors to enjoyment of their way of life. 
Participant: Fishermen are that wqy. Thry're all ... 
Participant: Yeah. 
Participant: . . free individuals or 1ve Jvouldn't be at it, right? 
Participant: Yeah. 
Participant: Certain freedom- that's JV~ it's getting so damn bad now. There's so ma'!Y regulations and 
things beingjorced on you - oh "(} Chnst . .. 
Participant: Yeah. 
Participant: Yeah. 
Participant: .. . turns your stomach- turned a lot of olrler fellows from fishing. 
Patticipant: Y eah. 
Participant: Oh yes. 
Participant: You know, it makes me stomach sick. 
Patticipant: 'r"eah. 
Partiapant: You ~~ot no scry in al!)'thing. 
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Theme 3: Safety is Common Sense. For some, staying safe was a matter of common 
sense. Safety courses were for naught if harvesters lacked the experience that would give 
them the common day-to-day knowledge to survive at sea. 
Participant: I look at it-you can take all tl;ese courses but ... the thing I look at is col!lmon seme. If 
thry haven't got that, this means nothing. 
4.1.2 Category 2: Attitudes Toward Safety Training 
Thry can offer 1vhat safe!J course thry like, the people are still going to do 1vhat thry 1vant to do and more 
than /ike!J no1v I 'II take that course and I'm still going to go out and go lobster fishing alone 
Five themes were identified in this category including: reluctance toward the mandatory 
training program, expectations of the training, intimidated by the requirements of the 
training, cost as a deterrent to training and shift in paradigm. Most participants' attitudes 
toward the training program were a reluctant compliance. They were unsure of what to 
expect in their 3-day training course other than a general boost in confidence and an 
increase in knowledge. They were intimidated by the thought of being in a classroom 
setting, being in the water and jumping from heights (which would be part of their 
practical lessons). They also felt that the overall out-of-pocket cost for the training 
program was too steep for them and believed this was acting as a deterrent for others. 
Participants felt that there was a shift in the paradigm in the fishing industry from being 
a traditional occupation to a more professional occupation. They perceived the training 
program as a reflection of that change but while some were able to accept the change 
and look at the positive side of the training, others felt angered by this change. Their 
frustration over the move toward a "professional" fishery manifested itself as reluctance 
to participate in the training programs. 
Theme 1: Reluctant compliance toward mandatory training program. Participants 
felt compelled to enrol in the safety training course. They believed that they would not 
73 
have come for the training if this was not a regulatory requirement. There was a strong 
negative emotion surrounding the institutionalization of the training program. \'V'hile they 
felt that any training would be good and necessary in their field of work, the association 
of training with government requirements spoiled it for them. Some of their reluctance 
was assuaged by the positive feedback they had received from previous participants. 
There was still, however, a strong sense of resistance toward the training program in 
general. 
For example: 
Participant: Thry forced ffS to come here. (laughter) 
Partiapant: Y eah, the on!J thing about this is JJ!e're getting some e:><.perience too- something lleJIJ out of 
it. At least you know JJ!bat to do. 
And another example was: 
Partiapant: To be quite honest about, I didn't JJ!ant to do it. 
Theme 2: Generalized expectations of the training. Participants were expecting a 
general increase in awareness and knowledge after their training. They were unsure of the 
specifics of how the training may be of help in their daily life, but were hoping for a 
boost in confidence and increased knowledge. For example one participant said: 
Partiapant: A t least 110111 JJ!e JJ!i/1 k noJJI Jllbat to do if eJJer 111e have the opportunity to be in an emerg,enry 
I guess. 
Another said: 
Partiapant: II?' ell, see, if you did this course then you should be prepared for some of those things. 
Theme 3: Intimidated by some of the requirem ents of safety training. Participants 
fe lt intimidated by some of the requirements of their training program. Most participants 
had left formal education at a very young age. They expressed concern about being in a 
classroom setting and participating in formal lessons. In addition to that, they were also 
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afraid of swimming and jumping from heights. They cited these as some of the mo t 
common deterrents of safety training and fe lt that these factors not only intimidated 
them but that they were inhibiting others from attending MEDA 1. 
For example: 
Participant: llf"I!J? ~Tf"ell, Jirst of all I can't SJvim and I got a fear of it so (laughs) that's my b~r?,gest thing. 
And also: 
Participant: Y eah. Even if you can't sJvim ... it's the thot!ght ofjumping in the 111ater is the ... RigiJt? 
F rotn the height. 
And another example was: 
Participant: A lot of jell01vs in the fishery too, nght, 111ho are neroous to go back to school. I kn0111 there's 
hvo on our boat- old jellmv skippers ... actuai!J, our skipper said 111e 're mpposed to do this co~~rse. 1 0111 
thry 111ere neroous. 
Theme 4: Cost as a deterrent to training. Another inhibitory factor for the training 
program was the overall out-of-pocket cost. Most participants were able to receive a 
government subsidy for their training program, however, other fees associated with their 
training such as travel and lodging, the health check, being out of work for the three days 
of training, and the balance of the training fees added up to be a deterrent for them. 
One participant said: 
Participant: There's hvo things here: one is time and one is ll/OIIf!Y. 
And another said: 
Participant: llf"ell, tben again b), getting people in - Jlle've ,got to dn·ve back and jo1th come 
Christmas time - cli!J'fillle - I 111ean ,gas right 110/V going bc1ck and jo1th trat,eling, I 111ean sure thry 're 
,going to help y ou J/lith school. Everyborfy is not next door to the stboo/. You kn01v, but I 111ean it 's goin<g 
to spoil 50. . . 7 5 dollars for JOllie people 1vben thry 're trat.oeling back and jorlh here. / lnd like )IOU St!Y 
_you're not getting a lot of people in here. / I lot of people can't {/_fJord to COllie in, probab!J. 
T heme 5: Proft:ssionalization in the fishing industry. Participants felt that there was 
a shift in the industry from being a traditio nal occupation to a more professional 
occupation. The implementation o f a mandatory safety-training program was a re t1ection 
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of the new changes that were seepmg through the industry. orne perceived and 
accepted this change as the new way (especially the younger generation) while others felt 
that this move was the root cause of much of their frustration. They saw a gap between 
the needs o f the industry (such as an experienced worker) and availability (such as a less 
experienced but more certified worker) . Their frustration over this dichotomy 
manifested itself in the form of reluctance toward the training program. 
For example: 
Participant: Because I think that the 1vhole thing behind it is professionalization; and IOIIJOrroJv moming 
I'm going to be ... one of these dqys I 'm going to have to sqy I 'm lookingfor a man and 1 'II have to leave 
the thing in and they're going to put out 1vhat they want. I might not be able to take Harry because he's 
a best kind of a Jishenmn but he haven't got his tet:th cleaned so he can't come Jl!ith me. J o I got to ha11e 
mate over there /J)ho got his papers up the length of his arm but .. . 
And another example was: 
Participant: The biggest problem I find with that is the person in charge mqy have a polity in place, but 
it's not chasing after people to enforce it all the time. What I 've been finding Jvith the younger generations 
going to sea -you don 't have to tell them af!Ymore. It is automatic because it's starting to (. . .) so111e 
years ago 1ve had a hard time getting the gr!JS to put an emergenry mit aboard, and no1v it's become 
second nature 
4.1.3 Category 3: Attitudes Toward Safety Equipment 
We don't even kno1v ho1v to put it on. They're in the bottom of our bunk and 111e don't kno1v nothing 
about them, onfy thry 're there. 
Three themes emerged in this category. These are: inappropriate torage and misuse of 
safety equipment, safety equipment as a necessary evil, and poor or non-existent 
maintenance f safety equ1pment. Participants had the basic mandatory equipment 
onboard to be complaint with the law but were mostly unaware o f their proper use and 
maintenance. They perceived the ec1uipment as clutter of space aboard a \·essel but 
deemt.::d it nece sary to have onboard. ~fas t participants said that they had ne\·er worn 
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their suits, deployed a life raft or used a tire extinguisher and were unsure of the correct 
handling procedures for most of their onboard equipment. 
Theme 1: Inappropriate storage and misuse of safety equipment. Participants 
reported that some safety equipment was stored in locations that were not readily 
accessible in the event of an emergency or was used for purposes other than survival. 
This was a common occurrence with life jackets in that participants kept them onboard 
to be compliant with the law but used them as pillows or cushions fo r support. Prior to 
their training, they were unaware of the damage that could result from improper use. 
For example: 
Participant: Makes a good pi/lou;. 
Participant: Yeah . .. up under the mdrfy. I ktJOJV, sure, gro11ling up - out jigging "!Y 1vhole life, nght? 
IPhere are the life jackets? Up in the mdrfy. And someone got ... if someone got . . . started to get sick or 
something, 1/lhat Jvould 111e do- /cry him up and let him go to sleep on it. 
Participant: Yeah. I put hvo or three in a garbage bag and make a good pii!OJv. 
And another example: 
Participant: We don't even ... 1ve don't even knouJ ho//l to put it on. Tbry 're in tbe bottoiJl of our bunk 
and Jve don't kfiOJV nothing about them, on!J thry 're tbere. 
Theme 2: Poor or non-existent maintenance of safety equipment. Participants were 
not testing their safety equipment to see if and how it operated. Even though they 
possessed the right gear on board (which was often misused or inappropriately stored as 
noted abo,·e), they were not maintaining it appropriately. 
For example: 
Participant: Well, by, to teii] OU the tmtb I JJel'er erer seen neither mit. I nerer ererput one orr. l'l•e bctd 
it out. Rolled it out and looked at it. Rolled it up and put it bm·k in tbe bag 
,\ nd another example was: 
Pmticipant: \ 'ot boiiJ lllflf!Y people ll'bo bare not put tbe111 on ... UO//l llltii!J people b t1l 't' not taken tbt'IJl 
out oftbe /}({~in orer a_year? 
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Theme 3: Safety equipment as a necessary evil. Carrying safety equipment onboard 
was not just a fu lfilment of regulatory requirements, it was also a reassurance of safety. 
Even though participants were unhappy about the amount o f equipment that had to be 
onboard, they appreciated the importance of having the equipment at hand in case of an 
emergency. It gave them a reassuring sen e of being prepared for an emergency: 
Participant: And another thing- with all this equipment ... then you got to _r;et em extra boat to lug 
arormd,yo11 kn01v 1vhat I mean? (lattghter) 
Participant: Yes. Yes. 
Participant: }/o!l can on!J take so tn!lch so ... 
Facilitator: That's tme, and there's so ma"!Y safety gear that yo!l have to carry. Do yo!l think it reai!J ... 
I mean it takes up space; it clutters the space. 
Participant: It do, b!lt yo !I kn01v, the other side of it is that I'd rather it took up a bit of space than me 
taking up a bit of space in the ground. (laughter) 
Participant: Yeah, that's part of it. 
Participant: You know, it's ... 1vell, it's better to be prepared than not at all. 
4.1.4 Category 4: Attitudes Toward Regulatory Requirements 
The jishemun are licensed to death. 
Four themes emerged in this category that best described participants' attitudes toward 
regulatory requirements of the fishing industry. These themes included: expensive safety 
requirements, enforcement of regulations for profit, haphazard, incongruent safety 
procedures, and loopholes in the regulations. Pre-training participants perceived 
regulations to be a bane to their survival. They fe lt that the industry was being regulated 
haphazardly and only in the wake of tragic events. \ 'hile this was not a rt11te blanche denial 
of the \'alue of safety regulation , safety training or e\·en safety equipment, participants 
felt that they were being overwhelmed with unsystematic regulations that involved 
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exorbitant fees and bureaucratic hurdles. Paying individual fees for individual regulatory 
requirements in the long run was adding up to a substantial cost. Participants blamed the 
government for not taking a more hojjstic and proactive attitudes toward regulating 
safety in the industry. 
Theme 1: Expensive Safety Requirements. Fishing is an expensive activity and not as 
profitable an occupation as it used to be. Most harvesters were finding it hard to keep 
their operations going and to earn a jjving. Given their situation, participants felt that 
safety regulations that required purchasing additional safety equipment, vessel 
inspections in combination with other fishery-related fees were being changed and 
implemented too often and were becoming too expe!ls1ve a burden to carry. For 
example: 
Participant: o. It's not ... you're reading me 11 rong. I 'm not talking about too much crab in the boat. 
I'm talking about tbere's not enough of a quota of crab there to pqy for the expense- I have to bt!J this 
stuff. 
And another example was: 
Participant: See, there's another thing that's going to be 111ithin another je111 years. For our size of our 
boat right no111 - 34 - like 111e can't even afford to put fuel in them nght 110111. So this is getting shoved 
do111n our throats and, all of a sudden, I'm going to need a suit and then I'm going to need a life raft? 
Participant: I agree. Right no111 all )'OU need is a life jacket. You're not .. . 
Participant: But I mean 111itbin another 11110 to tbree )'ears it's going to be COtlling to that. J o if I 'm not 
making 11/0II~y, 111f!] do I need a life raft or a mit on if I can't afford to go out. 
Theme 2: Enforcement of Regulations for Profit. Part of their frustration with the 
expense was the bejjef that regulations were being implemented for governmental profit. 
While they appreciated that they might gain some knowledge through the safety-training 
course, they strongly objected to it being forced on them. They likened it to other past 
experiences where they felt forced to purchase safety equipment or pay fees that they felt 
were unnecessary. Participants were skeptical of new rules and regulations and some felt 
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that they were being forced to justify someone else's existence or profit. Having to do 
the MED A 1 training was no exception. For example: 
Participant: A-light learn a nice bit, but I resent tbe fact that I've been forced to do tbis in order to keep 
1!() license. 
Fmilitator: Yeah. 
Partiapant: The same thing 1vith tbat black box' too. I 1vas forced . .. there n;as somethin~P,jorced on me 
that I didn't need or want, and I 1vas forced to pqy for it in order to go fishing. 
Facilitator: Yeah. 
Participant: The same thing 111itb the radios. 
Participant: Yeah, same thing Jvith the radio. We had a VHF aboard and that was on!J a VHF same 
as what we had, onfy a more expensive one, . . . 
Participant: It Jl!as jmt more expensive. 
Particzpant: . .. that's all. 
Participant: Yeah. 
Participant: And that 111as forced on liS. 
Participant: I don't ltke ... I mean in lots if cases 1ve're forced into situations to justify someborfy else's 
prqftt or existence. That's the point I don't like abotlt it, rigbt? 
Facilitator: Yeah. 
Participant: I think, no doubt, like be said, to open up a- I don't know hOJvmuch I'm going to learn. I 
don't knoJliJVhat to expect, but all I'm lookingfor, realfy, is a piece if paper at tbe end if tbe 111eek ... 
Facilitator: Yeah. 
Patticipant: .. . but 0 the time tbe end of the u•eek comes, I 'm bopil~P, tbat )'Of/ ~P,Ot 11() mind cba1~ged. 
Partidpant: Yeab. 
Partictpant: That I't-'e picked up a lot. A lot iffeiiOJvs do sqy tbat, t~P,ht? 
Pmtiapant: 'J'hat's ri,ght, by, I mean 1 ... 
1 Vessel Monitoring Systems commonly known as ' Black Box' is a device that allows to help monitor 
vessel ac ti vity with regards to compliance with ti sheries regulations 
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Participant: But I do pit"k it up so . . . 
Participant: )'eab, and that's one thit~~ I flnr/, )'OU knoll' ... 
Patticipant: 1'111 a doubting Tho111as until )'OU jJtVI'e it. 1 '111 alll'qys that li!CfY. 
And another example was: 
Participant: It's the e>..penses. 
Partiapant: It's the e>..pense that )'OU got to go through to ,get this st11f; and it's not like its a J•olunteer 
!bing or )'OII're geltir~ a discount on this because it's .. . I 111ean the govern111enl don't care ... the 
government is going to come and sqy )'Oil need this, it's going to save y o11r life, b11t 111e 're going to charge 
three times the pn·ce. J o, realfy, all thry 111ant is the monry grab out of it. 
Participant: You got to have it now so the price ... we're going to put the price on it. 
Theme 3: Haphazard and incongruent safety procedures. Participants felt that 
safety in the fishing industry was being regulated rather haphazardly and procedures were 
usually put in place after an accident. For instance, they felt that regulatory restrictions 
on vessel length instead of vessel weight had caused more harm than good with respect 
to safety issues. While they were not denying the value of all safety procedures per se, 
they were frustrated by the way the procedures were being implemented. They were also 
frustrated by the bureaucracy involved and felt that instead of making things easier for 
them some of the regulations brought about overwhelming logistical and financial 
hurdles. Citing experiences that left them less than satisfied with regulations, some 
participants conceded to feeling apprehensi\·e toward the fED A 1 mandate as well. 
For example: 
Participant: Ill' bat a/1/azes 111e is thry 're ,goii~P, to /Jill ... thry .~ot tbese pmgrams in place and, belie1•e 111e, 
I tbink it's pmbabfy JJIOJtiJII,hile. f-lo Ill fall th~y Jitstify spendiJZP, all this 1110n~y in safery and Ofl the otber 
hand thry design a boat - 6-1 Ji. 11 - that can tip o1•er, and thry k ne111 it can tip OL'er and have ber 35 
feet b(gh j v111 the keel to the top. 1~sk II(J lmdtjy there. I~ e ll'ent orer and IJ'alfbed one bt'il{~ b11ilt in 
Tn.mjy. i\ 'o111 I said bo111 high is ihe? She's 35 feet. Tbats jine and dantjy, b11t bo111 can th~yjwtify 
so111ethin.~ like that, )'Oil knoll'; and these are the sallie /!,I!)'S that dre111 that plan 11p - the naral architet'ts 
- !bat IOIIIOITOJII 11/omin..P, iJJ'OU ll'anted to .~o and ,get a license, ,P,et ,;•our boat tha!.JOU jisbed in for tbe 
last 2 5 . years - re~y stable - is .~oil~~ to tell )'OU that .your boat is not stable. So _rou J',OI to spend 
S6000 . . . S5000 is it?- to ,e,et that . . . 
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And another example was: 
Participant: 1/;l'ell, that's u•en like this course. I 111ean l'1•e beard- and 1 '11e said tl; I iiJ Jf,Uilty of SC?_)'ing 
it- it's nothing now on!J a monry racket 
Facilitator: It's quite e.'\pensive but ) 'OU kn01v 1viJat ... ? 
Participant: But it's not ... I kno1v ... I 111ean if it n•as 5000 dollars to do this course, it's n·orth it in 
the long mn if one life is saved; but it's the JllqJ that it comes across. Like 110 matter ... th~y're licensed to 
debt. The jishmmn are licmsed to debt. I n;ean every ti111e thry turn around it's. . . 
Participant: Monry. 
Participant: .. . monry; and no1v it seems like it's going to be more. Et•ery ti11u there's a tragerfy 
something comes in place. There's nothing never included. It's a!Jvqys individual prices for something, and 
that's the Jmstratingpart in all this. 
Theme 4: Loopholes in regulations. Participants felt that the requirement to complete 
MED A 1 to avoid losing their license was not a very useful way of regulating safety in the 
industry. They suggested that there was no way of ensuring, without an expiration date 
on the MEDA 1 certificate or regular spot checks, that participants were actually 
complying with or reviewing their training. They perceived this to be a loophole in the 
regulation and this reinforced their perception that the government was interested in 
profi ts as opposed to ensuring participants were up to speed on survival techniques in 
the long run. 
For example: 
Pa~ticipant: But I 111as on!J talking about the .~oJ•em/1/enl. TIJry're forcitz~ 111e to do this, ~~~bt. In order 
for me to ,f!,et "~Y license, th~y 're forcing 111e to do it and then thry lem·e it up to 111e then to carry out. Like 
as long as I paid this 500 or 700 dollars to st(l!t in there and ~~et that piece of paper, 1 can .~o rffjishit~P,. 
~~~ht. That's all th~y 're ll'om'ed about. Th~y 're not ,~oil{~ around sqyi1{~ there s going to be spot-checks on 
)'OU or spot-checks 011.JOU to 111c1ke sure that )IOU knoll' bow to 11se that ,~ear. 
;\ nd another example was: 
PaJtidpcml: Theil's what I i11 sq_yi'{f!, b11t the .~orem111ent is not folloll'in.~ on thro1z~h. / Is lo1~~ as )'Oil .~ot 
that mtijicate ... that diplo111a at the md oftbis 1/'eek,)'OII're ok<?Y· 
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4.2 General Post-training Attitudes and Perceptions 
Five broad categories emerged from the post-training discussions. These were: attitudes 
toward safety; knowledge, skills and attitudes toward safety equipment and the practical 
training session; attitudes toward safety training; attitudes toward regulatory requirements 
and recommendations. 
There was a change in participants' perceptions of safety. Post-training 
participants felt that the presence of safety equipment onboard and the Limited 
knowledge of safety that they had prior to completing the course had given them a false 
sense of security. They learned to redefine safety within a context of possibilities. 
By being trained to use a variety of safety equipment under different conditions, 
participants believed that they were now better able to judge the necessity and 
appropriateness of their safety equipment. They believed that the training helped them 
trust, use and know how to maintain their equipment better. Attitudes toward safety 
equipment shifted from seeing it as a necessary evil onboard to seeing it as a trusted and 
respected life saver. 
Before their training, participants were apprehensive about the demands of the 
physical training but once they had gone through the challenges and confronted their 
fear they felt empowered. Participants learned to understand their own strengths and 
weaknesses as these related to equipment, sun·ival techniques and em rgency response 
techniques. They attributed this greater self-understanding and the subsequent changes 
onboard vessels and in their Life as these related to emergency preparedness (such as 
being more organized, buying equipment that was above the minimum requirement and 
everyone being more ,·igilant and proacti,·e about safety) as a direct impact of their 
trammg. 
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There was a marked difference in participants' attitudes toward the MED 1 
regulatory requirement after the training. Not only did they feel that it was necessary for 
them to have participated in the program, they deemed it necessary for all seafarers to 
undergo the training. Those who had participated in MED A3 and could compare the 
two programs believed that MEDA 1 was better suited to the needs of seafarers because 
it involved a lot of practical lessons. 
Realizing the benefits of the program, participants recommended that the 
training be g1ven to extended family members of all seafarers, that the MEDA3 
(mandated for vessels within 25 mile radius) be abolished requiring everyone to do the 
MEDA 1. They also recommended that first aid training be included with the MEDA 1, 
survival suits be a mandatory requirement on board and that a refresher MEDA 1 course 
should be available and required. 
4.2.1 Category 1: Attitudes Toward Safety 
Fishing and that and survival suit and lifeboat training is not the same 
Three themes were identified in this category. These are labelled: dispelling common 
myths, faci ng fear, and change in fatalistic attitudes. Post-training participants viewed 
hazards and risks as something definable and manageable. Realizing that they did not 
know how to operate or maintain their safety equipment prior to the training, they felt 
that they had been instilled with a false sense of security. Their concept of safety shifted 
from being defined by the limits imposed by risks to being defined by understanding 
their own strengths and potentials and realizing the specific possible uses of the various 
safety items. 
Theme 1: D ispelling common myth. Participants felt that what they had previously 
known with regards to being safe and the trust that they had placed on thei r equipment 
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may have given them a false sense of security. The definition of being safe changed from 
being compliant and possessing safety equipment to being aware of what kind of 
equipment they possessed and how it could be of help or even how to use it. 
For example: 
Participant: Ill' ell, there's a lot of stuff that 1ve bad and 1ve never got to use it and //J/1 didn't now, so JVe 
kt1o1v how to 11se it. That's the 1vhole thing. IV'e probab!J all have it, but we didn't kno1v bo1v to liSe it; 
and u;hat Jve got home- some st11jJ what 1ve have got aboard is no good, Jvbich have cbtmged but 1ve did 
not kn01v. 
And another example was: 
Partictpant: And you see 1vhat false sense of secmiry a fire extinguisher gives you. Yo11 see a 1 0-pound 
rylinder doesn't last very long. 
Theme 2: Facing Fear. The sea was a tragic reminder of loss for most fish harvesters. 
They appreciated the treacherous nature of the sea and were intimidated by the thought 
of being in the water. Having gone through the training and having tested some of the 
survival equipment on the water, they felt like they had confronted their fear and built 
their confidence. Their concept of safety was redefined not only by knowing of the 
possibilities of survival equipment and the knowledge of how to use it, but also by an 
overall change in their attitudes toward being able to face their fear and realizing that fear 
as something manageable. 
For example: 
Participant: I can S]})illl. I used to m;i/Jl all the time wben I //'CIS a kid, but "(Y j i1'end drowned a 
t'OIIjJie .. . c1j'eJv )'ears t{go, cllld since then 1 '111 afraid to .~o ... I lot•e tbe water .. . lmt I don 't know. I just 
can't do it, /Jut I'm not scared IIOJV if! had like a life J•est on or one of tbe mmg,enry mils. I know ]})tth 
tbat I '111 Jine. 
And also: 
Pmtidpant: , \line too - 111ine was fear - 1101 tii!J'IIIore tboug)J. I cafl get in the Jllaler 11011' Jl'itb 01111 of 
tbe111 mmg,mry suits on. I lot•e it. I Jl'as tenijied. 
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Theme 3: Change in fatalistic attitudes. Participants felt that the MED A 1 
familiarized them with equipment, increased knowledge and boosted their level of 
con fidence. While they were cognisant of the fact that life at sea was unpredictable and 
uncontroUable and that they could not be prepared for all eventualities, they were 
appreciative of the fact that the training gave them enough knowledge, confidence and 
strength to respond to an emergency. T hey reported a change in their attitudes toward 
survival possibilities and risk management and their notion of safety was re-
contextualized within a framework of survivability. For example: 
Participant: o, not 100% but you're just learning more abo11t the equipment and h01v to use it and 
handle it. It lvi/1 never p repare you for on the water because every dqy you go out there it's a different dqy. 
It's never like co111ing in ben:. You a/,vqys got the .. . dqy after dqy it's a routine,· but every time you go on 
that water and I 've been there for about 35 years- I never smv hvo dqys alike yet. I tie up "D' boat the 
same 1vhen I come in the harbour. ~fl'hen I'm ten and fifteen mile off /an~ it's alwqys a dijferent dqy -
tide, 1vinds, fogs, af!Jthing. J o it 1vill never prepare you until yo11 'n: out there and the situation happens, 
but it will. .. it did learn a lot- that mqybe I could save "!Y life and help save someone else's life now. 
And another example was: 
Participant: To some extent, right, because you go out there ... 111hen something goes 111rong everything is 
going 111rong the one time, but it'll prepare you for so IIIIIch of it, and you 'II graduai!J go on 111ith the rest 
of it. Everything 111ill keep ... it'll fall into place. It's shllnot going to prevent atrythin,gfrom happening; 
and when something does happen, you're not ,~oing to prevent all the chain ... all the links of chain 
bryond that because there's still going to be sttiff go wron,g after that point, but it 1vill . . . you kn01v, at 
least_you 'II 110111 have some idea of zvhat to do right from the start. 
4.2.2 Category 2: Knowledge, Skills and Attitudes Toward Safety Equipment and 
the Practical Training Session 
lfl'el/ then, iJJ'oU didn't know b01v to do it or n•as nenr sholl'ed it )'Oil 1votddn 't know it. ) ·ott 'd sqy-
j11ck, I '111 ,~oing to rlro1vlt a!?.JIIlt!J. (lttughter) There's more rootJJ for sotJJe!Jo1y l'lse. (la11gbte1) 
Six themes were identified in this category including: knowledge of eljuipment, skills and 
equipment, attitudes toward equjpment, practical lessons and self confidence, survi\·al 
technjques, and practical trairung is the 'best part" of MED r\ I. Participants believed that 
they gained substantial knowledge through the practical trajrung sessions. They felt more 
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familiar with their equipment onboard and felt that they learnt to properly use it for 
survival. They believed that the physical training helped them realize how their body 
responded in the water and in an emergency, and therefore gained more confidence in 
dealing with emergencies. They learned survival techniques that they did not know 
before the course and felt that this increased their confidence in their possibility of 
survival. 
Theme 1: Knowledge of Equipment. Most participants were unaware of the correct 
procedures for putting on suits/ life jackets and how to get into the water wearing them. 
Deploying life rafts, turning over an upturned raft and getting into the raft directly from 
water required some practical experience that participants did not know. These 
experiences were new to them and had they not undergone the training, they believed 
that they would not have been able to respond to an emergency situation. For example: 
Participant: Lfl'e had . .. I had life jackets nmv aboard the boat . . . a PFD . .. but never more or less put 
it on, but the proper Ivery of putting it on 1vhen you get in the water and the same thing 1vith the mit-
and the rcift - you use the rcift 1/0Jll to get in it upright. There's a lot of stt!lf like that I didn't k no1v. I 
IJiouldn 't even have a clue before so ... 
And also: 
Partictpant: mv basicai!J I did . .. _you smv these rcifts on the boat but we didn 't see them operate it or 
a'!}thing else. You k n01v, I thought, you kn01v, you would take these straps off and you leave them and 
j ust hang the thing OIJerboard. 
Theme 2: Skills and equipment. Participants had not tried or tested most of their 
equipment prior to the training. They had also not tried wearing survival suits in the 
water. Survi,·al suits give better protection and increase potential survival time in cold 
water compared to a lifejacket (which is the minimum requirement onboard). By trying 
on a range o f different kinds of equipment during the MEDAl training, they felt that 
they were given the opportunity to experience the Jifference in quality and comfort for 
themselves and get a better feel fo r the eyuipment. For example: 
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Participcmt: Y eah, )its/ to e.'\periem'f! il in the water wit/; nothing-j lfst even with the I(Je j m·ket, )'Oif 
kno;v, mmpared /o lfsing the sHit-) 'Oif ;volfldn 't give a set"ond tbolfgbtno;v in regards to gelling a mit. 
I\ nd another example was: 
Participant: lf/el/,_yolf got a better lfnderslanding bow to handle them, lhat'sjor stm - dam 1ight. 
Partidpcmt: I got auflfl taken in tholfgh on tbose fire exlinglfishers. Bqy, I reai!J lbolfghl there was 111ore 
stt({fin them than what's in tbem ... 
Theme 3: Attitudes toward equipment. Post-training participants developed a better 
understanding of their life saving equipment. Even though they were compliant with 
safety regulations prior to the course and kept the minimum required equipment 
onboard, they were often apprehensive about using it or they did not trust its 
effectiveness. Not only did their training familiarize them with the equipment, it also 
helped them develop a sense of trust in their equipment. For example: 
Participant: Yolf knozv, before wming here I had flO idea at all tvhat it wo11ld be lzke. 
Participant: No. 
Participant: I had a very mistrust of that suroival sHit and all that . .. life jm·k et JJJOtt!d never float me 
but .. . I alwcrys tholfght it ;vas sometbing like ;ve got on board We on(y got them life jackets. But I 
alwcrys tbo11ght it JJJO!IId be ;its! as well take a rock in y olfr hand as to jlfmp out (la11ghter) 
Theme 4: Practical lessons and self-confidence. Putting on suits, deploying life rafts, 
using fire extinguishers were new experiences for most participants. Along with learning 
to operate safety equipment, another new lesson for them was the art of responding to 
an emergency quickly in adverse situations. Participants believed that the practical 
training helped them realize a self-potential that they would o therwise no t have known. 
For example: 
Participant: I Vel/, it's like ... I bat's like in December, plflling on a Slf171iJ'al sHit - I didn 'tthink_yo11 
could put it on in / 1110 mimtiP s in /be dark, b111111e did it . 
. \ nd also: 
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Participant: I think, if nothi1zg else, it gives 11s all lllore mnjidena. I think ifJve had to get in a 
sit11ation, probab!J ... I know I )eel more roJljidentlmmm y o11 kno111 111hat to do no111 type qf thing. 
Theme 5: Survival techniques. Part of the practical training involved learning sun·ival 
techniques such as righting an O\'erturned life raft and using safety equipment in the dark 
and so on. Most participants felt that these new techniques gave them an essential tool 
for survival and increased their confidence in preparing for emergencies. They felt that 
these new techniques were imperative in their line of work and tha t they increased the 
possibility of survival. 
Participant: I don't kno111. I cerlain!J remember roming in over that raft-you kn0111, front up like that. 
I 've never seen that done before. I have one of those emergenry suits. I'm after trying I bat 011 probab!J five 
or six times. I'm a bit familiar with that. I 1vasn't familiar 111ith getting it 011 i11the dark. (laughter) 
0111 I ,·an do it, you kn01v,- but 1tprighting that rqft . . ... getting into the raft 1vas something else. 
Participant: Yeah. 
Participant: Yeah, the same tbing tbere like 111hen y ou take him (referring to life raft) 11p ... float 
him up to get him out of the 1vater and that . .. that, y ou kn0111 . .. 
Participant: Y eah. 
Partidpant: Yeah. 
Parlictpanl: ... Jllell thm, ijj ou didn't kno111 ho111 to do it or 111as mver sb01ved it y ou 111ouldn 't kno111 it. 
You'd scry - Jiu·k, I'm going to dro111n at!JIIIC!JI. (laughter) There 5 more room for someboc!J else. 
(laugbter) 
Theme 6: Practical training is the "best part" of MEDAl. Participants found 
practical training to be more educational and enjoyable than their classroom lesson . 
T hey felt that they learned a lot more by doing the rasks themselves than by hearing or 
seeing someone else do it. Fo r example: 
Partidpant: Yt•ah. I thought il1vas a l'f~JI good com:re. Spedai!J• all the hands on s/1~/l I merm_yo11 mn 
sit in the das.rroom all dcry and read about st1~//,. bulllntii)'OII act11ai!J do it . .. 
Partitipcmt: II ands on i.r about the be.rt pm1. 
Partitipant: . ·lnd thi.r is the stii//)'0/1 Jllill reltlember at !be exad . .. 
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And another example was: 
Parti£ipcmt: Yo11 kilO IV IJoJJJ to get on y o11r s11it. Yo11 k110111 a lot qf stt~/l- bow y o11 have /o get 011 a l!fe 
ra.Ji. LP'e m11er seen tbal done b~jore. 
Parlidpcmt: IV'e kn01v bow to gel in it. 
Partidpanl: IV'hen_yoN 've done .romethi11gy ou 'II remember it. U) o11 jmt bad read S0111elbi11g, it would 
)its/ go in and oNt. 
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4.2.3 Category 3: Attitudes Toward Safety Training 
I Jvouldn 'Ieven ha11e a due before 
Six themes were identified that described changes in participants attitudes toward safety 
training including: pertinent training, discovering body skills, impact o f training onboard 
a vessel, impact of training on awareness, shared responsibility and preparing for 
emergency. Participants described a change in attitudes toward the training both on the 
philosophical level (i.e., the regulatory mandate as noted above), and the practical 
usefulness of the program. They felt that they realized the implications o f its usefulness, 
and that they had gained substantial new knowledge about themselves, their strengths 
and potentials, and the basic utilization of some of the safety equipment, which up until 
now, most of them had not used. They felt that their training had given them the 
capacity to be able to judge for themselves the usefulness and necessity of their safety 
equipment. 
Theme 1: Pertinent training. Participants felt that their training helped them gain new 
knowledge that was necessary for them to perform their jobs safely. They felt that they 
would not have known how to react in an emergency had they not taken the course. 
They also felt that their training was relevant and applicable not only to their line of duty, 
but that it coulu also be applied in their daily life. Their training gave them necessary and 
pertinent information. For example: 
Partidpanl: Do _you remember . .. I /old ) 'Oil that I he 1ve are dismssing Jvttb the Lnivm-iry to have a one 
dqy co11rse to replaa Ibis three df!ys L"OIIrse for the stientist . . . b11t in fad, I think, having gom lhro11gh 
Ibis course, I think it is not ct good idea. I think doing the three dqy.r is absol11te(y massa'.J'· Bem11se 1ve 
arc lola!!J ignorant! / 1nd j iiJt having . . .. If it is not neassal)' at the boat it Jvi/1 be nm'JJCI? a/ home! 
/ lt!)'IVtry it is janlaslid 
:\ nd also: 
Partidpanl: I mean !/)'Oil go 011/ no1v and .rbe sink.r, it mean.r )'Oil hat>e ba(( a dJanre - more lhan.ro11 
did bl'_[ore. 
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T heme 2: Discovering body skills. Participant felt a positive change in themselves as 
a direct result of their training. They felt that they were able to do certain things that they 
had no knowledge or experience of before. fost participants had never been in the 
water and so they did not know, prior to their training, if their bodies would float or sink 
in water naturally. Discovering the limits and potentials of their own body was a major 
new lesson for them. For example: 
Participant: Ll?'e/1, dim bing up the net no1v and up the ladder I didn't Jind hard, but keeping my feet 
d01vn in the water. !.found that hard bet·ause they al1vays t·ome up. 
And also: 
Participant: o1v I wouldn't get in the water no1v without one qfthem Jllils on buawe I know I'm going 
to sink. 
Theme 3: Impact of training onboard a vessel. Post-training participants indicated 
that they would be making some serious safety changes onboard vessels as a direct result 
of their training. Their training made them think of the changes that were necessary 
rangmg from buying specific safety equipment (that was above the minimum 
requirement) to maintaining safety equipment to ensuring that the crew were compliant 
with safety procedures. For example: 
Partidpant: ll?'ell, I said to !Jim the other night, them emergenry Jllits are 011 his boat Jour or Jive years, I 
suppose, and they 1vere put on and put i11 a dose/ and they never mme out since. So I /old !Jim after 
Chris/mas we're going lo /m .ng them d01vn to the bouse . .. and tbry 're probab!J all ;;:_ippered up and . .. 
tight? We 'II haul them out cmd dry them out and sttdf, ngbt? 
.-\nd also: 
Partitipant: / lnd b~jorr .. . /;~fore ne.Yt Jlllmner, bejore lbt• ne.-...:1 .fishing .rea.ron is ot,er, tbt:fll be ... !be 
Jvbole cr01vd aboard q( "~Y boa/ will be in the water with them '· I 1 1 1 •· ·, 11 • • ) 011 too. 
T heme 4: Impact of training on awareness . Participants felt that they were more 
conscientious as a result of their training. They felt that their training gave them an 
experientia l knowledge about certain safety equipment and procedures that they woukl 
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otherwise not have acquired and this in turn made them more alert and vigilant. They 
felt a difference in their attitudes toward safety issues and claimed to be more proactive 
in dealing with hazard management. For example: 
Participant: It made me more mvare q/ 1vhat .. .. and stt~/l like that 011 her bew11se they lllq)' 110t be 
dmked the eq11ipme11t and all. They 're 11ot, I wo11/d scry, 011 a reg11lar basis. 01v I 'll be more ... )'OII'd 
better make s11re that's reac!J, ngbt? 
r\nd another example was: 
Partidpant: I don't k1101v- like other st11Jf that Jve med to p11t on a boat, VIII yo11 k now 1vhat I mean, it 
makes y o11 realize h01v 1111.raje we tm!J are. 
Theme 5: Shared Responsibility. Instead of relying on the skipper for instructions, 
participants felt that their training made them realize the importance o f everyone being 
vigilant about possible hazardous situations. Dealing with safety issues such as ensuring 
that the equipment is in working order or that it is kept in accessible places became a 
shared responsibility. Participants felt that their training gave them all equal knowledge 
and therefore equal responsibility about safety procedures. For example: 
Partidpant: They'd be more t'OIIterned,yes, and they'd be more mvare of it too became there's nothing . . . 
there's notbing wrong with a mw member d.Jecking on a raft to make s11rc the raft is ok, nght? f.Y/ /D' 
does the m w member got to wait for the skipper to tell him to do it, right? Like be said, they 
sho11ld've .. . tbe tTew member should scry something .. . like c·ome to the skipper a11d scry: this is o11tdated. 
Let him .. . 
Partidpa11t: If tmth be k noum, the skipper sho11ldn't bm1e to look aro11nd. There's wo11gb people goi11g 
aro11nd tbat boat to pass a look at tbe date 011 tbis or look at the date on tbat and come and let )'Oil 
k no1v t!Jat it is o11tdated. 
Partil'ipant: Yeah. 
And another example was: 
Participant: I wn see wbere)'OII dejlnite!y need eVC!]'OIIe to be tmimd. 
Participant: Y eab. 
Partidprllll: 1 'w/1. 
Participant: Et'eryborfy kn01v.r 1/lbat to do for .rmt!. 
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Theme 6: Preparing for emergency. Participants felt that their training made them 
realize the importance of being prepared for an emergency and instead of leaving 
survival to fate, participants' attitudes toward emergency was to be prepared for it at all 
times. They described a change in their behaviour, perceptions and attitudes toward 
emergency preparedness. For example: 
Partidpant: It's a lot better to be prepared with Jitmping ifl Jvith tbe suit OJJ Jar tbejirst lime tban baving 
it in y o11r lotker in your b11nk and St!Jing ... getting tbe tal/to sqy -get out now - because like evm 
before, being on a boat, )its! laking it out we hard!J ever took it out of tbe bag to look at it but no1v I 'II 
take it 011/ qfthe hag and make sure, rigbt? Make sure it's going to )it and make sure that I don't have 
a leaky one. (tlmck!eJ) 
And another example was: 
Partidpant: It makes yo11 more mvare too like of di.ffermt stuff 011 the boats, Jqy ... like when y ou get on 
her before- there's probab!J a mess on the deck -you j ust walk ry it and jus/ shove it ojj'like; but no1v 
1vhw you got on and yo11 see it, y ou prohab!J might straighten it up or something, nght? 
4.2.4 Attitudes Toward Regulatory Requirements 
I'm a believer 
Five themes emerged in this category including: :MEDAl puts everyone on the same 
level of preparedness/ response; change in attitudes toward the MEDA 1 requirement; 
MEDAl should be mandatory for all; MEDA3 is incomparable to MED 1; and, 
expensive safety requirements. Post-training group discussions indicated there was a 
dramatic change in attitudes toward the regulatory requirement to complete the 
MEDr\ 1. Participants felt that the training brought about a sense of shared knowledge 
and understanding - a baseline from which they could build a sense of trust in each 
other in terms of dealing with an emergency. They also acknowledged a change from 
feeling a strong repulsion Lu\ ard · the mandatory requirement to take the MED. \ I to 
being "happy" about being there. [ [aving experienced the training first hand, they \vcre 
able to judge the necessity and importance of the training as it related ro their 
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occupational environment and conceded that it was necessary for all seafarers to 
undergo the training before embarking on sea. They suggested that the MEDL\ 3 (which 
some participants had taken and could compare) be replaced by the MED1\l. In spite of 
fully endorsing the MEDAl, their concern of the expenses involved in fulfilling 
regulatory requirements remained strong. 
Theme 1: MEDA1 puts everyone on the same level of preparedness/response. 
Participants believed that the MEDA 1 training put everybody on the same level in terms 
of responding to an emergency. They felt that it helped them build trust in each other 
and felt strengthened by the knowledge that everybody onboard wo uld be on the same 
level in terms o f dealing with a hazardous situation. For example: 
Participant: W ell, I found on the ship no1v onboard .. . I 111as on (;m.• ,,·d.:; difl}- it's on!J a fishing boat 
- but, y ou know, there's people t:oming from different backgrotmds and noboc!J got the l"rnme. This 
course puts everyboc!J pretry much on the same level of response and everyboc!J has got the same ideas Of/ 
h01v thry 're going to respond to that emergenry. 
Theme 2: Change in attitudes toward the MEDA1 requirem ent. After they had 
undergone their training program, participants appreciated the requirement to complete 
the MEDA 1. They felt that it was worth doing the course and that they had gained 
substantially. For instance: 
Participattt: ~r;'e/1, ad11al(y, I probab!J 1V011Idn 't have come in; b11t 110111 that I got it done, I 111ould 
request someom to tome i11 and do it. I probab!J 111ouldn't come in on!J became it 111as required- but it's 
niL"e to k now 
And also: 
Faalita!ot7 Jf;/'ell, L"OT11i11g itt 110111 one q[)'ou said )'Ou're here bemuse t!'s required - mandatory. Does 
that still stand? { fOJV do j'OU.feel l/0111? 
Partidpant: ! feel d(fJerent about it 110111. 
Partir'ipant: 1 'I' a h. 
Partidpant: I lllean it's a good leamit~g e.Ypen·mce. I learned a lot. Keep itjh•.rh i11 )'Our mi11d and the 
ji.rhi11g JffiJOII t:r nolthrlt.far m11q_y again and I 'II do thing.r d!flermt altogether now. 
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One participant summed it up: 
Participant: I 'm a believer. 
Theme 3: MEDAl should be mandatory for all. At the end of the three-day course, 
participants appreciated the benefits of their training to the extent that they felt that it 
should be mandatory for all seafarers. Participants who were new to the job and had not 
had any safety orientation onboard felt the benefit of th.is training even more. They 
believed that had they not undergone the training, they would not have known how to 
deal with a hazardous situation. In addition to learning how to respond to an emergency, 
participants felt that the training made them understand how little they had known about 
hazards and about emergency preparedness. For example: 
Partitipant: I think it 1vent good. It was extiting and it's ... I don't know ... .. (laughs) No, but you 
shouldn't be allowed to go to sea 1vithout k no1ving all this stuff. Like I did a co11ple of trips om time 011 
tbis boat, the Ot·eaJJ Com·ord; and wbcn I first got 011 it, thry JJever took me aro11nd to show me their ... 
I think the skipper sh01ved me the fire stations, but that was it. H e never shotved me like anything, 
reai!J. 
Facilitator: Yeah. 
Partidpant: Right? A nd like if I bad goJJe down tbm, 1 1vouldn 't have bad a dm 1vhat I Jvas doing 
becaiiSe I JJever bad mry training. 
Fadlilator: Yeah. 
Partidpant: Yeah, so everyone should be jon"Cd to do Ibis. 
Another example was: 
Partitipcm/: {( lmth be k nou;n, we .rhould've never been allowed out tbere 1vitbout ... 
Parlitipant: ,'-..,"o, 1ve sbould no/ ba!Je. 
Theme 4: MEDA3 and MEDAl are incomparable. Some participan ts had prC\"iously 
participated in the t\IED \ 3 courst: which is required of ca farcrs going out within a 25-
mile radius. The i\ lED \ 3 delin red by the PFI ICB is part of a larger apprenticeship 
course which includes first-aid and basic seamanship, howe,·cr, it docs not involve 
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practical W11n1ng. The participants believed that the l\IEDA 1 was more suited to the 
needs of all seafarers regardless o f how far they travelled from shore. They felt that the 
MED1\ 3 was less effective as a training program and that they had learned a lot more in 
the l\IEDr\1 training because it had practical training. For example: 
Partidpant: o, but it should )or ever]'boc!J - iiiJicle and all ( · . , " _ ' - the same 
course that 1ve )its/ look. ff yo11 're aboard a boat ... you should have to take this e.Yad same cotme ij' 
y ou're goingjisbing. I look the other om, but it 1vas noi/Jbere near like thts one. It 1va.r a lo11ger courJe 
but I leamecl a lot more here than I die/ in that rotme )or jive days 
Another example was: 
Participant: There Jvas 110 bands-on, right. Thry're looking at stmdural training and no bands-on 111ith 
it. ll?'ell, y olf told us a lot of stuff; but 1/Jhen 111e see it, it 111as different. 
Participant: Hands-on stuff is a lot better. 
Theme 5: Expensive Safety Requirements. This was a common theme .in both pre-
and post-training gro up discussions. T hey were frustrated with all of the fees associated 
with the new regulations and believed that the overall cost resulting from meeting all of 
these regulatory requirements was substantial. For .instance: 
Participant: I mean for example, like the pi!Jsica/, right? I mean H:J monry - 80 bucks - and ten 
minifies in an office is a bil sleep in my opinion, you k110111. 
And another example was: 
Partidpant: But like I say, CII!JOne JJiitb a big boat . . . like I said, that I have 11110 qf those. Tlmt there's 
boat insurance. Then it's your dotkside monitoring. Tbm it's the observerji:es. f()'OU do ralmlate it all 
up,j•ou'cl be Sllrprised 111hat you pay out in a year. 
4.2.5 Recomm endations 
You muir/ probab!yiHIIJe a group qf 2 S or 30 and afelloi/J jtt.rt c'Oille in and <go tbrot(gh all this r~gain j us/ 
to .. . (maps.Jin,ger.r for empha.ris) that in )'OIIr mind, n'ght? 
Participants recommended that c.;\'(:rybody going out to sea complete the \fED.\ I 
course. The~· bclieYed that there should be no difference in training bc.:t\\'ecn the inshore 
(less than 25 miles) and offshore (more than 25 miles) seafarers. In addition to training 
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all sea farcrs, participants also recommended that the IED1\ 1 training be given to the 
seafarers' family members to help raise wider community awareness. I laving tested some 
of the equipment onboard, participants also recommended that the survival suit be made 
a regulatory requirement since they felt that it gave better pro tection than a life jacket 
(which is the minimum requirement). In addition to the current IEDA 1 training 
outline, participants also recommended the inclusion o f first aid training. They felt that 
dealing with an emergency situation would potentially require dealing with injured 
persons, therefore some knowledge of first aid was necessary and thus it needs to be 
included in the emergency preparedness training program. Some participants in the 
enhanced group found the instructional safety video clips to be outdated and 
recommended showing more relevant clips. Participants also strongly recommended 
implementing refresher MEDAl courses. They felt that the knowledge gained during 
their 3-day would need to be refreshed over time to get the maximum benefit. 
Them e 1: Community Awareness. Fishing is a family tradition. Post-training 
participants felt that the MEDAl training should be extended to all other family 
members of fish harves ters even those who were OT going o ut to sea. They felt that 
iovohring the larger community would increase safety awareness o f the community as a 
whole and also exert a stronger influence on other harvesters to complete MED1\ 1. 
They believed that the training would also help them manage their fear. 
Participant: S omelimes too .. . Ibis L'Ourse should be opmed /o not jml I be jisber people 1vbo are on t!Je 
boa!, but lnt!Jbe lo rxlwdedj(JJni!J - because I'm sure /bat ~(_your girlfiiend or_your w~/e or .. . knew 
wbctl ... )'Oif k now, 111bat l'tlll happen - wbo k nows; !bey .-ould light a )ire under them and .rc!y, _you 
k now, Ibis should be dom. I mean 1vben II(] /)l(.rband leave.r the wbcuf in lbc momi1~g, it'.r bim and "~Y 
three .ron.r on tbe boat. So I 111ert11 • •. and like IIJmtaliry ji1.rl goe.r into OL'erd1i11e. } ·au 're pidmi'z~ .r/1~0· 
happming ami wming . .. and .romeli111e.r 11111 're all out tbere - the ji1•e q/ u.r, fi..g/;1- 11nrl 1 llletln)'Oif try 
no/ /o lbink m,~aliJ•e, lmi_)'OU 'n: wonden'ng like, )'Oif kno1v. 
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Theme 2: Same MEDAl course for all. Participants who underwent the MED..:\3 
course (the training recommended for boats within the 25 mile zone) and could compare 
their experiences with the MED1\ 1 course felt that everybody going out to sea should 
take the MED1\ l. The ~fED.:\3 delivered by the PFHCB is part of a larger 
apprenticeship course. 1\nd, although it includes basic seamanship and fir t-aid training 
they felt that because the ~IEDi\3 lacked practical training sessions it was insufficient to 
prepare seafarers for emergencies. For example: 
Participant: . . . that w/Jetber y ou're 100 miles offibore or 1 mile ofjjiJore, you still mn 't swim. You still 
got to kn01v b01v to get in them suits and get in out of the 1vay . .. 
Parliapant: That's right. 
Parlit1"pant: . .. be,"tJ!fSe that's still Slfroiva/. Rvett tholfgh yolf're mile in tmd yo" see the land, you're still 
not going . .. 
And another example was: 
Participant: One thing I'd like the govemment ... there's one thing I'd like the govemmenl to change is 
the reqlfirement sholfld . .. this t"Oifrse ilse!f sbolfld've been required for all fishermen, 110 matter h01v Jar a 
distam·e yo" go. I'd reai!J like to see that - everyboc!J got the same course - and I said that from day 
one. Should be ofjered at . .. the extent that we ji1st did S holfldn 't be no less ... so now 1ve 're ajier leami11g 
a nice bit so it sbolfldn 't be 110 less. 
Theme 3: Include first aid with MEDAl. Participants felt that part of learning to deal 
with emergency and survival at sea was also learning to take care of medical emergencies 
such as dealing with an injured person onboard a life raft. They recommended orne first 
aid training be included in the ~IEDA 1 to complete it as emergency preparedness 
training. For example: 
Parliripanl: } "eab, I'd rf'L"OIIIIIIend that - Jhould be r1 It/lie bit ofjif:rt aid- /om·/; a !H"t onji1:rl air/. 
Parlicipcmt: ~/t/;~y're bumed l!y.fire or (/tbry 're mii!Y something, then lJ'OII JVt'Tt'fl '! tmint'f/, I suppose, 
1vhat to do Jvitb /bat, 1~gbt . 
. \ nd another example was: 
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Partidpant: You know, even the i\llED/ 13 .... like the first course I done- I mean even some of thejirst 
aid and jlfJt knowing - well, !f this happens, this is what y ou should do 110111- I'd be able to implement 
it 1vith .romething el.re. Like y ou saicl, y ou don't know unless )'Oil 're in the situatiotJ, how )'OU 're going to 
read, right? 
Theme 4: M andatory Survival Suits. Post-training participants felt that a survival suit 
was better suited to their needs than a life jacket. One of the changes they would like to 
see is the mandatory implementation of the survival suit. Despite the cost (and despite 
arguing against the implementation of new rules, and newer safety equipment that they 
had come to see as "regular hurdles" of the current fishing industry) they felt that 
survival suits were appropriate to their needs and would be a wise investment. For 
instance: 
Partidpant: I think those suits - those survival suits- thry should be mandatory for everyboc!J. Five or 
six hundred bm·ks- tbry're there for years and years and years, if you j ust look after them tbry 'll save 
y our life. 
Partidpant: It's not much for.. 
Partidpant: It's not a big investment. 
Participant: No. 
Partiapant: .. . like over . .. bo/llever mat!)' )'Cars y ou got leji in the fishery- 10.. . 15 or 1vhatever it is. 
Partidpant: Yeah. 
Another example: 
Partidpant: That .rhould come doum to government too. I mean some things y ou got .. . y ou got . . . nght 
now y ou're ticketed if y ou haven'! got y our seatbelt on, right, but 1ve can go on a fi.rhingj ob without a suit 
T heme 5: So-so video clips. Participants were indifferent toward the video clips shown 
during class. \Vhile so me felt that the clips were informative, others felt that some o f the 
lessons were not applicable to the size of their boat or that the material shown was out 
o f date. f<or example one said: 
Parliapant: .·1 lot of those dips though .ra m datffl. /1 lot qfthat st!(/f looks prl'try old. 1 'm .wre )'OU tW I 
come up with IJeJver . . . 
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And another said: 
Parliapant: I think a lot of the 11ideo dips too the kind q/stu(}"that we're no/ going to look at at!)'IJJ'f}-
like 011 big boats. 
Theme 6: MEDAl Refresher Courses. Participants recommended a refresher 
MEDr\1 training course. They recommended that the refresher version could be 
shortened to only include the practical training. They believed that the practical training 
was very important and pertinent to their work and that it needed to be rehearsed over 
time. 
Fadlilator. And then jmt to wrap this up, how bas tbis changed your pemption of training? And going 
awqy noJv, do you feel tbat you .. . 
Partitipant: ~1:/'el/, deflnite!J think that it should be taught more ... 
Partitipant: OJJ yeah. 
Partitipant: And every so often get an update. 
Partitipant: Yeah. It wouldn't burt. Well, at least tbm . . . 
Partitipant: And I Jvou/dn 'I think you wouldn't . .. you probab(y wouldn't have to do it as s~~t·h as a 
small dass. You could probab!J have a group of 25 or 30 and a fellow jitSt wme in and go through all 
this again just to ... (snaps fingers )or emphasis) that in )'OUr mind, right? Like yo11 don 't have to go 
back to !be dassroom, right,- and then, ifyo/1 bad a wuple .. . like 1ve got three fell01vs here, so ij)ou bad 
25 or 30, then go over so much. You take so ma'!Y and Jitst throw them in the JJJater a11d Jitst ... 
(laughter) 
4.3 Common Findings: Pre- and Post-Training Attitudes Toward the Fishery 
Noboc!J else is going to get into it. 
five themes emerged as a common concern in both pre- and post-training discussions 
regarding the tishery. These were: no future in the fishery, discouraging the fishery as a 
future option, comprehensive professional work jobs and no more \vork jobs', instability 
and having a fall back option anu no safety training funds for teenagers. Participants 
pcrceiYcd the industry as Jying out. They could not sec a future in the fishery to 
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encourage the next generation. They felt that the demand in the fishing industry was 
shifting towards a more professional occupation and that fishing as it used to be was 
dying out. They felt frustrated by this change and felt that they must now find alternative 
sources of income. They discouraged the next generation from entering the fishery and 
those who were involved were being encouraged to have an exit strategy or at least a fall 
back option. Additionally, participants were finding it hard to train their next generation 
since, traditionally, youngsters are trained on the job but they are not able to take them 
onboard anymore since there are no safety training funds for teenagers. 
Theme 1: No Future in the Fishery. Participants could not see a future in the fishery 
anymore. They felt that their generation was the last one and that the younger generation 
would not be taking the same road into the fishery as they had: 
Participant: j'vfy opinion no1v - once our class goes, that's it! because tbe 1vqy the fishery is going noJIJ 
it's . . . noboc!J else is going to get into it. 
Participant: There are so many factors tbere involved 1vitb the JIJq)' it's going and that, I t'Cin 't see a lot of 
y oung people going doum tbe same road 1ve're after going doJIJn. I can't see it. It might be dijforent. 
Theme 2: Discouraging the fishery as a future option. Participants felt that the 
fishery was riddled with obstacles and that every year there were new regulations and 
hurdles to deal with. Realizing the hardship and uncertainty of the fishery, participants 
encouraged their children into education and other areas. 
Participant: That~r like "9' daughter - like l'l'ery dq;• JIJhm she goes to .rcboo/, I Sf!JS gei )'OUr rdumlion 
because y ou got to ,get out oj'1 'eu;foundland, cmd a lot rij'people is like !bat no1v bm.mse there's nothing 
!Jere, rigbt? So I can 't see other people going doing ... getting into !be .fishery. 
Partitipanl: U:'d/, tbere 's tiJe part ... 1vel/, JIJIJat)'OU go tiJrougb every year. ) ·au k no1v, I'Ve~y )'l'tlf tbere 's 
.rometbing !Ifill coming up and it'.r another obstacle )'OU got to try to rross, ) 'Off k no111. So, like I said, 
people roming o!ft - especiai!J !be _yoto~ger J)l'oplr - tbry 're more or less . .. th~y're not ,going to do ... I 
gueJ'S, goit~g 011 !be road like 1ve 're at, right? I mn'l see them II!J'IVtfY. 
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Theme 3: Competitive professional options and no more 'work jobs'. Part of the 
problem with encouraging young people into the fishery was the booming oil industry. 
Participants felt the drain on their population as more and more of the younger 
generation were attracted to the newer industry. Additionally, the labour market was 
changing such that it demanded more professionals with academic background. One 
participant described manual labour as 'work job' and how there was less demand for 
labour intensive work such as fishing. 
Partitipanl: It seems like more ... the younger crowd 110111 out of school and ,·oming 0111 q/sdJool are all 
goingjor the oil jobs. 
P artitipanl: yeah. 
Participant: It mms to be laking over a lot from the jishery tiOJV. 
Partitipat~t: One lime notv, zj 1vas lzke an eledridan or plumber. There's none of that 110111. You're a 
met·hanical engineer. You're an electn·cal engineer. That's what everyone goes f?y, 1ight? There's none of 
these .. .. I call them '111orkjobs~ 
Theme 4: Instability and Fallback options. Due to the uncertain nature of the 
fishery, fish harvesters were encouraging the next generation who are employed in the 
fishery to get an alternative career as a fallback option for when the fishery fails again. 
Partidpanl: Like I mean y ou got . .. the average I'd sqy now are late 40's, ear!J 50 :r. That's 111hat's l~ji; 
a11dthe 111qy everything is going 110111 in this fishery, there's 110 1/C,'d gmeralion. Like there's 110 ... there's 
no/ goi11g to be 110 ei/COIIragemelltjrom like husbat1ds a11d 111ives or fathers a11d mothers to emrmrage their 
children to go into this beca11se there's 110 stabili!J there. So like the biggest thing is fear. I mean .. . 
Partidpa11t: Yo11 are almost /11med qff 1/0JV. 
Partidpa11t: Y es. Yo11 're encouragi11g them 110/ i11to it - to go i11to al/otherjielcl- a11d it's Si"tll)' bemuse 
the mqj01i(y of them . .. I meal/ I ,got tbree .ro11s 111ho love it 011 the 1vater, but 1ve rouldt1 '! with all 
wnsde11a enm11rage tbcm to go i11to 111itbout something behi11d them to back them up for when thts Jiulr 
agmtl. 
Theme 5: No safety training funds for teenagers. !-"ish han·esters are trained on the 
job from a very young age. This helps to keep earnings within the family unit and it gives 
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children an understanding of their way of life and an appreciation of their parents' work. 
However, as the MED1\ 1 is mandatory for all on board, and there arc no funding for 
young adults to participate in l\fED1\ 1, families were finding it hard to take them out to 
work and to train them at sea. For instance one participant said: 
Partidpant: Okqy- because that's where like the mty'ori(y ~/the people that are doing this course are 
sponsored Right? So a1ryom that's 14, 15, 16 is out ofpm·ket but where you're losing ... where the 
padidpation is being lost is tbe fimdingpart. You got to be EI eligible itJ order to be.Jimded, right? 
And also: 
ParticipatJt: Bec·ause I t'alled about my son - tbe 16~year-old- because I 1vould've loved for him to do it. 
0111 the other /Jvo .. . nry other llvo children dom it through the Marine Institute 1vith the courses that 
thry done, right; but they told me that be 1vas too young. 
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CHAPTERS 
Questionnaire findings 
5.1.1 Gender, Age & Experience at Sea 
A total of 94 students of MEDA 1 participated in this study (Table 5.1.1 ). There were 80 
men and 14 women participants with a mean age of 41.5 years, ranging from 18 to 62 
years (s.d. 11.07). The number of females in individual groups and in total was 
significantly lower than the number of males (p<0.001). There was no significant 
relationship between gender and group (p>0.05). The mean years of experience at sea 
was 16 years (s.d. 11.43) with some participants having no experience at all, whilst others 
had had up to 46 years of experience. The enhanced group consisted of 46 participants 
whilst the standard group consisted of 48 participants. There was no significant 
difference between the enhanced and standard group with respect to gender attribution, 
mean age, mean years of experience at sea or the number of participants in each group. 
Table 5.1.1: Gender, Age & Experience at Sea 
Enhanced Standard Total 
Gender • % Male (N) 91.3 (42) 79.2 (38) 85.1 (80) b 
% Female (N) 8.7 (4) 20.8 (10) 14.9 (14) 
Age e Mean 41.26 41.73 41.5 
Standard Deviation 11.6 10.66 11.07 
Minimum 22 18 18 
Maximum 61 62 62 
Years of Experience at Seau 
Mean 17.36 15.19 16.27 
Standard Deviation 11.59 11.3 11.43 
Minimum 0 0 0 
t-.·1aximum 45 46 46 
% Total Participants (Nt 48.9 (46) 51.1 (48) 100 (94) 
a. There is no significant relationship between gender and group (x2=2. 73, p> 0.05, d.f. = I) 
b. Total number of males is significantly higher tlnn the total number o f females (x2= -t6.34, 
p<0001, d .f.= l) 
c. o significant difference in mean age between the two groups (2 tailed t-test; t = 0.201, 
p>O.OS, d.f. = 85) 
d. o significant difference in mean years of experience at sea between the two groups (two 
tailed t-test; t=-0.898, p>O.OS, d.f. = 88) 
e. No significant difference in the number of participants between the two groups (x2=0.0-t3, 
p>O 05, cl.f.= I) 
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5.1.2. Occupation 
Proportion of fish harvesters (81 %) in the study was significantly higher than all other 
occupations combined (x2=37 .43, d. f.= 1, p<0.001; Table 5.1.2). Non-fish harvesters 
included the 'seafarer' category and the 'other' category of participants. Participants who 
checked the 'other' category described themselves as research scientists working with the 
DFO in offshore vessels, fisheries scientist, shore captain, researcher, an ordinary 
seaman and a marine geologist. A significant proportion of participants (79%) worked in 
boats larger than 35 feet (l=42.77, d.f.=1, p<0.001) and the proportion of crew (63%) 
was significantly higher than a combination of proportions of skipper, both skipper and 
crew and those who described themselves as other (x2=6.128, d.f.=1, p<0.05). 
Table 5.1.2: Occupation 
% Enhanced % Standard %Total 
Principal Occupation 
Fish Harvester 76.1 (35) 85.4 (41) 80.9 (76)' 
Seafarer 4.3 (2) 10.4 (5) 7.4 (7) 
Other 17.4 (8) 4.2 (2) 10.6 (10) 
Missing 2.2 (1) 0 1.1 (1) 
Role on the Vessel 
Crew 60.9 (28) 64.6 (31) 62.8 (59) b 
Skipper 19.6 (9) 20.8 (10) 20.2 (19) 
Both 4.3 (2) 2.1 (1) 3.2 (3) 
Other 15.2 (7) 12.5 (6) 13.8 (13) 
Size of Boat 
Less than 35 feet 17 . .f (8) 10.4 (5) 13.8 (13) 
More than 35 feet 78.3 (36) 79.2 (38) 78.7 (74) c 
Both 2.2 (1) 10.4 (5) 6.4 (6) 
Missing 2.2 (1) 0 1.1 (1) 
Total Participants 48.9 (46) 51.1 (48) 100 (94) 
a. Total number of Fish Harvesters was significantly higher than all other occupations (x2=37.-B, 
d.f = 1, p< 0.001) 
b. Total number of crew was higher than all other role on vessel (x~=6.128, d. f.= 1, p<O.OS) 
c. There were significantly higher number of boats that were more than 35 feet (x~=.f2. 77, d. f. = I, 
p<O.OO I) 
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5.2 Accident causes 
1\nalyses of internnl/ behavioural, external/ situational and other causes of accidents at 
sea are presented below (Tables 5.2.1 , 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 respectively). Respondents in the 
enhanced group show a significant difference in two internal/ behavioural items (rushing 
level of safety training) and three external/situational items (slippery deck, stress, 
experience of crew). In contrast, respondents in the standard group show significant 
difference in only one internal item (speeding) and one external item (boat size) . Group 
difference in responses is not statistically significant. 
5.2.1. Perceptions of Importance of Internal/Behavioural Items 
Table 5.2.1 identifies the proportion of participants in each group before and after the 
intervention who described the 10 internal causes as very important, important, slightly 
important or not important. It shows more than three quarters of the participants 
perceived alcohol, overloading and carelessness as very important behavioural factors 
that caused accidents at sea both prior to and after their training (similar to Murray & 
D olomount, 1994). There was an increase in the number o f participants, after the 
training, who rated rushing, level of safety training and overpowering/ speeding the boat 
as very important behavioural facto rs that caused accidents at sea (similar to Murray & 
D olomount, 1994). The former two internal/beha,rioural factors were significant for the 
enhanced group while the latter was significant fo r the standard group. Also, there was 
an increase in the proportion of participants who perceived 'safety awareness o f self in 
Lhe enhanccJ group as an impo rtant contributory factor toward accident causation; 
altho ugh, this was no t statistically significant. 
107 
Table 5.2.1 Pre- and Post-Training Score Differences in Internal/Behavioural Perce,etions Items 
Wilcoxon test 
Perceptions Before After two-tailed 
INTERNAL % Very % Imp. 0/o % Not Mean % Very % Imp. Slightly % Not Mean 
BEHAVIORAL Imp. (N) (N) Slightly Imp.(N) score Imp. (N) (N) Imp. (N) Imp. score z p 
lm . 
Alcohol 
Standard 89.6 (43) 0 2.1 (1) 6.3 (3) 3.77 8S.4 (41) 8.3 (4) 2.1 ( I) 4.2 (2) 3.7S -0.142c 0.887 
Enhanced 89.1 (41 ) 6.5(3) 2.2 ( I) 2.2 (I) 3.83 87 (40) 10.9 (S) 2.2 (I) 0 3.8S O.OOOa 1.000 
Overloading 
Srandard 85.4 (-H) 12.5 (6) 0 2.1 (1) 3.81 91.7 (44) 6.3 (3) 2.1 (1) 0 3.90 -0.832c 0.-+05 
Enhanced 89.1 (41) 8.7 (4) 2.2 (1) 0 3.87 76.1 (3S) 19.6 (9) 4.3 (2) 0 3.72 -1.6S8b 0.097 
Carelessness 
Standard 81.3 (39) I 0.4 (S) 4.2 (2) 2.1 (1) 3.74 79.2 (38) 16.7 (8) 2.1 (1) 2.1 (1) 3.73 -0.206b 0.837 
Enhanced 76.1 (3S) 17.4 (8) 2.2 (1) 0 3.77 73.9 (34) 23.9 (11) 0 0 3.76 -0.277b 0.782 
Overworking 
Standard 68.8 (33) 31.3 (1S) 0 0 3.69 70.8 (34) 22.9 (11) 4.2 (2) 0 3.68 O.OOOa 1.000 
Enhanced S2.2 (2-l) 37 (17) 10.9 (S) 0 3.41 S2.2 (24) 43.S (20) .u (2) 0 3.48 -0.632c 0.527 
Tiredness 
Standard 62.S (30) 27.1(13) 6.3 (3) 2.1 ( I) 3.S3 66.7 (32) 27.1 (13) 6.3 (3) 0 3.60 -0.97Sc 0.329 
Enhanced 69.6 (32) 21.7 (1 0) 8.7 (4) 0 3.61 S4.3 (2S) 34.8 (16) 6.S (3) 0 3.50 -1.291 b 0.197 
Overpowering/ 
Speeding 
Standard S6.3 (27) 27. 1 (13) l 0.4 (S) 6.3 (3) 3.33 70.8 (34) 20.8 (10) 6.3 (3) 2.1 (1) 3.60 -2.27Sc 0.023 
Enhanced 47.8 (22) 28.3 (13) 13 (6) 10.9 (S) 3.13 S6.S (26) 23.9 (11) 13 (6) 6.S (3) 3.30 -1.734c 0.083 
Rushing 
Standard 47.9 (23) 29.2 (14) 16.7 (8) 6.3 (3) 3.1 9 S4.2 (26) 31.3 (IS) 10.4 (S) 4.2 (2) 3.3S -1.1 09c 0.268 
Enhanced 32.6 (IS) 41.3 (19) 21.7 (10) 4.3 (2) 3.02 4S.7 (21) 39.1 (18) 10.9 (S) 2.2 (1) 3.31 -2.090c 0.037 
Sickness 
Standard 39.6 (19) 29.2 (14) 20.8 (10) 5 (1 0.4) 2.98 41.7 (20) 33.3 (16) 20.8 (1 0) 2 (4.2) 3.13 -1.286c 0.198 
Enhanced 32.6 (1S) 3-+.8 (16) 21.7 (10) 8.7 (4) 2.93 37 (17) 34.8 (16) 28.3 (13) 0 3.09 -0.9S2c 0.3-l I 
Safe · awareness 
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Wilcoxon test 
P erceptions Before After two-tailed 
INTERNAL % Very % Imp. % % Not Mean % Very % Imp. Slightly % Not Mean 
BEHAVIORAL Imp. (N) (N) Slightly Imp.(N) score Imp. (N) {N) Imp. (N) Imp. score z p 
Im 
self 
' tandard 81.3 (39) 18.8 (9) 0 0 3.81 79.2 (38) 16.7 (8) 4.2 (2) 0 3.75 -0.728b 0.467 
Enhanced 6 7.4 (31) 32.6 (15) 0 0 3.67 82.6 (38) 17.4 (8) 0 0 3.83 -1.94lc 0.052 
Level safety 
tra1Jllilg 
Standard 7'2. 9 (35) 22.1 (II ) 2.1 (I) 2.1 (!) 3.67 75 (36) 20.8 (10) 4.2 (2) 0 3.71 -0.318c 0.751 
Enhanced 58.7 (27) 39.1 (18) 2.2 (!) 0 3.57 80.4 (37) 17.4 (8) 2.2 ( I) 0 3.78 -2.310c 0.021 
Diffcn:nces in 
total scores 
Standard -1.098a 0.272 
Enhanced -0.703 0.482 
a The swn of negative ranks equal the swn of positive ranks 
b Based on positi,·e ranks 
c Based on negative ranks 
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5.2.2. Perceptions o f Importance of External/Situational Item s 
Table 5.2.2 identifies the proportion of participants in each group before and after the 
intervention who described the 10 external causes as very important, important, slightly 
important or not important in accident causation. [ore than two thirds of the pre-
training participants from the enhanced group perceived rough sea and safety awareness 
of crew as very important factors while more than three quarters from the standard 
group perceived rough sea, safety awareness of crew and slippery deck as very important 
factors in causing accidents at sea ( imilar to Murray & Dolomount, 1994). After the 
training, more than two-thirds from both groups perceived rough sea, slippery deck, 
poor safety regulations, untidy deck, safety awareness of crew and lack of a safety culture 
to be very important factors in cau ing accidents. Three items hawed a significant 
increase in the enhanced group: stress, slippery deck and experience of crew while one 
item showed a significant decrease in perceived importance in the standard group: size of 
boat. 
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Table 5.2.2. Pre- and Post-Training Score Differences in External/Situational PerceEtions Items 
Wilcoxon test 
Perceptions Before After two-tailed 
EXTERNAL 0/o 
SITUATIONAL Slightly %Very Slightly % Not 
%Very % Imp. Imp. Mean Imp. % Imp. Imp. Imp. Mean 
lm . score score z 
Rough Sea 
tandard 77. 1 (37) 18.8 (9) 0 2.1 (1) 3.74 66.7 (32) 29.2 (1 4) 2.1 (1) 2.1 (1) 3.60 -1.216b 0.22-t 
Enhanced 69.6 (32) 26.1 ( 12) 4.3 (2) 0 3.65 73.9 (34) 17.4 (8) 8.7 (4) 0 3.65 O.OOOa 1.000 
Slippery deck 
Standard 75 (36) 18.8 (9) 0 2.1 (1) 3.74 75 (36) 22.9 (1 1) 2.2 (1) 0 3.73 -0.378c 0.705 
Enhanced 56.5 (26) 34.8 (16) 6.5 (3) 0 3.51 76.1 (35) 21.7 (10) 2.2 (1) 0 3.74 -2.357c 0.018 
Poor safety 
regulations 
Standard 64.6(31) 22.9 ( 11) 6.3 (3) 6.3 (3) 3.46 70.8 (34) 22.9 (1 1) 4.2 (2) 2.1 (1) 3.63 -1.370c 0.17 1 
Enhanced 5-t.3 (25) 32.6 (15) 10.9 (5) 2.2 (1) 3.39 63 (29) 30.4 (14) 6.5 (3) 0 3.57 -1.228c 0.219 
Untidy Deck 
Standard 64.6 (3 1) 25 (12) 2. 1 (1) 4.2 (2) 3.57 66.7 (32) 20.8 (10) 6.3 (3) 4.2 (2) 3.53 -0.028b 0.978 
EnhanceJ 60.9 (28) 26.1 (12) 6.5 (3) 0 3.58 71.7 (33) 19.6 (9) 6.5 (3) 0 3.67 -1.069c 0.285 
Stress 
Standard 52.1 (25) 39.6 (19) 4.2 (2) 4.2 (2) 3.40 60.4 (29) 29.2 (14) 8.3 (4) 2.1 (1) 3.48 -0.676c 0.499 
Enhanced 37 (17) 43.5 (20) 13 (6) 2.2 (1) 3.20 56.5 (26) 32.6 (15) 10.9 (5) 0 3.46 -2.828c 0.005 
Bad Luck 
Standard 8.3 ( -t) 18.8 (9) 14.6 (7) 58.3 (28) 1.77 14.6 (7) 18.8 (9) 4.2 (2) 62.5 1.85 -0.579c 0.563 
Enhanced 8.7 (4) 6.5 (3) 28.3 (13) 56.5 (26) 1.67 4.3 (2) 10.9 (5) 28.3 (13) (30) 1.63 -0.284b 0.776 
56.5 
(26) 
Expenence of Crew 
Standard 62.5 (30) 31.3 (15) 0 6.3 (3) 3.50 64.6 (31 ) 14.6 (7) 12.5 (6) 6.3 (3) 3.40 -0.58-tb O.:'i59 
Enhanced 65.2 (30) 26. 1 (12) 6.5 (3) 0 3.60 41 .3 (19) 47.8 (22) 8.7 (4) 2.2 (1) 3.28 -2.480b 0.0 13 
Safety awan.:ncss 
Ill 
Wilcoxon test 
Perceptions Before After two-tailed 
EXTERNAL % 
SITUATIONAL Slightly % Very Slightly % Not 
% Very % Imp. Imp. Mean Imp. % Imp. Imp. Imp. Mean 
lm score score z 
crew 
• tandard 79.2 (38) 18.8 (9) 2.1 (1 ) 0 3.77 72.9 (35) 20.8 (10) 6.3 (3) 0 3.67 -1.127b 0.260 
Enhanced 69.6 (32) 30.4 (14) 0 0 3.70 80.4 (37) 19.6 (9) 0 0 3.80 -1.667c 0.096 
Lack of a safery 
culture 
Standard 58.3 (28) 29.2 (14) 8.3 (4) 4.2 (2) 3.42 66.7 (32) 18.8 (9) 8.3 (4) 6.3 (3) 3.46 -0.380c 0.70-t 
Enhanced 52.2 (24) 37 (17) 8.7 (4) 0 3.44 71.7 (33) 17.4 (8) 8.7 (4) 0 3.6-t -1.708c 0.088 
Boat size 
' tandard 58.3 (28) 27. 1 (13) 8.3 (4) 4.2 (2) 3.43 43.8 (21) 25 (12) 16.7 (8) 12.5 (6) 3.02 -2.143b 0.032 
Enhanced 5-+.3 (25) 23.9 (11) 13 (6) 8.7 (4) 3.24 37 (17) 37 (17) 19.6 (9) 6.5 (3) 3.04 -1.519b 0.129 
Difference · in total 
scores 
Standard 
-0.970b 0.332 
Enhanced -0.977 0.329 
a The sum of negatiYc ranks equal the sum of positive ranks 
b Based on positive ranks 
c Based on negative ranks 
11 2 
5.2.3 . Perceptions o f Impo rtance o f Other Perception Ite ms 
Table 5.2.3 shows the proportion of participants in each group who identified the tive 
other items of perception as either very important, important, slightly important or not 
important in causing accidents at sea. Although none of the results shows any significant 
difference between the pre-and post-training scores, more than half of the pre- and post-
training participants from both groups thought that the colour of boat and individual's 
height were not important in causing accidents at sea. 
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T able 5.2.3 Pre- and Post-Training Score Differences of Other Perceptions Items 
Wilcoxon test 
Perceptions Before Mter two-tailed 
OTHER % % 
% Very %Imp. Mean %Very % Imp. Mean z p 
Im . score lm . score 
\X'ater 
temperature 
Standard 39.6 (19) 16.7 (8) 16.7 (8) 27.1 (13) 2.69 27.1 (13) 18.8 (9) 12.5 (6) 41.7 (20) 2.31 - 1.889b 0.059 
Enhanced 23.9 (11 ) 19.6 (9) 23.9 (11) 32.6 (15) 2.35 32.6 (15) 19.6 (9) 23.9 (11) 21.7 (10) 2.64 -1.317c 0.188 
Type of Fish 
Standard 31.3 (15) 37.5 (18) 16.7 (8) 14.6 (7) 2.85 20.8 (10) 31.3 (15) 18.8 (9) 29.2 (14) 2.44 -1.901 b 0.057 
Enhanced 13 (6) 34.8 (16) 28.3 (13) 21.7 (10) 2.40 15.2 (7) 21.7 (1 0) 34.8 (16) 28.3 (13) 2.24 -1.186b 0.236 
Time of Day 
Standard 20.8 (10) so (24) 8.3 (4) 20.8 (10) 2.71 31.3 (15) 35.4 (17) 10.4 (5) 22.9 (11) 2.75 -0.286c 0.775 
Enhanced 21.7 (1 0) 28.3 (13) 26.1 (12) 21.7 (10) 2.51 17.4 (8) 28.3 (13) 34.8 (16) 19.6 (9) 2.43 -0.22.4b 0.823 
Boat colour 
Standard 6.3 (3) 1 0.-J. (5) 16.7 (8) 66.7 (32) 1.56 10.4 (5) 12.5 (6) 6.3 (3) 66.7 (32) 1.65 -0.680c 0.-+96 
Enhanced -+.3 (2) 13 (6) 19.6 (9) 63.0 (29) 1.59 4.3 (2) 15.2 (7) 13 (6) 67.4 (31) 1.57 -0.188b 0.851 
Your height 
Standard 4.2 (2) 6.3 (3) 25 (12) 62.5 (30) 1.51 4.2 (2) 16.7 (8) 18.8 (9) 60.4 (29) 1.65 - 1.185c 0.236 
Enhanced 4.3 (2) 8.7 (4) 26.1 (12) 60.9 (28) 1.57 4.3 (2) 8.7 (4) 26.1 (12) 60.9 (28) 1.57 -0.082c 0.935 
a The swn of negatiYe ranks equal the sum of positive ranks 
b Based on positi\'e ranks 
c Based on negative ranks 
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5.2.4 Differences Between Group Scores 
Comparison of post-training perceptions scores between the enhanced and standard 
groups shows no significant difference in either the internal or external perceptions 
scores (p>0.05; Table 5.2.-t). 
Table 5.2.4: Group Differences in Internal and External Post-Training 
Perce£tions Scores 
Post-training Mean Sum of Mann Whitney U 
Perceptions cores N Rank Ranks z 2-tailed p 
Internal Enhanced 44 43.94 1933.50 -0.725 0.234 
tandard 47 47.93 2252.50 
External Enhanced 44 44.14 1942.00 -0.313 0.377 
tandard 45 45.84 2063.00 
5.3. Attitudes to Safety 
Analysis of individual attitude items within the six subscales: skepticism, responsibility, 
boatmanship, vessel restrictions, regulations and risk acceptance are presented in Tables 
5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 5.3.4, 5.3.5 and 5.3.6 respectively. The enhanced group showed a 
significant difference in one individual skepticism item, two individual responsibility 
items and two individual regulation items; in contrast, the standard group showed a 
significant difference in one individual responsibility item and one individual 
boatmanship item only. Respondents in the standard group showed no significant 
difference in any of the attitude subscales whilst respondents in the enhanced group 
showed a significant difference in attitudes toward responsibility and regulations (Table 
5.3.7). There was no significant difference in overall attitudes scores between the two 
groups (Table 5.3.8). 
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5.3.1 Skepticism Items: Table 5.3.1 identifies the proportion of participants in each 
group before and after the intervention who strongly agreed, agreed, didn't know, 
disagreed or strongly disagreed with a series of statements skeptical of safety 1ssues. 
There was a larger proportion of participants from both groups who disagreed, after the 
intervention, with the statement: All the safety equipment you are required to carry 
clutters up the boat. Although this change was not significant for the standard group it 
was significant for the enhanced group. More than two thirds of the participants from 
both groups disagreed or strongly disagreed with the following statements both before 
and after the intervention: 
• If you are worried about safety you wouldn't get your job done. 
• The government spends too much time and resources on safety at sea. 
• The reason I carry the required safety equipment is so that I won't receive a fine . 
• All too often, strict adherence to the safety rules and regulations causes more 
trouble than it's worth. 
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Table 5.3.1 Pre- and Post-Training Score Differences in Ske;eticism Items 
Wilcoxon rest 
SKEPTIC IS:\! Before .After rwo-tailed 
"t o % % Strongly 0/o % Don't 0/o % Strongly 
Strongly 0 o Agree % Don't Disagree Disagree Strongly % Agree Know Disagree Disagree z p 
.\gree (1\:) C') Know (N) (l\.1) (N) .Agree (l\.1) (N) (N) 1) (N) 
Skept. 1 
Standard 6.3 (3) 12.5 (6) 8.3 (4) 56.3 (27) 16.7 (8) 6.3 (3) 16.7 (8) 2.1 (1) 41.7 (20) 33.3 (16) -0.747a 0.45;) 
Enhanced 4.3 (2) 15.2 (7) 13 (6) 47.8 (22) 17.4 (8) 2.2 (1) 8.7 (4) 6.5 (3) 54.3 (25) 26.1 (12) -2.119a 0.034 
Skepr. 2 
Standard 14.6 (7) 33.3 (16) 4.2 (2) 31.3 (IS) 12.5 (6) 6.3 (3) 39.6 (19) 6.3 (3) 31.3 (15) 14.6 (7) -0.723a 0.470 
Enhanced 8.7 (4) 30.4 (14) 10.9 (5) 34.8 (16) 15.2 (7) 10.9(5) 26.1 (12) 15.2 (7) 30.4 (14) 17.-t (8) -0.036b 0.971 
Skcpr. 3 
Standard 10.4 (5) 16.7 (8) 6.3 (3) 52.1 (25) 12.5 (6) 4.2 (2) 20.8 (10) 10.4 (5) 41 .7 (20) 18.8 (9) -0.379a 0.704 
Enhanced 2.2 (1) 13 (6) 21.7 (10) 52.2 (24) 10.9 (5) 2.2 (1) 13 (6) 13 (6) 47.8 (22) 21.7 (10) -1.196a 0.232 
Skept. 4 
Standard 8.3 (4) 10.4 (5) 10.4 (5) 47.9 (23) 20.8 (10) 2.1 (1) 29.2 (14) 4.2 (2) 41.7 (20) 18.8 (9) -0.534b 0.593 
Enhanced 0 21.7 (10) 19.6 (9) 45.7 (21) 8.7 (4) 0 21.7 (10) 15.2 (7) 45.7 (21) 17.4 (8) -0.863a 0.388 
Skepr. 5 
Standard 6.3 (3) 16.7 (8) 6.3 (3) 52.1 (25) 14.6 (7) 2.1 (1) 22.9(11) 2.1 (1) 45.8 (22) 27.1 (13) -1.258a 0208 
Enhanced 0 10.9 (5) 6.5 (3) 67.4 (31) 13 (6) 0 10.9 (5) 2.2 (1) 63 (29) 23 .9(11) -0.941a 0.347 
Skcpt. G 
Standard 4.2 (2) 2.1 (1) 6.3 (3) 54.2 (26) 31.3 (15) 0 2.1 (1) 8.3 (4) 45.8 (22) 43.8(2 1) - 1.-l28a 0.153 
Enhanced 0 2.2 (1) 6.5 (3) 60.9 (28) 28.3 (13) 4.3 (2) 2.2 (1) 4.3 (2) 58.7 (27) 30.4 (14) -0.028b 0.978 
Skepr. 7 
Standard 4.2 (2) 6.3 (3) 4.2 (2) 54.2 (26) 29.2 (14) 8.3 (4) 12.5 (6) 0 45.8 (22) 31.3 (15) -1.114b 0.265 
Enhanced 0 6.5 (3) 4.3 (2) 63 (29) 26.1 (12) 2.2 (I) 6.5 (3) 4.3 (2) 63 (29) 23.9 (II) -0.426b 0.670 
Skcpt. 8 
Standard 8.3 (4) 8.3 (4) 8.3 (4) 56.3 (27) 16.7 (8) 4.2 (2) 12.5 (6) 2.1 (I) 4 1.7 (20) 37.5 (18) -1.266a 0.206 
Enhancc:d 4.3 (2) 13 (G) 10.9 (5) 52.2 (24) 19.6 (9) 0 15.2 (7) 6.5 (3) 54.3 (25) 23.9 (11) -0.962a 0.336 
Skepr. 1. :\11 the safety equipment you are required to carry cluners up the boat. 
Skepr. 2. The required safety equipment is too expensive. 
Skepr. 3. ~ [any of rhe present safety regulations are unrealistic and should be changed. 
Skcpr. 4. Recommended safety procedures work until you become busy. 
Skcpr. 5. If you arc worried about safety you wouldn't get your job done. 
Skcpt. 6. The government spends roo much rime and resources on safety at sea. 
Skcpr. 7. The reason I carry the required safety equipment is so that I won't receive a fine. 
Skcpr. 8. :\ll roo often, strict adherence to the safety rules and regulations causes more trouble than it's worth. 
a The urn of negative ranks equal the sum of positive ranks 
b Based on positive ranks 117 
5.3.2 Responsibili ty Items: Table 5.3.2 identifies the proportion of participants in each 
group before and after the intervention who rated a series of statements on safety 
responsibility with either: strongly agree, agree, don't know, disagree or strongly disagree. 
There was a larger proportion of participants in both groups who strongly agreed with 
the following statements after the intervention: Personal flotation devices should be 
worn when working on deck; all boats sho uld have safety inspections every year; and, a 
fisherman / seafarer is less likely to have an accident if s/he takes safety courses. Change 
in the first statement was significant for the standard group willie changes in the latter 
two statements were significant for the enhanced group. More than two thirds of the 
pre- and post-training participants from both groups agreed/ strongly agreed with the 
statement: the union should be more concerned with safety issues. More than three 
quarters of pre- and post-training participants disagreed/ strongly disagreed with the 
statement: The RCMP /Coast Guard have no business boarding fishing or other vessels. 
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Table 5.3.2 Pre- and Post-Training Score Differences in ResEonsibility Items 
Wilcoxon rest 
Before .-\fter two-railed 
RESPO:\:S!BlLITY 0 0 
Stro ngly o; o % Strongly % Don't 0 ' / 0 0; o Strongly 
.\gree 0 o Agree 0/o Don't Disagree Disagree % Strongly % Agree Know Disagree Disagree 
~'2 \.') J-.:now (N) ~) (N) Agree (N) (N) (N) (N) ~) z !!. 
Rcspon. 1 
Standard 33.3 (16) 25 (12) 14.6 (!) 22.9 (11) 4.2 (2) 47.9 (23) 33.3 (16) 4.2 (2) 10.4 (5) 4.2 (2) -2.981a 0.003 
Enhanced 26. 1 (12) 3-L8 ( 16) 13 (6) 26.1 (12) 0 30.4 (14) 41.3 (19) 8.7 (4) 17.4 (8) 2.2 (1) - 1.437a 0. 151 
Rcspon. 2 
Standard 52.1 (25) 33.3 (16) 2.1 (1) 12.5 (6) 0 43.8 (21) so (24) 0 6.3 (3) 0 -0.677a 0 .-+99 
Enhanced 30.-+ (14) 43.5 (20) 0 21.7 (10) 4.3 (2) 39.1 (18) 45.7 (21) 4.3 (2) I 0.9 (5) 0 -2.808a 0.005 
Respon. 3 
Standard 22.9 (11) 39.6 (19) 6.3 (3) 25 (12) 6.3 (3) 29.2 (14) 35.4 (17) 2.1 (1) 25 (12) 8.3 (4) -0.203a 0.839 
Enhanced 13 (6) 47.8 (22) 8.7 (4) 23.9 (11) 6.5 (3) 37 (17) 47.8 (22) 0 13 (6) 2.2 (1) -2.767a 0.006 
Respon. 4 
Standard 20.8 (10) so (24) 10.4 (5) 10.4 (5) 6.3 (3) 20.8 (10) 60.4 (29) 8.3 (4) 2.1 (1) 8.3 (4) -1.048a 0.295 
Enhanced 13 (6) 54.3 (25) 23.9 (11) 6.5 (3) 0 19.6 (9) 58.7 (27) 13 (6) 6.5 (3) 0 - 1.209a 0.227 
Respon. 5 
Standard 2.1 (I) 12.5 (6) 4.2 (2) 47.9 (23) 31.3 (15) 4.2 (2) 10.4 (5) 4.2 (2) 52.1 (25) 29.2 (14) -0.269b 0.788 
Enhanced 0 6.5 (3) 4.3 (2) 65.2 (30) 23.9 (11) 2.2 (1) 2.2 (1) 6.5 (3) 67.4 (31) 21.7 (10) -0.378b 0.705 
Respon. I. Per onal flo tation devices should be worn when working on deck. 
Rcspon. 2 . .-\ll boars should have safety inspections every year. 
Respon. 3 .. \ fisherman/ seafarer is less likely ro have an accident if s/he takes safety courses. 
Rcspon. 4. The union should be more concerned with safety issues. 
Respon. 5. The RC:\lP /Coast Guard ha\'e no business boarding fish.ing or other vessel. 
a ' ll1c sum o f negative ranks equal the sum of positive ranks 
b Based on po irive ranks 
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5.3.3 Boa tmanship Items: Table 5.3.3 identifies the proportion of participants in each 
group before and after the in tervention who rated a series of statements on boatmanship 
with either: strongly agree, agree, don't know, disagree or strongly disagree. Although not 
statistically significant, more than 89% of all pre- and post-training participants in both 
groups agreed/ strongly agreed with the statements: Boat decks should be washed down 
after each working day/ end of shift; and, when not in use, all fishing or deck gear should 
be stored readily on the deck. 
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Table 5.3.3 Pre- and Post-Training Score Differences in Boatmanship Items 
Before 
BOATMANSHIP % % •;. 
Boat. I 
Boat. 2 
Strongly 
Agree 
Standard 52.1 (25) 
Enhanced 52.2 (24) 
% Agree 
45.8 (22) 
37 (17) 
Don't 
Know 
2. 1 (1) 
8.7 (4) 
•;. 
Disagree 
0 
0 
Strongly 
Disagree 
0 
2.2 (1) 
Standard 43.8(21) 47.9(23) 2. 1 (1) 6.3 (3) 0 
Enhanced 4 1.3(19) 47.8 (22) 6.5 (3) 4.3 (2) 0 
Boat. I. Boar decks should be washed down after each working day/ end of shift. 
BoAt. 2. \Xfhcn not in usc all fishing or deck gear should be stored readily on the deck. 
a The sum of negative ranks equal rhc sum of positive ranks 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
64.6 (31) 
58.7 (27) 
56.3 (27) 
43.5 (20) 
After 
% 
Don't % 
%Agree Know Disagree 
35.4 (17) 0 0 
3 7 (17) 2.2 (1) 2.2 (1) 
35.4 (17) 4.2 (2) 4.2 (2) 
50 (23) 0 6.5 (3) 
•;. 
Strongly 
Wilcoxon test two-
tailed 
Disagree Z p 
0 -1.9-Ha 0.052 
0 -1.213a 0.225 
2.1 (1) -0.809a OA1 9 
0 -OA26a 0.6+-l 
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5.3.4 Vessel Restric tion Item s: Table 5.3..+ identifies the proportion of participants in 
each group before and after the intervention who rated a series of statements on vessel 
restrictions with which they either: strongly agree, agree, don't know, disagree or strongly 
disagree. lore than three-quarters of the pre- and post-training participants in both 
groups rated the following statements with agree/ strongly agree: fishing vessels should 
be limited as to how much fishing gear they carry; and, fishing vessels should be limited 
as to how much fish they carry in one trip. About 65% of the post- training participants 
from both groups agreed/ strongly disagreed with the statement: fishing vessels should 
be limited as to how far they can travel from shore. 
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T able 5.3.4 Pre- and Post-Training: Score Differences in Vessel Restriction Items 
Before :\free Wilcoxon test 
two-tailed 
\T.SSEL 
!US I'RlCTIO:--.: 0 
' 0 
0; o Don't % %Strongly % Don't 0/o 0/ o S. 
Strongly 0 o :\ gree Know Disagree Disagree % Strongly % Agree Know Disagree Disagree 
. \gree f.') (!') (N) (N) Agree (N) (N) (N) (N) (N) z p 
\ 'es.Res. l 
Standard :w.8 (10) 29.2 ( 1-+) 8.3 (4) 31.3 (15) 8.3 (4) 16.7 (8) 47.9 (23) 6.3 (3) 22.9 (11) 6.3 (3) - 1.666a 0.096 
Enhanced 13 (6) 47.8 (22) 15.2 (7) 17.4 (8) 6.5 (3) 10.9 (5) 54.3 (25) 10.9 (5) 17.4 (8) 6.5 (3) -0.1 93a 0.847 
\'es. Rcs.2 
Standard 25 ( 12) 50 (24) 8.3 (4) 14.6 (7) 0 27.1 (13) 60.4 (29) 4.2 (2) 4.2 (2) 2.1 (I) - 1.4-+ 1a 0.150 
Enhanced 13 (6) 67.-l (31) -+.3 (2) 10.9 (5) 2.2 (I) 26.1 (12) 52.2 (24) 4.3 (2) 13 (6) 2.2 (1) -0.55-+a 0.580 
\' cs.Rcs.3 
Standard 25 ( 12) 50 (2-+) 2.1 (I) 20.8 (10) 0 29.2 (14) 54.2 (26) 4.2 (2) 6.3 (3) -+.2 (2) -1.459a 0. 145 
Enhanced 10.9 (5) 69.6 (32) 4.3 (2) 8.7 (4) 4.3 (2) 23.9 (11) 54.3 (25) 2.2 (1) 15.2 (7) 2.2 (1) -0.606a 0.545 
\' cs.Rcs. 1. Fishing vessels should be limited as ro how far they can travel from shore. 
\ ' es.Res. 2. Fishing \·essels should be limited as to how much fishing gear they carry. 
\ 'es.Res. 3. Ftshing vessels should be limited as to how much fish they carry in one trip. 
a The sum of ntgative ranks egual the sum o f positive ranks 
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5.3.5 Regulations Items: Table 5.3.5 identifies the proportion of participants in each 
group before and after the intervention who rated a series of statements on regulations 
with which they either: strongly agreed, agreed, didn't know, disagreed or strongly 
disagreed. A large proportion of pre- and post-training participants from both groups 
agreed/ strongly agreed with the following statements: fisherman / Seafarer should never 
put to sea in bad weather; and, if you follow safety regulations you are less likely to have 
an accident. The change in pre- and post-training rating was significant for the enhanced 
group for both statements, but not for the standard group. 
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Table 5.3.5 Pre- and Post-Training Score Differences in Regulation Items 
Before 
0 0 0t o Don't o/ o 
REGCI.:\TIO\:S Strongly Know o/o %S. Strongly 
,\grcc , :) ~ o ,-\gree (N) Disagree Disagree ;\grce 
(0:) (N) (N) (N) 
Rcgul. 1 
Standard -+5.8 (22) 33.3 (16) 4.2 (2) 12.5 (6) 2.1 (1) 39.6 (19) 
Enhanced 19.6 (9) 45.7 (2 1) 8.7 (4) 23.9 ( 11) 2.2 (1) 34.8 (16) 
Rcgul. 2 
Srandard 35.4(1 7) 52.1 (25) 0 8.3 (4) 2.1 (1) 33.3 (16) 
Enhanced 21.7 (10) 60.9 (28) 8.7 (4) 6.5 (3) 2.2 (1) 47.8 (22) 
Rcgul. I. fisherman/seafarer should never put to sea in bad weather. 
Rcgul. 2. If you follow safety regulations you are less likely to have an accident. 
a TI1e sum of negative ranks equal the sum of positive ranks 
b Based on positive ranks 
After 
% Don't % 
%Agree Know Disagree 
(N) (N) (!'.') 
43.8 (21) 6.3 (3) 8.3 (-+) 
47.8 (22) 4.3 (2) 13 (6) 
so (24) 2.1 (1) 6.3 (3) 
43.5 (20) 2.2 (I) 4.3 (2) 
%S. 
Disagree 
(N) 
2.1 (1) 
0 
4.2 (2) 
2.2 (1) 
\X'ilcoxon rest 
rwo-railed 
z p 
-0.039a 0.969 
-3.300a 0.001 
-0.357b 0.721 
-1.968a 0.049 
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5.3.6 Risk Acceptance Items: Table 5.3.6 identifies the proportion of participants in 
each group before and after the intervention who rated a series of statements on risk 
acceptance with which they either: strongly agreed, agreed, didn't know, disagreed or 
strongly disagreed. 1\bout 23% of participants in the standard group and 39% of 
participants in the enhanced group agreed/ strongly agreed that they had gone out to sea 
in bad weather in spite of advice from others. Twenty-seven percent of the participants 
in the standard group and 35% of the participants in the enhanced group described 
themselves after the intervention as the risk-taking type. More than three-quarters of the 
participants from both groups disagreed/s trongly disagreed with the statement: fishing 
would not be as enjoyable without the risks that are involved. 
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Table 5.3.6 Pre- and Post-Training Score Differences in Risk Acceptance Items 
\XIilcoxon test 
Before After r\\·o -tailed 
R1:-\K 0 0 
.\CCEPT.\~CE Strongly 0 o Don't 0/ o %Strongly 0/ o Don't 0/ o ~o Strongly 
. \ grec "o .\ gree MOW D isagree Disagree %Strongly % Agree Know Disagree Disagree 
(') (') (N) (N) (N) ,-\gree (N) (N) (N) 0'9 (N) z p 
Risk.. \ c. l 
Standard 10.4 (5) 12.5 (6) 10.4 (5) 52.1 (25) 12.5 (6) 0 22.9 (11) 14.6 (7) 41.7 (20) 16.7 (8) -0.265a 0.79 1 
Enhanced 0 28.3 (13) 13 (6) 43.5 (20) 13 (6) 0 39.1 (18) 8.7 (4) 32.6 (15) 19.6 (9) -0.572b 0.567 
Ri k..\c.2 
Standard 2.1 (1) 18.8 (9) 6.3 (3) 56.3 (27) 14.6 (7) 0 27.1 (13) 2.1 (1) 43.8 (21) 25 (1 2) -0.014a 0.989 
Enhanced 2.2 (I) 30.4 (14) 2.2 (I) 50 (23) 15.2 (7) 2.2 (1) 32.6 (I 5) 2.2 (1) 39.1 (18) 21.7 (10) -0.036a 0.97 1 
Risk.,\c.3 
Standard 2.1 (1) 4.2 (2) 6.3 (3) 47.9 (23) 35.4 (17) 2.1 (1) 18.8 (9) 4.2 (2) 31.3 (15) 4 1.7 (20) - 1.637b 0.102 
Enhanced 2.2 (1) 10.9 (5) 6.5 (3) 54.3 (25) 26.1 (12) 0 6.5 (3) 10.9 (5) 47.8 (22) 34.8 (16) -1.755a 0.079 
Risk .. -\c.l. I have gone to sea in bad weather in spite of advice from others. 
Risk .• \c.2. I am the type of person who takes risks. 
Risk .. \ c.3. Fishing would nor be as enjoyable without the risks that arc involved. 
a The sum of negative ranks equal the sum of positive ranks 
b Based on positive ranks 
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5.3.7 Six Attitude Factors 
The enhanced group showed a signiticant change in attitudes toward responsibility 
(p <0.05) and regulation (p<0.05), and in the overall attitudes score (Table 5.3.7); in 
contrast the standard group showed a significant change only in the overall attitudes 
score. 
Table 5.3.7 Six Attitude Factors 
Wilcoxon test two-tailed 
Standard Enhanced 
Total After minus Before Scores z z p p 
Skepticism -1.1 74a 0.240 -1.176a 0.240 
Responsibili ty -1.569a 0.117 -3.318a 0.001 
Boatmanship -1.726a 0.084 -.962a 0.336 
Vessel Restrictions -1.674a 0.094 -.208a 0.835 
Regulations -.469b 0.639 -2.991a 0.003 
Risk Acceetance -.015a 0.988 -.797a 0.425 
Total Attitudes scores -2.217a 0 .027 -3.089a 0.002 
a Based on negative ranks. 
b Based on positive ranks. 
5.3.8 Attitudes Scores Between Groups 
Comparison of the overall post- training attitudes score between the enhanced and 
standard groups shows no significant difference in any of the subscales or overall 
attitudes cores (p>0.05; Table 5.3.8). 
Table 5.3.8 Attitudes Scores Between GrouEs 
Mean urn of Mann \'V'hitney 
Post-Training Attitudes Rank Ranks z L.J Two-tailed p 
Scores 
Skepticism E nhanced ..J.6 ..J.6.35 2132.00 
Standard ..J.5 ..J.5.64 205-J..OO -0.127 O...J...J.9 
Regulations E nhanced ..J.6 ..J.8.37 2225.00 
Standard ..J.6 ..J...J..63 2053.00 -0.690 0 .2-J.S 
Res ponsi bili ty Enhanced ..J.6 ..J.8.0..J. 2210.00 
, tandard -t8 -+6.98 2255.00 -0. 190 0.-+25 
-----
Boatmanship l ~nhanced ..J.6 ..J.3 .71 ~0 1 0. 50 
tandard ..J.7 50.~2 2360.50 - l. ~..J.3 0.107 
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Vessel Enhanced -1-6 -1-6 .79 2152.50 
Restriction Standard 47 -l-7.20 2218.50 -0.076 0.-1-70 
- ---
Risk Acceptance Enhanced -1-6 45.7 1 2102.50 
Standard -1-6 -l-7.29 2175.50 -0.287 0.387 
Total scores Enhanced 39 37.68 1-1-69.50 
1\ fter tandard -1-2 ..J.-l-.08 1851.50 -1.225 0.221 
5.4 Safety knowledge 
5.4.1. Individual Knowledge Items: There were 19 individual knowledge items in the 
questionnaire. Bo th the standard and enhanced group showed a significant increase in 
knowledge score for 12 knowledge items. Ten of these were common to both groups 
including: common causes o f shipboard accidents, life jacket storage, device to launch 
lifeboats, how to launch a life raft, life raft pressure relief valve, inflation of life raft floor, 
survival plan, fire tetrahedron, Class B fire, and responsibility for safety onboard. In 
addition to these items, the enhanced group showed a significant increase in knowledge 
score with regard to two items: purpose of Muster list and rescue sling. The standard 
group showed a significant increase in knowledge score with regard to two other 
knowledge items: body losses in a survival situation and first priority after abandoning 
vessel. The remaining five items that did not show any significant increase in post-
training scores included: effective means of preventing accidents, survival craft, signalling 
devices, cabin on ftre and donning a life jacket. More lhan 78% of the participants were 
already responding correctly to these knowledge questions prior to their training. 
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Table 5.4.1. Individual Knowledge Items 
% Correct (N) Me emar test 
Individual Knowledge Items 1-tailed 
Before 1\ fter p 
Common cause of shipboard accidents 
Standard 75 (36) 97.9 (47) 0.001 
Enhanced 69.6 (32) 100 (46) 0.000 
Effective means of preventing accidents 
Standard 81.3 (39) 83.3 (40) 0.500 
Enhanced 78.3 (36) 91.3 (42) 0.063 
Purpose of Muster List 
Standard 87.5 (42) 89.6 (43) 0.500 
Enhanced 71.1 (33) 97.8 (45) 0.011 
Donning a lifejacket 
Standard 95.8 (46) 85.4 (41) 0.110 
Enhanced 91.3 (42) 84.8 (39) 0.227 
Lifejacket storage 
Standard 72.9 (35) 93.8 (45) 0.001 
E nhanced 67.4 (31) 82.6 (38) 0.046 
Survival Craft 
Standard 95.8 (46) 93.8 (45) 0.500 
E nhanced 95.7 (44) 100 (46) 0.500 
Device to launch lifeboats 
Standard 50 (24) 85.4 (41) 0.002 
E nhanced 30.4 (14) 93.5 (43) 0.000 
Launching a life raft 
Standard 43.8 (21) 89.6 (43) 0.000 
E nhanced 58.7 (27) 89.1 (41) 0.011 
Life raft pressure relief valve 
Standard 37.5 (18) 60.4 (29) 0.01 1 
Enhanced 52.2 (24) 80.4 (37) 0.011 
Floor of a life raft inflated 
Standard 64.6 (31) 95.8 (46) 0.000 
Enhanced 52.2 (2-t) 95.7 (44) 0.000 
Body losses in survival situation 
Standard 85.4 (41) 95.8 (46) 0.032 
E nhanced 87 (-tO) 95.7 (44) 0.227 
Survival plan 
Standard 16.7 (8) 35.-t (17) 0.018 
E nhanced 15.2 (7) 58.7 (27) 0.000 
Signalling devices 
tandard 91.7 (44) 93.8 ( 45) 0.500 
Enhanced 89.1 (41) 93.5 (43) 0.500 
Rescue sling 
Standard 83.3 (-tO) 95.8 (46) 0.110 
l ~nhanced 69.6 (32) 95.7 (4-t) 0.000 
Cabin on fire 
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% Correct ( ) Ic emar test 
Individual Knowledge I terns 1-tailed 
------- ---
Before 1\ fter p 
Standard 100 (48) 97.9 (47) 0.500 
E nhanced 97.8 (45) 97.8 (45) 0.500 
Fire tetrahedron 
Standard 31.3 (15) 89.6 (43) 0.000 
E nhanced 32.6 (15) 95.7 (44) 0.000 
Class B fire 
tandard 37.5 (18) 83.3 (40) 0.000 
E nhanced 34.8 (16) 95.7 (44) 0.000 
Responsible for safety onboard 
Standard 75 (36) 93.8 (45) 0.01 1 
E nhanced 73.9 (34) 95.7 (44) 0.01 1 
Priority after abandoning vessel 
Standard 47.9 (23) 79.2 (38) 0.000 
E nhanced 67.4 (31) 82.6 (38) 0.055 
Emergency drills on board 
Standard 93.8 (45) 93.8 (45) 0.500 
E nhanced 95.7 ~44L 97.8 ~45L 0.500 
5.4.2. Total Knowledge Score: The mean difference in training score (pos t-pre) was 
significant for both the standard (3.67; p<0.001) and enhanced (4.98; p <0.001) groups 
(Table 5.4.2). With a difference in mean score of 1.31, the enhanced group scored 
significantly (p<0.05) higher than the controls on knowledge scores (Fig. 3). 
Table 5.4.2. Total Knowledge Score 
Total Knowledge Score Mean Difference d.f Sig. 1-tailed p 
Standard (After-Before) 3.67 10.547 47 0.000 
Enhanced (After-Before) 4.98 11 .574 45 0.000 
Combined {1\ fter-Before2 4.31 15.269 93 0.000 
Graue difference (Enhanced-ControQ 1.31 2.381 92 0.0 10 
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Figure 3: Mean differences between total knowledge scores 
5.5. Gen era l Information 
5.5.1. Factors Mfecting Participants' D ecision to Attend M E DAl 
Almost all (98%) participants felt that their personal desire to improve safety knowledge 
was an impo rtant factor influencing their deci ion to take the ME D 1 course (of which 
63% said it was ver:y important). Fifteen percent of the participants felt that their family's 
or friends' recommendation was a ver:y important influencing factor in their decision to 
attend ME DA 1, while 49% felt that it was also a ver:y important regulatory requirement 
to complete this co urse. Close to half o f the participants felt that lack o f time (50%), 
fear, level of literacy, or the cost of training (46% each) were not important factors in 
their decision to attend the class. Location and the duration of training were important 
or Yer:y important factors for ..J.1.5°'o and 52.1% respecti,·cly. There was no significant 
difference in opinio n between the standard and enhanced group on these questions with 
the exception of job requirement. Roughly three-quarters of participants in the enhanced 
group (7-J.0 'u) felt that job requirement wa an important contributory factor compared to 
about half (5-J.0 o) of participants in the standard group (p<O.OS). 
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T able 5.5.1. Factors Mfecting Particieants' D ecis ion to Attend M E DAl 
I low important l\Iann-\'{'hitney 
were the following % ot % Slightly % % Very U ~ 2-tailed 
factors in your Important Important Important Important 
decision to attend ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) z p 
this class? 
Family or friend 
recommendation 
Enhanced 26.1 (12) 28.3 (13) 26.1 (12) 17.4 (8) 
tandard 31.3 (15) 20.8 (1 0) 33.3 (16) 12.5 (6) 
Total 28.7 (27) 24.5 (23) 29.8 (28) H.9 (H ) -0.328 0.743 
Job Requirem ent 
Enhanced 2.2 (1) 0 23.9 (11) 73.9 (34) 
tandard 0 6.3 (3) 39.6 (19) 54.2 (26) 
Total 1.1 (1) 3.2 (3) 31.9 (30) 63.8 (60) -2.010 0.044 
D esire to improve 
safety knowledge 
Enhanced 2.2 (1) 2.2 (1) 34.8 (16) 60.9 (28) 
tandard 0 0 35.4 (17) 64.6 (31) 
Total 1.1 (1) 1.1 (1) 35.1 (33) 62.8 (59) -0.521 0.603 
Regulatory 
Requirem ent 
Enhanced 2.2 (1) 13.0 (6) 32.6 (15) 50.0 (23) 
tandard 6.3 (3) 4.2 (2) 37.5 (18) 47.9 (23) 
Total 4.3 (4) 8.5 (8) 35.1 (33) 48.9 (46) -0.053 0.958 
Cost of T raining 
Enhanced 43.5 (20) 19.6 (9) 21.7 (10) 13.0 (6) 
tandard 47.9 (23) 14.6 (7) 12.5 (6) 25.0 (12) 
Total 45.7 (43) 17.0 (16) 17.0 (16) 19.1 (18) -0.241 0.809 
Lack of time 
Enhanced 52.2 (24) 23.9 (11) 15.2 (7) 6.5 (3) 
Standard 47.9 (23) 16.7 (8) 18.8 (9) 16.7 (8) 
Total 50.0 (47) 20.2 (19) 17.0 (16) 11 .7 (11 ) -1.051 0.293 
Duration of 
training 39.1 (18) 13.0 (6) 30.4 (H ) 15.2 (7) 
Enhanced 35.4 (17) 6.3 (3) 37.5 (18) 20.8 (10) 
tandard 3 .2 (35) 9.6 (9) 34.0 (32) 18.1 (17) -0.884 0.377 
Total 
Location 
Enhanced 43.5 (20) 10.9 (5) 30.4 (14) 13.0 (6) 
Standard 41. (20) 14.6 (7) 29.2 (14) 10.4 (5) 
Total 42.6 (-+0) 12.8 (12) 29.8 (28) 11 .7 ( II ) -0. 165 0.869 
Personal Interest 
Enhanced 6.5 (3) 13.0 (6) 47.8 (22) 32.6 (15) 
randard .3 (4) -+.2 (2) 47.9 (23) 3 .5( 18) 
Total 7.4 ( ) 8.5 (8) 4 .9 (45) 35. 1 (33) -0.-; 54 0.451 
Fear 
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Enhanced -+7.8 (22) 13.0 (6) 23.9 (11) 15.2 (7) 
tandard -+3.8 (21) 16.7 (8) 22.9 (11) 1-+.6 (7) 
Total 45.7 (-+3) 1-+.9 (1-t) 23.-t (22) 14.9 (14) -0.131 0.869 
Level of Literacy 
Enhanced 47.8 (22) 10.9 (5) 21.7 (10) 13.0 (6) 
Standard 43.8 (21) 12.5 (6) 25.0 (12) 16.7 (8) 
Total 45.7 (43) 11.7 (11) 23.4 (22) 14.9 (1-t) -0.619 0.536 
5.5.2 Safety Ideas and Willingness to Serve on Safety Committees 
More than half (54%) of the pre-training participants in each group and, in total, claimed 
to have taken previous safety training courses. The majority, however, claimed that they 
did not have ideas about ways to improve safety in the fishery (65%) nor were they 
willing to serve on local safety committees (68%). There was no significant difference in 
response between the two groups (p>O.OS; Table 5.5.2). 
Table 5.5.2: Safety Ideas and Willingness to Serve on Committees 
Sig. 2-
% Yes 2 d.f. tailed 
Have you previously attended any 
safety training courses? 
Enhanced 54.3 (25) 45.7 (21) 
Standard 54.2 (26) 45.8 (22) 0.000 1 0.986 
Are you willing to serve on a local 
safety committee? 
Enhanced 32.6 (15) 65.2 (30) 
Standard 29.2 (14) 70.8 (34) 0.188 1 0.665 
Do you have ideas that could 
improve safety in the fishery? 
Enhanced 39.1 (18) 56.5 (26) 
Standard 27.1 (13) 72.9 (35) 1.964 1 0.161 
5.5.3 Safety Training 
:\ ~IcNcmar test analysis confirms that there was a significant increase in the proportion 
of participants (from 76% to 96%) saying that they had sufficient safety knowledge after 
the training (one-tailed p < 0.00 1). There was no significant difference between the 
enhanced (-+-+ participants) and standard (-+6 participants) groups on this item (:\!ann-
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Whitney one-tailed p = 0.156). When asked if they felt that their colleagues had sufficient 
knowledge to work safely aboard a vessel, the number of people saying yes increased 
significantly from 4 to 83 (one-tailed p = 0.006). o differences were found between 
the groups (1\Iann \X'hitney C, one-tailed p = 0.133) on this item. \'\ 'hen asked if they 
knew of anyone else who could benefit from this course, the number of people saying 
yes increased significantly (one-tailed p = 0.009) from 57 (pre-training) to 69 (post-
training). T here was no significant differences (Mann \Vhi.tney U one-tailed p = 0.378) 
between the two groups on this item. The number of participants expressing interest in 
further safety training increased signiticantly (one-tailed p = 0.007) from 65 (pre-training) 
to 75 (post-training) . There was no ignificant difference between the groups (Mann 
\Vhi.tney U one-tailed p = 0.482) this item. \Vhen asked if they think that fish 
harvesters/ general eafarers should take safety lessons, there was no significant 
difference in opinion between the two groups or before and after training: the majo rity 
claimed that they should. 
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T able 5.5.3: Safety Training 
~fann % Yes ( ) Groups 1\fc etnar 
% ~s (Ni ,\ fter \V'hitney Combined Test 1-tailed 
-- - -
Enhanced Standard U 1-tailed Before After p 
p 
Do you feel you 
have sufficient 
knowledge to 95.7 (-+~) 95.8 (46) 0.156 75.5 (71) 95.7 (90) 0.0 0 
work safely 
aboard a vessel? 
Do you feel that 
your colleagues 
have sufficient 91.3 (42) 85.4 (41) 0.133 79 (74) 88.3 (83) 0.006 
knowledge to 
work safely 
aboard a vessel? 
Do you know of 
anyone else who 73.9 (34) 5 (36) 0.378 53.6 (57) 64.8 (69) 0.009 
could benefit 
from this course? 
Are you 
interested in 
further safety 80.4 (37) 79.2 (38) 0.482 61.1 (65) 79.8 (75) 0.007 
training? 
Do you think fish 
harvester/ general 
seafarers should 97.8 (45) 95.8 (46) 0.5 78.9 (84) 81.8 (87) 0.125 
take a course in 
safe ? 
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5.5.4 Does Training Help in Real Situations? 
\Vhcn asked if they think that safety training helps in real situations, all participants both 
before and after training said it docs. 
Table 5.5.4 Does Training Help in Real Situation? 
Do you think safety training helps in real situations? 
Before 
After 
Before 
After 
Before 
After 
Enhanced 
Standard 
Total 
5.5.5. Feedback on Video Clips 
95.7 (44) 
97.8 (45) 
100 (48) 
95.2 (46) 
97.9 (92) 
96.8 (91) 
0 (N) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
This was an open-ended question. The result is tabulated according to favourable and 
unfavourable reactions. While most (about 50%) had positive reactions to the clips, there 
were some who believed the clips could have been improved. 
Table 5.5.5. Feedback on Video Clips 
Favourable 
reactions 
Unfavourable 
reactions 
E ducational 
Excellent 
Good 
What did you think of the video clips? 
Informational 
Very good 
Very educational 
Very knowledgeable 
\'(leak. There are more relevant and detailed clips available 
rootage a little old 
I t helps to a degree but harder to remember than practical 
Need to update to increase credibility 
ot enough clips were shown 
othing 
Ok 
%(N) 
2.2 (1) 
2.2 (1) 
36.9 (17) 
___ 2_.2_ QL_ 
8.7 (4) 
2.2 (1) 
2.2. (1) 
2.2 (1) 
2.2 (1) 
2.2 ( I) 
2.2 ( I) 
4.3 (2) 
2.2 (1) 
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CHAPTER 6: Discussion and Conclusions 
General Discussion 
Globalisation, changing markets and proliferation of technology ha meant that 
the structure of employment in Canada is shifting toward a knowledge and technology 
intensive economy (Health Canada, 1999). l\fany Canadians are worried about being able 
to keep up with the changes of the global market and the fish harvesters of 
ewfoundland are no exception. 
Commercial fishing is widely acknowledged to be a dangerous occupation 
(Abraham 2000; Fr\.0 2000; ILO 1999; Meng 1991). Several factors contributing to 
accidents and hazards in the industry have been identified (Abraham, 2002; Antao et al., 
2008; Binkley, 1995; NRC, 1991; TC, 2002). Safety training has been identified as one of 
the best solutions to the alarming rate of accidents and hazards in the industry ( RC, 
1991). Education and safety training implemented in other fishing industries of the world 
show a wide acceptance by fish harvesters (Snorassson, 2000), an increase in knowledge 
and change in attitude toward the importance of workplace safety (Langaune, 2000), and 
overall reduction of fatalities and safer working practices (Dzugan, 2000; Lincoln & 
Conway, 1999; Perkins, 1995). Occupational health and safety training is a crucial 
component of accident prevention and injury reduction programs at the workplace 
(Cohen & Colligan, 1998). \'(!bile safety training docs not always have the desired impact 
(Darragh ct al., 200-t; Tan ct al., 1991), it has been strongly suggested that training must 
be evaluated carefully to determine its cffccti,·encss (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 200 1). 
This thesis foil owed Kirkpatrick's four-b ·cl model of training evaluation ( 1979, 1996) to 
assess the impact of training on fish harvesters' and o ther seafarers' kno\\"ledgc and 
attitudes toward the !\lED.\ I training program. 
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The aun of this thesis was to cxam10e the knowledge and attitudes o f fish 
harvesters and other seafarers toward safety and the l\IEDA 1 safety training program. 
Completion of the program showed a significant increase in knowledge on safety and 
changed attitudes toward safety practices and safety training among fish harvesters and 
other seafarers of ewfoundland and Labrador. 1\loreover, when the standard training 
program was augmented with video clips it seemed to further improve participants' 
knowledge and attitudes toward safety. 
6.1 Knowledge of Safety and the Impact of Safety Training 
Traditionally fish harvester gain knowledge of safety through practical 
experiences on the job (Murray & Dolomount, 1994; 1995). Participant of the MEDA1 
training program reflected this knowledge and experience. They had an average of 16 
years experience at sea and were generally quite knowledgeable of hazards and safety 
procedures. Two-thirds scored correctly on 12 out of the 19 individual knowledge items 
prior to the program. till, there was a significant increase in the percentage of correct 
responses from both the standard and enhanced groups following the program. In both 
groups there was improvement on ten knowledge items concerning safety equipment 
(such as life jackets and life rafts), fires (understanding the different kinds of fires and 
how to put them out) and responsibility (such as survival plan and responsibility for 
safety on board etc.; Table -+.4.1). 
The standard group showed a significant increase in two additional knowledge 
items: 'body losses in surYi\'al situation' and 'fi rst priority after abandoning \'esscls'. It is 
noteworthy that more than 85° o of the pre-training participants in the enhanced group 
were already scoring correctly on the former item and the latter, while not statistically 
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significant, showed an increase in the number of correct responses from 67% to 82% 
(Table 4.4.1). On the other hand, the enhanced group showed a significant increase in 
two o ther items: 'purpose of the muster list' and 'rescue sling'. I Icre, more than 80% of 
the pre-training standard group participants were already scoring correctly. The five 
remaining items ('effective means of preventing accidents', 'sun ival craft', 'signalling 
devices', 'cabin on fire' and 'donning a life jacket', Table 4.4.1) that did not show any 
significant change between pre- and post-training scores were correctly answered by 
more than 78% of both groups prior to the intervention. This would suggest that 
participants are generally knowledgeable of the dangers associated with marine work and 
related safety procedures. 
It is interesting to note, however, that their knowledge revolved around what 
could be described as a 'theoretical' understanding. For instance, most (above 90%) from 
both groups knew that to don a life jacket one must have the correct size, secure the 
straps and stow the attachments (question 4 of the knowledge items on the 
questionnaire, Appendix A). \'<'hile the steps were known to most, discussion revealed 
that participants had never practiced wearing them, nor did they know how to care for 
one, or indeed how it felt to wear one and jump into water. Post-training participants felt 
that their knowledge of life jackets increased from just knowing how it 111ight work to 
actually knowing how it does work and the related safety procedures. 
Similarly, all pre-training participants (almost 100%) knew that when the cabin is 
on fire, one must sound the alarm, report the location and start to fight the fire (question 
15 of the knowledge items on the questionnaire , \ppcndix , \ ). But they did no t know 
the four required clements (namely heat, oxygen, chemical reaction, and fuel) that started 
a fire (question o n fire tetrahedron increased in correct responses from 30° o to almost 
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90% in each group; Table -J..-l- .1 ). They also did not know that remm·ing any one of the 
four clements will extinguish a fire and that to remove it, one needs to have the 
appropriate extinguisher (question on class B fire increased from 35% to 85% in both 
groups; Table -l-.4.1). 
Pre-training participants' knowledge of safety (specially in relation to safety 
equipment) can be described as a theoretical understanding: they understood the 
importance of safety equipment, of the general hazards of fishing and of being out at sea 
and they thought they knew some of the common safety procedures such as putting on 
life jackets, putting out fires and so on. This gave them a sense of security and the 
perception of safety as 'common sense knowledge'. This sense of independence and 
subjective perception of safety has been documented in other studies (Murray & 
Dolomount, 1995; Poggie et al., 1995). Post-training participants, however, expressed an 
in-depth and increased knowledge of safety issues. They realized how little they actually 
knew of safety procedures and the extent to which they had relied on their limited 
knowledge. They reported an increased knowledge of safety equipment (how to operate, 
maintain and use), of emergency procedures (how to respond and react responsibly), and 
how to react to emergencies. Knowledge gained in classroom and in practical training 
was an empowering phenomenon for them. The proportion of participants who claimed 
that they and their colleagues had sufficient knowledge to work safely aboard a vessel 
increased significantly after the training (Table -l-.5 .3). 
6.2 Attitudes Toward Safety and the Impact of Safety Training 
Some pre-training participants expressed an indifferent attitude toward ~afety. 
They Jcfined safety within a framework of risks and felt that the nature o f fi shing 
141 
dictates that harvesters be resilient, make judgement calls, be alert and basically usc their 
'common sense'. Similar attitudes to safety have been widely documented elsewhere 
(Binkley, 1991; l\[urray & Dolomount, 1995). Indeed, fatalistic attitudes to safety and 
accident, and anxiety have been identified as possible contributory factors toward 
accidents and it has been suggested that these characteristics lead to less attention being 
given to safety procedures and consequently to more accidents in the fishing industry 
(Antao et al., 2008; Murray, Fitzpatrick & O'Connell, 1997). 
Post-training participants, however, expressed a different concept of safety. 
Instead of a fatalistic attitude, most reported that the training had increased their 
awareness of hazards, helped them realize how unaware they were, built their confidence 
and that they actually felt empowered to act in an emergency. Increased knowledge of 
safety equipment, emergency procedures and discovering their own physical abilities led 
to a redefinition of the concept of safety and a reduction in the fatalistic attitude. 
Participants, for instance, expressed a renewed respect for their safety equipment and 
there was a shift in attitudes from either being blindly dependent on safety equipment or 
not trusting it at all, to understanding how it actually works and therefore how it could 
be of help to them. 
It is interesting to note, however, that a large proportion of pre-training 
participants from the standard group (-l-8%) and the enhanced group (39%) 
agreed/ strongly agreed that the required safety equipment was too cxpens1ve. 
Discussions also revealed that the expenses surrounding safety equipment and 
procedures frustrated the study participants. Although there was no change in their 
recognition of this cost, post-training participants aurnittcd that they would purchase 
safety equipment (such as the sutYival suit) that was more expensl\'e and not a 
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mandatory rcc1uircment because they felt it was better suited to their needs. This suggests 
that pcrhap · fish hatTcstcrs arc not necessarily skeptical of safety measures (Murray & 
Dolomount, 1995) . Instead, there is an appreciation of safety measures and a willingness 
to spend money on it as long as they could identify with its usefulness. Indeed a majority 
of the fi ·h harv stcrs did not agree with the eight items that expressed skepticism 
towards some safety measures (Table 4.3.1). 
Participants were generally aware of the risks and dangers associated with their 
occupation. This is consistent with other re earch in this area (Murray & Dolomount, 
1994; Poggie et al., 1995) . For example, more than 90% of the pre and post-training 
participants from both groups identified rough sea as either important or very important 
in accident causation. Yet, at least 20% of the participants described themselves as the 
risk-taking type and admitted to having gone out to sea in bad weather in spite of being 
advised otherwise. \Vh.ile this attitude is often described as the hallmark of a fishing 
subculture, it i noteworthy, that most (two thirds) disagreed/strongly disagreed to being 
the risk taking type (Table 4.3.6). 
Previous research has suggested that restrictive government regulations that have 
been put in place for fishery management has encouraged some harvester to take more 
risks (Kaplan & Kite-Powell, 2000) while others have suggested that the job selects the 
risk taking t)'l c (Binkley, 1991). However, it would appear that han·estcrs while adaptive 
to their hazardous environment arc cognizant of the threats and that perhaps their 
attitudes toward safct)' arc associated with a perception of risk management (Eklof & 
Torncr, :2002). It has been argued elsewhere that whilst increasing risk awareness can 
stimula te sa fe bcha,-iour this docs not work ,·cry \veil in the fishery \ here risky 
bcha,-iour is often impcrati\-c for suf\·i,·al and economic gain . . \ study by Eklo f & 
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Tomer (2002) did not support previous research in the area of risk acceptance and low 
risk awareness among fish harves ters, but instead showed safety activity to be 
significantly associated with perceptions of risk management (and not with perceived 
level of risk, experience of accident or acceptance of risk). 
1\ large proportion (80%) of pre-training participants agreed/ strongly agreed that 
following safety regulations reduces the chance o f accidents. 1\pprox.imatcly 75% also 
agreed on limiting fishing vessels on the carriage of fish/ fishing gear per trip. During 
discussions, however, the concept of 'safety regulations' elicited strong negative 
reactions. For instance, harvesters felt tha t the implementation of regulatory safety 
measures (such as equipment, procedures and training) was rather arbitrary and costly. 
Clearly, there is support as well as opposition for safety regulations. These differing 
positions (cf. Poggie et al. , 1995) can perhaps be attributed to the fishing subculture that 
promotes attitudes, beliefs and behaviour that are consistent with independence. 
However, it is noteworthy that their resistance is not founded on the belief that training 
or safety measures do not work; instead it is perhaps based on a lack of understanding of 
how these measures (such as safety equipment, or safety training) can be of benefit to 
them. 
Characteristics attributed to the fishing subculture: denial of danger, 
independence, fatalism in the face o f danger and technological primacy arc often cited as 
explanations of the pcrcci,·cd reluctance toward ,-esse! safety regulations (e.g., Poggic ct 
a!., 1995). \'\-llilc pre-training participants of the !\lEO,\ 1 program also expressed ~imilar 
,;ews, their aYcrsion ~ccmcd rooted more in the distrust of government rather than a 
subcultural int1ucnce. !"ish han ·estcrs rely on learning from experiences. o,-cr time, they 
have witnessed the growing im·oh·ement of gm·crnmcnt regulations that they bclicn to 
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be haphazard, costly, and seemingly creaung more hurdles and hoops (Kaplan, 2000). 
T heir criticism of government is perhaps no different from other organizations that 
point out the flaws of implementing rules that may not have considered the ground 
situation. This is reflected for instance, in the unarumous agreement amongst 
participants that training is beneficial, however, issues surrounding training such as cost, 
lack of understanding the specific relevance of training to their job, level of literacy, fear, 
all impact their decision to attend M ~ DA 1 training. 
6.3 Impact of the Video Clips in MEDAl Training 
Participants of the enhanced group showed a significant increase in overall 
knowledge scores as compared to the standard group. There was a significant 
improvement in five of the individual attitude items (within subscales: skepticism, 
responsibility and regulations) for the enhanced group compared to an improvement in 
only two individual items (within subscales: responsibility and boatmanship) for the 
standard group. This would suggest that participants who had undergone MEDA 1 
training enhanced with the addition of extra video clips had greater imprO\·ement in 
safety attitudes and knowledge as compared to those who had undergone the regular 
l\1EDI\ 1 training. During group discussions, however, participants expressed mixed 
feelings about the video clips. In the questionnaire, most had written 'good' but some 
had expressed that while they were good and informati,·e, the clips felt "out dated". 
\\ 'bile their reactions to the clips were not \'cry fa\·ourable, the addition of these clips did 
appear to reinforce knowledge and attitudes. This is consi tent w-ith the proposed 
alternati\·e model of Kirkpatrick which suggests that it is not necessary to haYe a 
fa\·ourable reaction to learn (-\ lligcr & .Janak, 1989). 
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Interestingly, more than 50% of the participants from both groups thought boat 
size was an important contributor of accidents. This number reduced significantly after 
the training for the standard group. The number increased in the enhanced group, but 
this was not significant. The ILO (1999), DFO (2000) and TC (2002) report that smaller 
boat sizes are often involved in more accidents, resulting in more fatalities and injuries 
than bigger boats. It is unclear why post-training participants of the standard group 
thought that the size of boat does not matter in accident causation. 
Respondents from each group showed a significant change in attitudes toward 
safety issues. Attitudes toward the MEDAl program had definitely shifted from it being 
seen as a nuisance requirement, to it being seen as a useful requirement. Attitudes toward 
the dangers of the sea had also shifted from defining safety ·with a fatalistic attitude, to 
defining it in terms of their ability to survive. While it appears that training has had a 
'positive' impact on participants' attitudes, it is possible that there were other extraneous 
variables at play. These will need to be considered carefully before drawing any 
conclusions, and for implications for future research. 
6.4 Safety Training and Conceptual Models 
A measure of various factors such as needs assessment, pre-training conditions, 
training design and methods, post-training conditions, and training evaluation help 
determine if training works (Tannenbaum & Yuki 1992; Salas & Cannon-Bowers 2001 ). 
\Vhile this study has only focused on the impact of training, a thorough assessment o f 
the eYaluation of training can be gained by looking into each of these factors . Future 
research in safety training in the fishing industry will need to keep these facto rs in mind 
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to take us to the next level of understanding of the specific strengths and weakness o f 
l\IEDAl training as it is applies to the fishing industry. 
Pre- and post-training discussions showed that training helped to change 
attitudes of fish harvesters, increased their knowledge and awareness of hazards and o f 
being prepared in the face of danger. This, however, docs not mean that there would be 
a change (using Kirkpatrick's terms) at the behavioural and organizational levels (Alliger 
& Janak, 1989). A limitation of Kirkpatrick's model as mentioned earlier suggests that it 
is too simplistic (Alliger & Janak, 1989; Bates, 2004). \Vhile it is a useful tool for heuristic 
information, it fails to consider other variables that may have impacted training 
outcomes. For instance, a skipper, a fish harvester and a university research scientist who 
all showed positive reactions to MEDAl training and exhibited increased knowledge 
will, undoubtedly, vary in their behaviour and actions after the training. Variables such as 
individual differences, pre-training environment, and post-training environment all 
impact the effectiveness of training (Bates, 2004; Salaz & Cannon-Bowers, 2001). 
Also, it is not clear whether Kirkpatrick differentiated bet'.veen learning skills and 
learning facts and whether the same assessment tool could be applied to both (Kraiger et 
al., 1993). For instance, fish harvesters showed an increase in knowledge and in learning 
facts . This was measured using the questionnaire and the actual assessment tool that was 
being used by OSSC. I Iowever, skills learnt during practical sessions could not be 
measured since there were no formal assessments for the practical sessions at OSSC. 
Instructors generally assessed learning skills by ensuring that participants follO\ved them 
by example and by ensuring that each participant completed the required task at hand. 
follow up research on behavioural change is necessary to inform our understanding o f 
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the extent to which skills learnt during practical sess10ns were applied back at the 
workplace. 
The issue of sa fety in the fishing industry and the role o f safety training in the 
fishing industry need to be viewed holistically and as a component of Reasons' model. 
Fish harvesters arc humans and therefore prone to making errors. Instead of viewing 
errors as human failure on their part, there is a need to realize that errors arc the result of 
a system failure on some level. For instance, this study has shown how participants carry 
safety equipment on board to be compliant, however, they have no idea how to use it or 
indeed that a lack of maintenance is as good as not having the equipment on board. This 
false sense of security was broken as a result of their training. 
Similarly, regulations that require the carriage of safety equipment also provide 
policy makers and governments with a false sense of security. By supplying safety 
equipment with what is thought of as relatively easy to follow instructions for operation, 
and by requiring them on board, it is assumed that persons will be able to apply/ operate 
during emergencies and thus be safe. This is not always the case. Lack of practical and 
theoretical knowledge can be detrimental to life and resources. From a systems 
approach, gear that intends to improve safety must consider the needs of the harvesters 
and their work environment. Technological evolution such as upgraded safety equipment 
that is not followed up with safety training of crew may not necessarily reduce 
occupational hazards (1\ntao et al., 2008). 
In addition to that, the magnitude of problems of safety in this industry will 
remain if safety measures arc dealt \\"ith retrospectively and in (rclati,·ely) small chunks at 
a time. If the dangers of commercial fishing arc to be reduced, C\'cry effort needs to be 
made to block a - many of the defence layers, as identified in Reason's model, as possible: 
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initial defences, unsafe act, preconditions, line management and high-level decisio n 
making. l\Iandatory safety-training goes a long way in blocking some of the latent and 
active conditions, but concerted effort of several strategies that arc aimed at dealing with 
other latent and active conditions needs to be made. For instance, training needs to be 
reinforced with other hazard eliminating strategies such as safety tools that do not hinder 
work (like PFDs that can be worn at all times when working on deck without hindering 
movement), fisheries management that is consistent with safe practice and that does not 
inadvertently create more hazards and re-training the harvesters at affordable costs. 
orne have argued that too much research done in the name of evaluating 
training, has in effect only measured trainee reaction (Alliger & Janak, 1989). This gives 
training a bad name (Hale 1984). There are two reasons why the current research is a 
very important contributor to the industry and to the training literature. First, this is the 
first research of its kind conducted with fish harvesters of ewfoundland. It serves as a 
good starting point for further research as it has shown that fish harvesters can benefit 
from safety-training. The timing and topic is pertinent to the present context as it helps 
to gain an understanding of fish harvesters' reaction to training. This is a necessary first 
step before we can look further into what can be done in this area. econd, the results 
indicate that there were changes in attitudes and significant increases in knowledge, albeit 
further research is necessary before a definite conclusion can be made. [ Iowever, this 
step is also a necessary prerequisite to support the continuation o f the 1EDA 1 and to 
help build on the lessons learnt. 
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6.5 Limitations and Future Directions 
1\lthough this study provides significant findings relating attitudes and 
knowledge to safety training, there arc still some limitations that need to be addressed if 
we are to build upon the current study and guide future research directions. Focus 
groups, in general, tend to be lively and informative, however, the validity of focus group 
data depends upon the extent to which participants feel sufficiently comfortable to share 
their thoughts, beliefs and ideas. Studies on group dynamics suggests a number of 
variables (such as group cohesiveness, gender, age and moderator bias) that impacts a 
participants comfort zone and thereby the group dynamics (Stewart, Shamdasani & 
Rook 2006). ome of the limitations specific to my research are identified below. 
In this research, I was able to include one group of offsite participants from a 
fishing community in Eastport. Participants at Eastport were more cohesive as a group 
(since they were all fish harvesters from the same community and already knew each 
other) and were less inhibited by their 'class setting' (it was held at their town fire station 
where they hold all of their community meetings), and had the com fort of returning to 
their homes at the end of training every day. Due to limited resources, it was no t possible 
to visit other communities where the OSSC was o ffering the ME DAl training and 
thereby collect sufficient data to compare on-site training held at OSSC classrooms and 
off-site training held at the various fishing communities. T he effectiveness of training, as 
mentioned preYiously, is enhanced by examining other variables and as such future 
research will need to explore possible differences in training due to in-class setting and 
communi ty setting. 
Demographic factors such as income, education, occupation, religion and age, all 
influence group beha,·iour (Stewart, ~ hamdasani & Rook 2006). I did not separate tish 
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hatTcsters from non-fish hatYcsters in my data analysis. Participants who checked the 
'other' category in the demographics described themselves as research scientists working 
with the DFO in offshore vessels, fisheries scientist, shore captain, researcher, an 
ordinary seaman and a marine geologist. The proportion of 'other' participants in the 
enhanced group was 17% compared to only -l% in the standard group . . \Jthough this 
difference was not statistically significant, it is possible that this influenced the group's 
responses to the questionnaire, their cohesiveness and compatibility during discussions. 
Gender composition of the group also influences group discussions (Stewart, 
Shamdasani & Rook 2006). I did not differentiate male and female responses in my data 
analysis. ine percent of the participants in the enhanced group were female compared 
to 21% in the standard group. While this difference was not statistically significant, 
future tudies will benefit from exploring gender differences in safety training. 
Also, more attention is needed toward female fish harvesters in this 'masculine' 
profession of commercial fishing (Binkley, 2000). Research exploring the health of 
female fish harvesters has suggested that men and women cope differently with stress, 
anxiety and illness (Howse eta!., 2006; Skaptadottir, 2000). Furthermore, women who do 
not go out to fish also have a vested interest in their communities. They participate in 
the fishing community through unpaid work such as bookkeeping, cooking for crew and 
generally prm·ide support to ensure that their husband's fishing enterprise is running 
well. Some post-training participants stressed the necessity to include wife/ girlfriend of 
fish hatTesters and other extended community/ family members to participate in the 
training program as a way to increase community awareness and also as a coping 
mechanism to deal \\ith anxiety for when their loYcd ones are our at sea. The ,·cry nature 
o f tishing communities (where eYcryonc has a part to play whether it is through paid o r 
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unpaid work) demands that everyone is gi\•en the opportunity to undergo a basic safety-
training/ awareness program. There is an urgent need for further research in this area, 
especially to explore how women, in particular, perceive the MED1\ 1 training and to 
what extent it impacts their health. 
6.6 Concluding Remarks 
About 40,000 fish harvesters and 30,000 processing workers are employed in the 
fishing industries of Canada (Canadian Council of Profes ional Fish Harvesters 
[CCPFH], 2005). It generated approximately $2.2 billion in landed value and $4.5 billion 
in export value in 2003. Owner-operator enterprises make up a large proportion of the 
fishing industries of Canada, however, this industry is entering a critical state (CCPFH, 
2005). There are fewer incentives for new harvesters to join the fishery. Fishing used to 
be a family/ community affair. Harvesters would raise their children by taking them out 
to sea from a very young age and learn the trade by way of example. This can no longer 
be the case. Two reasons were identified during discussions: the most prominent one 
being that they could not see a future in the fishery. There were so many changes both 
within the fishery and the wider labour market, that they perceived the fishery to be 
fighting a losing battle. It would seem that the current generation of fish harvesters is 
encouraging the next generation to take up other professions that would prO\•ide more 
stable sources of income and job security. 1\lso, TC mandates that \"esscl owners and 
skippers arc responsible for familiarizing their crew with l'vfED1\ 1 tra ining. But since 
there is no funJing for !\fED.\ 1 training for teenagers, most harvesters felt unable to 
take teenagers out to . ea to learn on the job. 
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In spite of the current state of affairs of the industry and the dwindling number 
of new fish harvesters, the importance of safety-training is echoed by participants of the 
MEDA 1. This research has shown that the l\lEDA 1 is ha\-ing a measurable impact on 
participants' attitudes and knowledge toward safety. Both in-class lessons and practical 
lessons appeared to have contributed to increased knowledge, safety-awareness and 
attitudes toward several issues related to safety at sea. The study, however, needs to be 
followed up to test for long-term effects and its impact on behavioural changes. 
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DIVIDUAL CODE: MEDA 1/ 
SAFETY AT SEA: PERCEPTION AND KNOWLEDGE 
Please DO OT write your name on this questionnaire. Please answer ALL que tions to the best 
of your ability. There are no identifying questions. This survey is designed to find out what fish 
harvesters and general seafarers think and know about safety. It is divided into 4 sections. 
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Section 1: This section contains a series of biographical questions. Please answer as 
appropriate: 
I . Principle occupation? 
Fish Harvester ( ) 
Seafarer ( ) 
Other (please specify below) 
2. Gender? 
Male ( ) 
Female ( ) 
3. Age? ____________________________________________ _ 
4. Years of experience at sea? ______________________________ _ 
5. What is your role on the vessel? 
( ) 
( ) 
Crew 
Skipper 
Other (please specify below) 
6. What size boat do you usually work on? Less than 35 feet 
More than 35 feet 
( ) 
( ) 
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Section II: This section contains a series of statements about certain asuect of safetv. There 
are no right or wrong answers. Please check ONE resuonse as you believe. 
l. How important do YOU think the following factors are in causing accidents at sea? 
Accident cause Not Slightly Important Very 
Important Important Important 
a. Rough seas ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
b. Type of fish ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
c. Tiredness ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
d. Size of boat ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
e. Carelessness ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
f. Color of boat ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
g. Experience of other ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
(crew members) 
h. Time of day ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
I. level of safety awareness ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
(of crew members) 
J. Level of safety awareness ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
(of self) 
k. Overworking ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
l. Your height ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
m. Rushing ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
n. S lippery decks ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
0. Untidy decks ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
p. Water temperature ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
q. Bad luck ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
r. Sickness ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
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s. Overloading ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
t. Overpowering/speeding ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
u. Stress ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
v. Alcohol ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
W. Lack of a safety culture ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
X. Poor safety regulations ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
y. Level of safety training ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
2. Please indicate how much YOU agree or disagree with each statement. There are no right or 
wrong answers. Please check 0 E response for each answer. 
Statement Strongly Agree Don't Disagree Strongly 
Agree Know Disagree 
I. Personal floatation ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
devices should be 
worn when working on deck 
2. All boats should ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
have safety 
inspections every year 
3. Boat decks should be ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
washed down after 
each working day/end of shift 
4. When not in use ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
all fishing or deck gear 
should be stored readily on the deck 
5. A II the safety ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
equipment you are 
required to carry clutters up the boat 
6. A fisherman/seafarer ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
is less likely to have 
an accident if s/he takes safety courses 
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Statement Strongly Agree Don't Disagree Strongly 
Agree Know Disagree 
7. Fisherman/seafarer ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
should never put 
to sea in bad weather 
8. The reason I ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
carry the required 
safety equipment is so that I won't receive a fine. 
9. All too often, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
strict adherence to the 
safety rules and regulations cause more trouble than it's worth. 
I 0. The required ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
safety equipment is too expensive 
11. Many of the ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
present safety regulations 
are unrealistic and should be changed 
12. Recommended ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
safety procedures work 
until you become busy 
13. If you are worried ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
about safety you wouldn't 
get your job done 
14. The government ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
spends too much 
time and resources on safety at sea 
15. The union should ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
be more concerned 
with safety issues 
16. The RCMP/Coast ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
Guard have no business 
boarding a fishing or other vessel 
17. Fishing vessels ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
should be limited as 
to how far they can travel from shore 
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Statement Strongly Agree Don't Disagree Strongly 
Agree Know Disagree 
18. Fishing vessels ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
should be limited as 
to how much fishing gear they carry 
19. Fishing vessels ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
should be limited as 
to how much fish they carry in one trip 
20. If you follow ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
safety regulations 
you are less likely to have an accident 
21. I have gone to sea ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
in bad weather in spite 
of advice from others 
22. I am the type of ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
person who takes risks 
23. Fishing would not ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
be as enjoyable 
without the risks that are involved 
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Section III: This section contains a series of questions about safety knowledge. Please circle 
ONE response: 
I . What is the most common cause of shipboard accidents? 
I. The vessels' condition. 
2 . Equipment failure . 
3. Environmental conditions. 
4. Human error. 
2. What is the most effective means of preventing accidents? 
I. Training. 
2. The buddy system. 
3. To only use new equipment. 
4. To make sure all personnel are wearing safety equipment at all times. 
3. What is the purpose of the Muster List? 
I. To inform individuals of their place of work. 
2. To inform individuals of their responsibilities during a shipboard emergency. 
3. To inform the ship ' s officers of the cargo onboard. 
4. To inform the owners of defects onboard. 
4. When donning a life jacket, you should ensure that, 
I. You have the correct size. 
2. The straps are secured correctly. 
3. Attachments are stowed. 
4. All of the above. 
5. On a vessel you may find life jackets stored. 
I. In crew member cabins. 
2. In the engine room. 
3. In deck storage boxes. 
4. All of the above. 
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6. Which of the following may be used as a survival craft? 
I. Liferafts. 
2. Approved/suitable boats. 
3. Lifeboats. 
4. All of the above. 
7. What device is used to launch lifeboats? 
I. Travel lift. 
2. Bosun chair. 
3. Davit. 
4. Shuttle launcher. 
8. What must you ensure before you launch a Iiferaft? 
I. The anti-wicking device is removed. 
2. The painter is tied securely to a strong point on the vessel. 
3. The gripe is secured to the vessel. 
4. The painter is pulled all the way out and given a sharp tug. 
9. When do life raft pressure relief valves operate? 
I. On inflation. 
2. During decreases in temperature. 
3. Before the raft is inflated. 
4. All of the above. 
I 0. Why is the floor of a liferaft designed to be inflated? 
I. To make the raft more buoyant. 
2. To make the raft less resistance to the sea. 
3. To make the raft drift faster. 
4. To provide insulation from the water. 
II. What losses does the body suffer during survival situations? 
I. Heat. 
2. Water. 
3. Energy. 
4. All of the above. 
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12. How is a survival plan able to help survivors during a survival situation? 
I. It makes sure that all people are at the muster station before 
abandoning. 
2. It gives the survivor a list of essential tasks to be performed and 
thei r priority. 
3. It informs you exactly what to do in any situation. 
4 . It ensures that all survivors know who is in charge of the situation. 
13. During a survival situation in a survival craft, who needs to know how to use 
signaling devices? 
I. The person in charge. 
2 . The lookouts. 
3. The Master. 
4. Everyone 
14. Where should your arms be when being lifted by a rescue sling? 
I . Above your head. 
2. Wrapped around the lifting wire. 
3. Straight out at shoulder level. 
4. Firmly down in front of you with hands clasped. 
15 . What should you do if you discover your cabin is on fire? 
I. Run to the nearest washroom for a bucket of water? 
2. Attempt to remove your personal belongings. 
3. Sound the alarm, report the location, fight the fire. 
4. Start to fight the fire . 
16. What are the four parts of the fire tetrahedron? 
I. Heat, water, chemical reaction , air. 
2. Heat, water, oxygen, carbon dioxide. 
3. Heat, fue l, oxygen, chemical reaction. 
4. Heat, fuel , oxygen, vapor. 
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17. What fuel is involved in a Class B fire? 
I . Wood, paper, or cloth material. 
2. Energized electrical equipment 
3. Flammable liquids. 
4. Combustible metals. 
18. Who is responsible for safety onboard ships? 
I . The employee. 
2. The employer. 
3. The government. 
4. All of the above. 
19. What should your first priority be after abandoning a vessel? 
l . Signaling for help. 
2. Making yourself comfortable. 
3. Protecting yourself from the environment. 
4. [ssuing rations. 
20. Why are emergency drills held onboard vessels? 
1. To ensure fast crew reaction in a real emergency. 
2. To try and lessen the chance of panic in a real emergency. 
3. To try and minimize injury and loss of life during a real 
emergency. 
4. All ofthe above. 
T EF I 
173 
-----------------------------------
TEF I 
Section IV: This section contains a series of questions about safety training courses. 
Please respond as appropriate: 
I. How did you learn about this safety course? 
Media/ Advertisement ( ) 
Friends/Family ( ) 
Work recommendation ( ) 
2. Have any of your friends/colleagues taken any safety training courses at OSSC? 
Some ( ) 
Most ( ) 
None ( ) 
3. Have any of your family taken any safety training courses at OSSC? 
4. What is the one thing you wish to learn from this course? 
Some ( ) 
Most ( ) 
one ( ) 
5. What major issue regarding safety do you think needs to be addressed in training? 
6. How important are the following factors in your decision to attend this class? 
Factor Not Slightly Important Very 
Important Important Important 
a) Family or ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
friend recommendations 
b) Job requirement ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
c) Desire to improve ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
safety knowledge 
d) Regulatory ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
requirement 
e) Costoftra ining ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
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Factor Not Slightly Important Very 
Important Important Important 
f) Lack oftime ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
g) Duration of training ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
h) Location ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
i) Personal interest ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
j) Fear ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
k) Level of literacy ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
I) Other (please specify) 
7. Have you previously attended any safety training courses? Yes ( ) 
No ( ) 
8. Do you feel you have sufficient knowledge to work safely aboard a vessel? 
Yes ( ) 
No ( ) 
9. Do you feel that your colleagues have sufficient knowledge to work safely aboard 
a vessel? Yes ( ) 
No ( ) 
I 0. Do you know of anyone else who could benefit from this course? Yes ( ) 
II. If yes, do you know why they have not registered for this course? 
12. Are you interested in further safety training? 
13 . Are you willing to serve on a local safety committee? 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No ( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
14. Do you have ideas that could improve safety in the fi shery? Yes ( ) 
0 ( ) 
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15. If yes. have you ever been given the opportunity to voice your ideas? Yes ( ) 
No ( ) 
16. Do you think fish harvester/general seafarers should take a course in safety? 
Yes ( ) 
No ( ) 
17. Do you think safety concern is a personal issue, a governmental issue or both? 
18. Do you think safety training helps in real situations? 
Personal ( ) 
Governmental ( ) 
Both ( ) 
Yes 
No 
( ) 
( ) 
20. What element of the course would you find particularly helpful? (Please be 
specific) 
21. What according to you would be the best part of this course? (Please be specific) 
22. What according to you would be the worst part of this course? (Please be specific) 
************************************************************************ 
Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire. Please check to see that you 
have answered ALL the questions. If you would like to add anything futther, please write 
below. Please return your questionnaire to your instructor or to the researcher. 
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APPENDIXB 
POST-TRAINING QUESTIONNAIRE: STANDARD GROUP 
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INDIVIDUAL CODE: MEDA 1/ 
SAFETY AT SEA: PERCEPTION AND KNOWLEDGE 
Please DO NOT write your name on this questionnaire. Please answer ALL questions to the best 
of your ability. There are no identifying questions. This survey is designed to find out what fish 
harvesters and general seafarers think and know about safety. It is divided into 3 sections. 
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Section II: This section contains a series of statements about certain as12ect of safet_y. There 
are no right or wrong answers. Please check ONE res12onse as _you believe. 
1. How important do YOU think the following factors are in causing accidents at sea? 
Accident cause Not Slightly Important Very 
Important Important Important 
z. Rough seas ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
aa. Type of fish ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
bb. Tiredness ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
cc. Size of boat ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
dd. Carelessness ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
ee. Color of boat ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
ff. Experience of other ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
(crew members) 
gg. Time of day ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
hh. level of safety awareness ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
(of crew members) 
II. Level of safety awareness ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
(of self) 
JJ. Overworking ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
kk. Your height ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
II. Rushing ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
mm. Slippery decks ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
nn. Untidy decks ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
oo. Water temperature ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
pp. Bad luck ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
qq. Sickness ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
rr. Overloading ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
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ss. Overpowering/speeding ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
tt. Stress ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
uu. Alcohol ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
vv. Lack of a safety culture ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
ww. Poor safety regulations ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
xx. Level of safely training ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
2. Please indicate how much YOU agree or disagree with each statement. There are no right or 
wrong answers. Please check ONE response for each answer. 
Statement Strongly Agree Don't Disagree Strongly 
Agree Know Disagree 
I. Personal floatation ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
devices should be 
worn when working on deck 
2. All boats should ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
have safety 
inspections every year 
3. Boat decks should be ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
washed down after 
each working day/end of shift 
4. When not in use ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
all fishing or deck gear 
should be stored readi ly on the deck 
5. All the safety ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
equipment you are 
required to carry clutters up the boat 
6. A fi sherman/seafarer ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
is less likely to have 
an accident if s/he takes safety courses 
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Statement Strongly Agree Don't Disagree Strongly 
Agree Know Disagree 
7. Fisherman/seafarer ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
should never put 
to sea in bad weather 
8. The reason I ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
carry the required 
safety equipment is so that I won't receive a fine. 
9. All too often, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
strict adherence to the 
safety rules and regulations cause more trouble than it' s worth. 
I 0. The required ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
safety equipment is too expensive 
II. Many ofthe ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
present safety regulations 
are unrealistic and should be changed 
12. Recommended ( ) ( ) 
safety procedures work 
( ) ( ) ( ) 
until you become busy 
13. If you are worried ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
about safety you wouldn't 
get your job done 
14. The government ( ) ( ) 
spends too much 
( ) ( ) ( ) 
time and resources on safety at sea 
15. The union should ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
be more concerned 
with safety issues 
16. The RCMP/Coast ( ) ( ) 
Guard have no business 
( ) ( ) ( ) 
boarding a fishing or other vessel 
17. Fishing vessels ( ) ( ) 
should be limited as 
( ) ( ) ( ) 
to how far they can travel from shore 
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Statement Strongly Agree Don't Disagree Strongly 
Agree Know Disagree 
18. Fishing vessels ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
should be limited as 
to how much fishing gear they carry 
19. Fishing vessels ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
should be limited as 
to how much fish they carry in one trip 
20. lfyou follow ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
safety regulations 
you are less likely to have an accident 
21 . I have gone to sea ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
in bad weather in spite 
of advice from others 
22. I am the type of ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
person who takes risks 
23. Fishing would not ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
be as enjoyable 
without the risks that are involved 
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Section II: This section contains a series of questions about safety knowledge. Please circle 
ONE response: 
I. What is the most common cause of shipboard accidents? 
I. The vessels ' condition. 
2. Equipment failure. 
3. Environmental conditions. 
4. Human error. 
2. What is the most effective means of preventing accidents? 
I. Training. 
2. The buddy system. 
3. To only use new equipment. 
4. To make sure all personnel are wearing safety equipment at all times. 
3. What is the purpose of the Muster List? 
I . To inform individuals oftheir place of work. 
2. To inform individuals of their responsibilities during a shipboard emergency. 
3. To inform the ship's officers of the cargo onboard. 
4 . To inform the owners of defects onboard. 
4. When donning a life jacket, you should ensure that, 
I. You have the correct size. 
2. The straps are secured correctly. 
3. Attachments are stowed. 
4. All of the above. 
5. On a vessel you may find life jackets stored. 
I. In crew member cabins. 
2. In the eng ine room. 
3. In deck storage boxes. 
4. All of the above. 
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6. Which of the following may be used as a survival craft? 
I. Liferafts. 
2. Approved/suitable boats. 
3. Lifeboats. 
4. A II of the above. 
7. What device is used to launch lifeboats? 
I . Travel lift. 
2. Bosun chair. 
3. Davit. 
4. Shuttle launcher. 
8. What must you ensure before you launch a liferaft? 
I . The anti-wicking device is removed. 
2. The painter is tied securely to a strong point on the vessel. 
3. The gripe is secured to the vessel. 
4. The painter is pulled all the way out and given a sharp tug. 
9. When do life raft pressure reliefvalves operate? 
1. On inflation. 
2. During decreases in temperature. 
3. Before the raft is inflated. 
4. All of the above. 
I 0. Why is the floor of a liferaft designed to be inflated? 
I . To make the raft more buoyant. 
2. To make the raft less resistance to the sea. 
3. To make the raft drift faster. 
4. To provide insulation from the water. 
II. What losses does the body suffer during survival situations? 
I . Heat. 
2. Water. 
3. Energy. 
4. A II of the above. 
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12. How is a survival plan able to help survivors during a survival situation? 
5. It makes sure that all people are at the muster station before 
abandoning. 
6. It gives the survivor a list of essential tasks to be performed and 
their priority. 
7. It informs you exactly what to do in any situation. 
8. It ensures that all survivors know who is in charge of the situation. 
14. During a survival situation in a survival craft, who needs to know how to use 
signaling devices? 
5. The person in charge. 
6. The lookouts. 
7. The Master. 
8. Everyone 
14. Where should your arms be when being lifted by a rescue sling? 
I. Above your head. 
2. Wrapped around the lifting wire. 
3. Straight out at shoulder level. 
4. Firmly down in front of you with hands clasped. 
15. What should you do if you discover your cabin is on fire? 
5. Run to the nearest washroom for a bucket of water? 
6. Attempt to remove your personal belongings. 
7. Sound the alarm, report the location, fight the fire. 
8. Start to fight the fire. 
16. What are the four parts of the fire tetrahedron? 
I. Heat, water, chemical reaction, air. 
2. Heat. water, oxygen, carbon dioxide. 
3. Heat, fuel , oxygen, chemical reaction. 
4 . Heat, fuel , oxygen, vapor. 
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17. What fuel is involved in a Class B fire? 
5. Wood, paper, or cloth material. 
6. Energized electrical equipment 
7. Flammable liquids. 
8. Combustible metals. 
18. Who is responsible for safety onboard ships? 
I. The employee. 
2. The employer. 
3. The government. 
4. All of the above. 
19. What should your first priority be after abandoning a vessel? 
5. Signaling for help. 
6. Making yourself comfortable. 
7. Protecting yourself from the environment. 
8. Issuing rations. 
20. Why are emergency drills held onboard vessels? 
5. To ensure fast crew reaction in a real emergency. 
6. To try and lessen the chance of panic in a real emergency. 
7. To try and minimize injury and loss of life during a real 
emergency. 
8. All ofthe above. 
TEF I 
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Section III: This section contains a series of questions about safety training courses. 
Please respond as appropriate: 
19. What was a new lesson for you in this course? Please be specific. 
20. What major issue regarding safety do you think needs to be addressed in training? 
21. Do you feel you have sufficient knowledge to work safely aboard a vessel? 
Yes ( ) 
No ( ) 
22. Do you feel that your colleagues have sufficient knowledge to work safely aboard 
a vessel? Yes ( ) 
No ( ) 
23. Do you know of anyone else who could benefit from this course? Yes ( ) 
24. If yes, do you know why they have not registered for this course? 
25. Are you interested in further safety training? Yes 
No 
No ( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
26. Do you think fish harvester/general seafarers should take a course in safety? 
Yes ( ) 
0 ( ) 
27. Do you think safety training helps in real situations? Yes ( ) 
No ( ) 
I 0. What element of the course did you find particularly helpful? (Please be spec ific) 
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II . What according to you would be the best part of this course? (Please be specific) 
12. What according to you would be the worst part of this course? (Please be specific) 
13. What did you think of the following aspect of the course? 
a) Classroom 
Discussions 
---------------------------------------------------------
b) Classroom 
Pressentations 
-------------------------------------------------------
c) Practical 
Exercises 
-----------------------------------------------------------
************************************************************************ 
Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire. Please check to see that you 
have answered ALL the questions. Jfyou would like to add anything further, please write 
below. Please return your questionnaire to your instructor or to the researcher. 
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APPENDIXC 
POST-TRAINING QUESTIONNAIRE: ENHANCED GROUP 
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INDIVIDUAL CODE: MEDA 1/ 
SAFETY AT SEA: PERCEPTION AND KNOWLEDGE 
Please DO NOT write your name on this questionnaire. Please answer ALL questions to the best 
of your ability. There are no identifying questions. This survey is designed to find out what fish 
harvesters and general seafarers think and know about safety. It is divided into 3 sections. 
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Section II: This section contains a series of statements about certain as[!ect of safety. There 
are no right or wrong answers. Please check ONE response as you believe. 
I. How imp01tant do YOU think the following factors are in causing accidents at sea? 
Accident cause Not Slightly Important Very 
Important Important Important 
yy. Rough seas ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
zz. Type of fish ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
aaa. Tiredness ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
bbb. Size of boat ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
CCC. Carelessness ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
ddd. Color of boat ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
eee. Other crew members ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
fff. Time of day ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
ggg. level of safety awareness ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
(of crew members) 
hhh. Level of safety awareness ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
(of self) 
iii. Overworking ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
jjj. Your height ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
kkk. Rushing ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
Ill. S I i ppery decks ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
mmm. Untidy decks ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
nnn . Water temperature ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
000. Bad luck ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
ppp. Sickness ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
qqq. Overloading ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
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rrr. Overpowering/speeding ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
sss. Stress ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
ttt. Alcohol ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
uuu. Lack of a safety culture ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
vvv. Poor safety regulations ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
www. Level of safety training ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
2. Please indicate how much YOU agree or disagree with each statement. There are no right or 
wrong answers. Please check ONE response for each answer. 
Statement Strongly Agree Don't Disagree Strongly 
Agree Know Disagree 
I. Personal floatation ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
devices should be 
worn when working on deck 
2. All boats shou ld ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
have safety 
inspections every year 
3. Boat decks should be ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
washed down after 
each working day/end of shift 
4. When not in use ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
all fishing or deck gear 
should be stored readily on the deck 
5. All the safety ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
equipment you are 
required to carry clutters up the boat 
6. A fisherman/seafarer ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
is less likely to have 
an accident if s/he takes safety courses 
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Statement Strongly Agree Don't Disagree Strongly 
Agree Know Disagree 
7. Fisherman/seafarer ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
should never put 
to sea in bad weather 
8. The reason I ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
carry the required 
safety equipment is so that I won't receive a fine. 
9. A II too often, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
strict adherence to the 
safety rules and regulations cause more trouble than it's worth. 
I 0. The required ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
safety equipment is too expensive 
II. Many ofthe ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
present safety regulations 
are unrealistic and should be changed 
12. Recommended ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
safety procedures work 
unti I you become busy 
13 . If you are worried ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
about safety you wouldn't 
get your job done 
14. The government ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
spends too much 
time and resources on safety at sea 
15. The union should ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
be more concerned 
with safety issues 
16. The RCMP/Coast ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
Guard have no business 
boarding a fishing or other vessel 
17. Fishing vessels ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
shou ld be limited as 
to how far they can travel from shore 
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Statement Strongly Agree Don't Disagree Strongly 
Agree Know Disagree 
18. Fishing vessels ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
should be limited as 
to how much fishing gear they carry 
19. Fishing vessels ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
should be limited as 
to how much fish they carry in one trip 
20. lfyou follow ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
safety regulations 
you are less likely to have an accident 
21. I have gone to sea ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
in bad weather in spite 
of advice from others 
22. I am the type of ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
person who takes risks 
23. Fishing would not ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
be as enjoyable 
without the risks that are involved 
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Section II: This section contains a series of questions about safety knowledge. Please circle 
ONE response: 
I. What is the most common cause of shipboard accidents? 
I. The vessels ' condition. 
2. Equipment failure. 
3. Environmental conditions. 
4. Human error. 
2. What is the most effective means of preventing accidents? 
l. Training. 
2. The buddy system. 
3. To only use new equipment. 
4. To make sure all personnel are wearing safety equipment at all times. 
3. What is the purpose of the Muster List? 
I . To inform individuals of their place of work. 
2. To inform individuals of their responsibilities during a shipboard emergency. 
3. To inform the ship's officers of the cargo onboard. 
4. To inform the owners of defects onboard. 
4. When donning a life jacket, you should ensure that, 
I. You have the correct size. 
2. The straps are secured correctly. 
3. Attachments are stowed. 
4. All ofthe above. 
5. On a vessel you may find life jackets stored. 
I . In crew member cabins. 
2. In the engine room. 
3. In deck storage boxes. 
4. All of the above. 
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6. Which of the following may be used as a survival craft? 
I. Liferafts. 
2 . Approved/suitable boats. 
3 . Lifeboats. 
4 . All ofthe above. 
7. What device is used to launch lifeboats? 
I. Travel lift. 
2. Bosun chair. 
3. Davit. 
4. Shuttle launcher. 
8. What must you ensure before you launch a liferaft? 
I. The anti-wicking device is removed. 
2. The painter is tied securely to a strong point on the vessel. 
3. The gripe is secured to the vessel. 
4. The painter is pulled all the way out and given a sharp tug. 
9. When do life raft pressure relief valves operate? 
I. On inflation. 
2. During decreases in temperature. 
3. Before the raft is inflated. 
4. All ofthe above. 
I 0. Why is the floor of a Iiferaft designed to be inflated? 
l. To make the raft more buoyant. 
2. To make the raft less resistance to the sea. 
3. To make the raft drift faster. 
4. To provide insulation from the water. 
II. What losses does the body suffer during survival situations? 
I. Heat. 
2 . Water. 
3. Energy. 
4 . All of the above. 
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12. How is a survival plan able to help survivors during a survival situation? 
9. It makes sure that all people are at the muster station before 
abandoning. 
I 0. It gives the survivor a list of essential tasks to be performed and 
their priority. 
II. It informs you exactly what to do in any situation. 
12. It ensures that all survivors know who is in charge of the situation. 
15. During a survival situation in a survival craft, who needs to know how to use 
signaling devices? 
9. The person in charge. 
10. The lookouts. 
I 1 . The Master. 
12. Everyone 
14. Where should your arms be when being lifted by a rescue sling? 
I. Above your head. 
2. Wrapped around the lifting wire. 
3. Straight out at shoulder level. 
4. Firmly down in front of you with hands clasped. 
15. What should you do if you discover your cabin is on fire? 
9. Run to the nearest washroom for a bucket of water? 
I 0. Attempt to remove your personal belongings. 
II. Sound the alarm, report the location, fight the fire. 
12. Start to fight the fire. 
16. What are the four parts of the fire tetrahedron? 
I. Heat, water. chemical reaction, a ir. 
2. Heat, water, oxygen, carbon dioxide. 
3. Heat, fuel, oxygen, chemical reaction. 
4. Heat fuel, oxygen, vapor. 
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17. What fuel is involved in a Class B fire? 
9. Wood, paper, or cloth material. 
I 0. Energized electrical equipment 
II. Flammable liquids. 
12. Combustible metals. 
18. Who is responsible for safety onboard ships? 
I. The employee. 
2. The employer. 
3. The government. 
4. All of the above. 
19. What should your first priority be after abandoning a vessel? 
9. Signaling for help. 
I 0. Making yourself comfortable. 
II . Protecting yourself from the environment. 
12. [ssuing rations. 
20. Why are emergency drills held onboard vessels? 
9. To ensure fast crew reaction in a real emergency. 
I 0. To try and lessen the chance of panic in a real emergency. 
11. To try and minimize injury and loss of life during a real 
emergency. 
12. All ofthe above. 
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Section III: This section contains a series of questions about safetv training courses. 
Please respond as appropriate: 
28. What was a new lesson for you in this course? Please be specific. 
29. What major issue regarding safety do you think needs to be addressed in training? 
30. Do you feel you have sufficient knowledge to work safely aboard a vessel? 
Yes ( ) 
No ( ) 
31. Do you feel that your colleagues have sufficient knowledge to work safely aboard 
a vessel? Yes ( ) 
0 
32. Do you know of anyone else who could benefit from this course? Yes 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
33. [fyes, do you know why they have not registered for this course? 
34. Are you interested in further safety training? Yes 
0 
0 
( ) 
( ) 
35. Do you think fish harvester/general seafarers should take a course in safety? 
36. Do you think safety training helps in real situations? Yes 
No 
Yes ( ) 
No ( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
I 0. What element of the course did you find particularly helpful? (Please be specific) 
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I I. What according to you would be the best part of this course? (Please be specific) 
12. What according to you would be the worst part of this course? (Please be specific) 
13. What did you think of the following aspect of the course? 
a) Classroom 
Discussions 
---------------------------------------------------------
b) Classroom 
Pressentations 
c) Practical 
Exercises 
-------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------
d) Video Clips on 
Sa~cy ____________________________________________________ _ 
************************************************************************ 
Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire. Please check to see that you 
have answered ALL the questions. If you would like to add anything further, please write 
below. Please return your questionnaire to your instructor or to the researcher. 
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APPENDIXE 
CONSENT FORM: STANDARD GROUP 
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October 2003 
Faculty of Medicine, Schools of Nursing and Pharmacy of Memorial 
University of Newfoundland; Health Care Corporation, St. John 's; Newfoundland 
Cancer Treatment and Resea rch Foundation 
Consent to Take Part in Health Research 
TITLE: Impact of Safety Training on l:..ish Harvesters' and General Seafarers' 
Knowledge and Perception of Safety 
INVESTIGATOR(S): Sophia] as min Shaikh 
SPONSOR: Safety Net 
You have been invited to take part in a research study. It is up to you to decide 
whether to be in the study or not. Before you decide, you need to understand what 
the study is for, what risks you might take and what benefits you might receive. 
This consent form explains the study. 
The researchers will: 
• discuss the study with you 
• answer your questions 
• keep confidential any information which could identify you personally 
• be available during the study to deal with problems and answer questions 
If you decide not to take part or to leave the study this will not a ffect your student 
status or work status 
1. Introduction/Background: 
As you may already be aware, commercial fishing is known as one of the most 
dangerous occupations in Canada. r\ survey of fish harvester in Newfoundland 
in the early 90's found that all those who were surveyed had incurred some 
form of injury in the fishing industry. Research in other industries shows that 
safety training is beneficial and that a lack of safety training or even inadequate 
training can lead to injury and death of workers. There is, however, no 
published literature evaluating the effectiveness of safety training programs in 
the Newfoundland fishery. j\ s training courses arc now mandatory for all 
seafarers (including fish harvesters) and it is a cost and time inYestment for 
both the individual and the gO\·ernmcnt, it is essential to investigate the 
effectiveness of these programs. 
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2. Purpose of study: 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the impact of safety training. 
3. Description of the study procedures and tests: 
1\ s a participant of safety training, you are asked to complete questionnaires 
and participate in group discussions regarding safety issues before and after 
your lesson. The group discussions will be audio taped. 
4. Length of time: 
Questionnaires and group discussions will be integrated as part of the course 
and will last approximately 1 hour. 
5. Possible risks and discomforts: 
Time involved may be a discomfort. There are no anticipated risks. If you feel 
discomfort as a result of the research, you may withdraw at any time. 
6. Benefits: 
No direct benefits will accrue to participants other than the knowledge and 
satisfaction of potentially contributing to safety training. 
7. Liability statement: 
Signing this form gives us your consent to be in this study. It tells us that you 
understand the information about the research study. When you sign this form, 
you do not give up your legal rights. Researchers or agencies involved in this 
research study still have their legal and professional responsibilities. 
8. Confidentiality: 
All information regarding this study will be kept confidential. We will destroy 
any identifying information and only data pertaining to the study will be kept in 
password protected computer flies. 
9. Questions: 
If you have any questions about taking part in this study, you can meet with the 
investigator who is in charge of the study at this institution. That person is: 
Sophia J. Shaikh. Email: u65sjs@mun.ca 
Or you can talk to someone who is not involved with the study at all, but can 
advise you on your rights as a participant in a research study. This person can 
be reached through: 
Office of the Human Investigation Committee (HI C) at 709-777-6974 
Email: hicra mun.ca 
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Signature Page 
Study title: Impact of Safety Training on Fish Harvesters Knowledge and Perception 
of Safety 
Name of principal investigator: Sophia Jasmin Shaikh 
To be filled out and signed by the participant: 
I have read the consent [and information sheet] . 
I have had the opportunity to ask questions/to discuss this study. 
I have received satisfactory answers to all of my questions. 
I have received enough information about the study. 
I have spoken to Sophia Shaikh and she has answered my questions 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study 
• at any time 
• without having to give a reason 
• without affecting my future student status 
Please check as appropriate: 
Yes { } o { } 
Yes { } No { } 
Yes { } No { } 
Yes { } No { } 
Yes { } No { } 
Yes { } o { } 
I understand that it is my choice to be in the study and that I may not benefit. Yes { } No { } 
I agree to take part in this study. Yes { } No { } 
Signature of participant Date 
ignature of witness Date 
To be signed by the investigator: 
I have explained this study to the best of my ability. I invited questions and gave answers. I 
believe that the participant fully understands what is involved in being in the study, any potential 
risks of the study and that he or she has freely chosen to be in the study. 
Signature of investigator Date 
Telephone number: 
Assent of minor participant (if appropriate): 
ignature of minor participant Date 
Relationship to participant named above Age 
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CONSENT FORM: ENHANCED GROUP 
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October 2003 
Faculty of Medicine, Schools of Nursing and Pharmacy of Memorial 
University of Newfoundland; Health Care Corporation, St. John 's; Newfoundland 
Cancer Treatment and Research Foundation 
Consent to Take Part in Health Research 
TITLE: Impact of Safety Training on Fish Harvesters' and General Seafarers' 
Knowledge and Perception of Safety 
INVESTIGATOR(S): Sophia Jasmin Shaikh 
SPONSOR: Safety Net 
You have been invited to take part in a research study. It is up to you to decide 
whether to be in the study or not. Before you decide, you need to understand what 
the study is for, what risks you might take and what benefits you might receive. 
This consent form explains the study. 
The researchers will: 
• discuss the study with you 
• answer your questions 
• keep confidential any information which could identify you personally 
• be available during the study to deal with problems and answer questions 
If you decide not to take part or to leave the study this will not affect your student 
status or work status 
2. Introduction/Background: 
As you may already be aware, commercial fishing is known as one of the most 
dangerous occupations in Canada. A survey of fish harvester in Newfoundland 
in the early 90's found that all those who were surveyed had incurred some 
form of injury in the fishing industry Research in other industries shows that 
safety training is beneficial and that a lack of safety training or even inadequate 
training can lead to injury and death of workers. There is, however, no 
published literature evaluating the effectiveness of safety training programs in 
the Newfoundland fishery. ,\ s training courses are now mandatory for all 
seafarers (including fish harvesters) and it is a cost and time im'Cstment for 
both the indi,i.dual and the governm<..:nt, it is essential to investigate the 
effecti\'eness of these programs. 
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2. Purpose of study: 
The purpose o f this study is to eYaluate the impact of safety training. 
3. Description of the study procedures and tests: 
1\ s a participant of safety training, you are asked to complete questionnaires 
and participate in group discussions regarding safety issues before and after 
your lesson. Your lesson will include video clips on safety. The group 
discussions will be audio taped. 
4. Length of time: 
Questionnaires and group discussions will be integrated as part of the course 
and will last approximately 1 hour. 
5. Possible risks and discomforts: 
Time involved may be a discomfort. There are no anticipated risks. If you feel 
discomfort as a result of the research, you may withdraw at any time. 
6. Benefits: 
No direct benefits will accrue to participants other than the knowledge and 
satisfaction of potentially contributing to safety training. 
7. Liability statement: 
Signing this form gives us your consent to be in this study. It tells us that you 
understand the information about the research study. When you sign this form, 
you do not give up your legal rights. Researchers or agencies involved in this 
research study still have their legal and professional responsibilities. 
8. Confidentiality: 
All information regarding this study will be kept confidential. We will destroy 
any identifying information and only data pertaining to the study \.vill be kept in 
password protected computer files. 
9. Questions: 
If you have any questions about taking part in this study, you can meet with the 
investigator who is in charge of the study at this institution. That person is: 
Sophia J. Shaikh. Email: u65sjs@mun.ca 
Or you can talk to someone who is not involved with the study at all, but can 
advise you on your rights as a participant in a research study. This person can 
be reached through: 
Office of the Human Investigation Committee (HIC) at 709-777-6974 
Email: h icrti' m u n.ca 
208 
Signature Page 
Study title: Impact of Safety Training on Fish Harvesters Knowledge and Perception 
of Safety 
Name of principal investigator: Sophia Jasmin Shaikh 
To be filled out and signed by the participant: 
I have read the consent [and information sheet). 
I have had the opportunity to ask questions/to discuss this study. 
I have received satisfactory answers to all of my questions. 
I have received enough information about the study. 
I have spoken to Sophia Shaikh and she has answered my questions 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study 
• at any time 
• without having to give a reason 
• without affecting my future student status 
Please check as appropriate: 
Yes { } No { } 
Yes { } No { } 
Yes { } No { } 
Yes { } No { } 
Yes { } No { } 
Yes { } No { } 
I understand that it is my choice to be in the study and that I may not benefit. Yes { } No { } 
r agree to take part in this study. Yes { } No { } 
Signature of participant Date 
Signature ofwitness Date 
To be signed by the investigator: 
I have explained this study to the best of my ability. I invited questions and gave answers. I 
believe that the participant fully understands what is involved in being in the study, any potential 
risks of the study and that he or she has freely chosen to be in the study. 
Signature of investigator Date 
Telephone number: 
Assent of minor participant (if appropriate): 
Signature of minor participant Date 
Relationship to participant named above Age 
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APPENDIXG 
FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONS 
2 10 
GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDELINES (BEFORE) 
I. How did you hear about this safety training course? 
2. Have you previously attended this safety training course? Have you attended any 
other safety training courses? 
2. Do you know anyone who has taken this safety training course? 
3. Why did you choose to register for this course? What encouraged you to come? 
4. Do you know anything about this course? 
5. Are there any specific lessons you are interested to learn from this course? 
6. Are safety training courses of any use in real life? 
GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDELINES (AFTER) 
I. What are some of the lessons that were new to you? Can you state at least one 
new lesson? 
2. Did you achieve what you came for? Do you think this added to your knowledge 
of safety? 
3. Do you think there should be more safety training? 
4. Did any of the lessons change your perception of safety? 
5. Would you encourage others to attend? 
6. Can anyone remember any video clips? (ONLY FOR THE EXPERIMENTAL 
GROUP) 
6. What did you think of the video clips on safety? (ONLY FOR THE 
EXPERIMENTAL GROUP) 
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